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II
ABSTRACI
The principal aim of this study is to produce a methodology
for the economic appraisal of management information. It
is not claimed that the methodology will work for all
management information but it is considered appropriate in
the majority of cases.
The first stage in the methodology is the production of a
management information needs framework. This framework
will have at least two level; management's present and
management's potential information needs. The information
needs framework is then extended into an information value
and cost framework. This extension is carried out by first
ordering the needs framework in order of importance to the
manager of the information. One of three methods of valua-
tion can then be used to place a value on the information
which enables its economic viability to be determined.
A series of empirical studies were carried out to determine
how successfully such a methodology can be operated by
management. These empirical studies indicated that mana-
gement can determine information needs reasonably success-
fully although they might need assistance to estimate
potential information needs. The studies also suggested
that management have problems in determining quantitative
values and costs and so would need some form of training
programme to carry out this part of the methodology. The
thesis also contains a number of case studies relating to
specific management information problems.
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1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.
The principal aim of this study is to produce a method-
ology for the economic appraisal of management inform-
ation. It is not suggested that the following method-
ology will work for all management information but it is
considered appropriate to the large majority of manage-
ment information. The methodology involves the determ-
ination of managers' inform~tion needs. This information
is then valued and costed to determine the information's
economic viability.
The study is split into three main parts these being
chapters two, three and four. Chapter two covers the
analytical background of the study containing definitions
of the process of management, management information and
management information systems. This chapter also contains
sections on the measurement of uncertainty, decision
analysis and simulation. Chapter three is the central
core of the study in which a methodology for the economic
appraisal of management information is developed. This
methodology is based on the determination of managers'
information needs, then the valuation and costing of this
information to determine its economic viability. Chapter
four reports on the empirical studies carried out to test
the effectiveness of the methodology. The work in this
chapter summarises the studies the bulk of the study
material being given in Appendices A to f.
2The fifth and final chapter of the study summarises the
conclusions.
31.1. INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER TWO.
Chapter two provides the analytical background of the
study. It establishes the basis on which the other
chapters are built.
The first section of the chapter examines the processes
involved within management. It is important when talking
of management information to have a clear understanding of
the function of management. Two definitions of the work
of management are given, the first being the classical
definition based around three activities: Planning,
Motivating and Decision Making. The second is a definition
outlined by Mintzberg (1973) who suggests that management's
work is based on three roles: Interpersonal Roles,
Informational Roles and Decisional Roles. If a compre-
hensive definition of management is to be produced then
both definitions will be required. The classical defini-
tion using such activities as planning, motivating and
decision making provides a good vehicle for looking at
management systems. It will not work too well when talking
to individual managers because the managers do not think
in the terms used in the definition. When talking to
individual managers the terms used by Mintzberg will have
more direct meaning. The problem with Mintzberg's defini-
tion is that it is difficult to apply to management
systems. Therefore to'provide a comprehensive definition
the classical definition i~ best used when describing
managment systems, and Mintzberg's management roles are
best used when talking to the individual manager about
4his job and in describing the individual manager's job.
The second section of the chapter provides a definition of
management information. It draws a distinction between
information and data although this distinction is seldom
made by managers in practice. The ways in which manage-
mant information can be subdivided are then examined.
Information can be concerned with the internal or the
external environment. It can be formal information or data
ie. information or data committed to record or as part of
a formal system of the organisation (this is using the
term recorded in the accepted management sense ie. ledgers,
files, computer. tapes, and discs, etc.). It can be informal
information and data that is not part of any formal system
of tha organisation. It can be committed to 'record' or
to an individual's brain and usually it is available to a
limited number of individuals and not the organisation as
a whole (here the term record is used in the sense of an
individual manager's record which will be available only
to the manager or a limited number of individuals). There
can be a third class of management information and data
this being potential information and data although by
definition some of this will fall outside the management
information of the organisation.
The third section provides a definition of a management
information system which can be briefly defined as: a
series of entities which help the process of management by
the provision of information and data, or in soma cases
5hinder the process of management by the provision of
misinformation, either due to poor information or data or
the variable nature of the data. A management information
system must by this definition be a large complex system
made ~p of a large number of sUb-systems some of which
could be dynamic (especially informal systems). The Manag-
ement Information System must be able to provide infor-
mation and data about the internal and external environ-
ment at both a formal and informal level. It must also
be able to deal with the possibility of potential infor-
mation and data.
These first three sections provide definition of the process
of management, management information and management infor-
mation systems to be used in the sections and chapters
to follow. The last three sections of this chapter fulfill
a slightly different need. An important principal to
remember when providing information is to provide the know-
ledge for the understanding of that information before the
information itself. Within this thesis I shall attempt to
practice what I preach. These three sections are intended
to provide the background knowledge to help the reader to
understand better some sections,i~ chapter three.
Section four examines the measurement of uncertainty
within the management field. It compares different ways
of measuring uncertainty: words, odds, proportions and
probabilities, and then gives the basic laws of probab-
ility (including Bayes' Theorom). Subjective probabilities
6are then considered as a basis for the setting of probab-
ilities within certain areas of the management field and
a series of heuristics are considered. Uncertainty is
important when considering the value of information. The
value of some information is accrued because this infor-
mation reduces the amount of uncertainty, to consider this
redu ct Ion methods of _uncB_rtail'ltymeasu rement .mu_st.be used.
A knowledge of probability theory is also required to
fully understand decision analysis which is used in chapter
three as a method of valuation.
Section five of chapter two develops decision analysis
from classical statistical decision analysis to the anal-
ysis of decision trees. Also considered is Bayesian
Decision Theory, and the relationship between decision
trees, simulation and other quantitative techniques.
The final section of the chapter, section six, examines
simulation a technique whose use is considered a number of
times in chapter three. The section starts by looking at
the different types of simulation models ie. iconic, anal-
ogue and symbolic. It then considers the construction,
verification and validation of simulation models. The
application of simulation models in prediction is consid-
ered as a means of providing of information to management.
Interactive simulations are also considered for they can
be used to train managers in the setting of subjective
probabilities and in the subjective setting of information
value and costs. The final part of this section considers
7the simulation of information systems which can vary from
simple an~~ogue models.showing typical information systems
outputs to full scale simulated running of the system to
verify and validate the system and its relationship to
its environment.
81.2. INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER THREE.
This chapter is the core of the study and outlines the
production of a methodology for the economic appraisal of
management information. It builds on the analytical
background covered in chapter two.
The chapter starts ruith an examination of some of the
myths surrounding management information. The ten myths
of Tricker (1971) and the five myths of Ackoff (1967)
are used as a base within this section.
In the summary of this first section there are listed
twelve pitfalls that should be avoided when information
systems are designed.
The second section of the chapter examines some basic
concepts in the economic appraisal of management infor-
mation. Six factors are listed which are to be taken into
account when information is valued, these being: time, the
speed at which the information can be obtained and is
required; knowledge, the knowledge level of the recipient/s
of the information; prior information, the amount and type
of other information that is available to assist with the
decision the piece of information is to be used for;
accuracy, the accuracy of the information (this may be
subjective dependent on personality); quantity, the size
of the piece of information or the amount of information
available for a particular decision; and finally power,
information can be closely linked to power, and as a result
9this may enhance the value of the information to the
individual but not necessarily to the organisation.
The main part of the production of methodology now starts
with section three the determination of the information
needs of managers. The information will have to be split
into at least two levels. The, first being to determine
the present information needs of managers. This can be
partially carried out by using systems and 0 & M techniq-
ues of interviews, diaries, etc., and charting the infor-
mation flows that exist in the organisation at present.
Although this approach can be considered a step in the
right direction the existing information flows do not
necessarily represent managers' present information needs.
The existing information may not give all the information
the manager needs and it may give some information the
manager does not need or some information the manager does
not understand. The existing information can only be turned
into a true reflection of management's present inform-
ation needs by careful discussion with managers. Care
should be taken not to ask simplistic questions such as
'what information do you need' otherwise simplistic answ-
ers such as 'I do not know' or 'all the information you
can give me' will be given. Managers need information to
carry out their functions so any discussion of information
needs must relate to this function. The second level of
information needs are managers' potential information needs.
Needs at this level are more difficult to determine because
the managers may only have a vague notion of them due to
10
incomplete knowledge. To get a picture of this second
level of needs various specialists may need to take part
in the discussions. This second level needs to be examined
so as to build into the present system the flexibility to
expand as managers' knowledge expands bearing in mind that
knowledge should always precede information.
Having determined the information needs the next stage of
methodology is to determine its value and this is consid-
ered in section four of this chapter. Having determined
that the information is needed has by implication put a
value on it. However, merely to say it has value is not
sufficient the value needs to be quantified. In the
fourth section four methods of valuing information are
examined, the first being what has been called the class-
ical approach that of statistical decision theory. This
approach is that suggested by the majority of references
to the valuing of information. It uses classical decision
theory and/or Bayesian analysis to arrive at a value. The
second method of valuation of information uses simulation
models but due to the expense of producing such models
they are unlikely to have any practical application.
However, simulations do have an application in interactive
gaming simUlation used in the training of managers in some
of the heuristics in method four. The third method has
been called the accounting approach to information valuing.
There are two approaches within this method of valuation;
first to determine the cost of not having the information
and then equating this cost to a value and second to
11
determine the savings accrued due to using the information
i.e. the savings from carrying out a project. The fourt.h
method is by using ft series of estimation heuristics to
arrive at a value. In putting a value on all the infor-
mation identified as needed then all the methods, with the
exception of the second, will be required due to the
differing nature of the information.
The next stage in the methodology is the determination of
the cost and this is examined in section five of the chap-
ter. This section sets out the terminology involved when
costing management information and examines methods of
arriving at costs. This is followed by the outline of a
method for determining the cost of management information.
Section six examines the techniques of cost benefit anal~...
ysis and cost effectiveness analysis and their use in the
economic appraisal of management information. 80th these
techniques have been mainly used in the evaluation of public
utilities. 8y combining the two techniques and modifying
them slightly it is possible to arrive at a technique
(cost benefit analYSis of management information) for
relating cost to value and determining the economic viab-
ility of the information.
Section seven of the chapter is entitled Management
Information Consultation and looks at the role of the
information analyst as an internal consultant within the
organisation. The aim of this section is to add to the
12
methodology some assistance to the information analyst in
dealing with some of the behavioral problems that could
be encountered when carrying out the other parts of the
methodology. This section is a guide to the work of other
people in this area and considers the problems
involved in dealing with individual managers and when
dealing with groups or teams of managers.
The final section of the chapter, is a summary entitled,
Methodology for the Economic Appraisal of Management
Information. It brings together all the other sections
in the formation of a methodology concerned with inform-
ation needs value and cost.
13
1.3. INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER FOUR AND APPENDICES.
Chapter four is concerned with the empirical studies.
The bulk of the detailed work of the studies has been
included in the six appendices. Three types of study have
been carried out. The first is a detailed look at the
overall management information system of one company. The
second type of study was carried out by observing the way
in which management students, all of whom were practicing
managers, solved certain problems presented as tasks and
case studies. The third type of study isolates certain
applications within the area of management information in
case study form.
The first study was a detailed study pf a company's mana-
gement information system. Areas examined were the way in
which it determined its information needs and decided what
information to produce and not produce, the way in which it
valued and casted information and whether the proposed
methodology is valid and would be of value. The summary
of the study and the conclusion drawn from it are given in
section two of chapter four. Appropriate extracts from
systems manuals and summaries and conclusions from various
interviews and group discussions are given in Appendix A,
A Company Information Study.
The second study examines the information needs of
personnel management. This study involved students from
the Institute of Personel Management Membership course.
The students were asked to determine the information needs
14
of the typical personnel department, the benefits of the
information and the resources required to produce this
information (because of the general natura of this study
it would be unrealistic to expect the student to produce
specific valuas for the information value and the inform-
ation cost). A description of the study, the methods
employed by the groups, summary of the results and the
conclusions of the study are given in section three of
chapter four. The full report produced by each group is
given in Appendix 8, Personnel Management Study.
The third study examines the marketing information system
of a particular company. A case study was written des-
cribing the marketing information system of a company
(the system in the case was a very poor one). Students
attending a residential period as part of studies for a
Diploma in Management Studies were then asked to examine
the case and say how they would improve the system. A
description of the study, the methods employed by the
groups, summary of the results and the conclusions of the
study are given in section four of chapter four. The case
study and the full report produced by each group is
given in Appendix C Marketing Information Study.
The fourth study is also based on a task set before and
during a residential period for groups of Diploma in
Management Studies Students. They were set the task of
producing a blue print for starting a small business.
The task was set some time before the residential to give
1S
the students time to gather ~ackground information. The
study examines the information used. Extracts of the
reports produced are given in Appendix 0 Small Business
Information Study (detailed cash flows, etc., have not been
included in this appendix). A description of the study,
the methods employed by the groups, summary of the results
and the conclusions from the study are given in section
five of chapter four.
The last two studies are presented in case study form.
Concord Insulators Ltd., is a,case study constructed
around a decision analysis problem. The full case study is
given in Appendix E and a summary is given in section six
of chapter four. This case has been produced to show a
method of producing a value of the piece of information
itself and also to show the size to which a realistic
example of a decision analysis can grow. Robert Livesey
and Sons Ltd. is a case study concerned with the implemen-
tation of a cost control system. The full case study is
given in Appendix F and a summary is given in section
seven of chapter four. This case study shows the two basic
problems that can occur when a specialist system is
implemented, these being a lack of understanding by manag-
ers of the information produced and the lack of credibility
of the information to the managers who do understand.
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CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND.
This chapter of the Thesis is concerned with the
analytical background of the research project. It starts
by examining the processes involved in management and
then goes on to provide a definition of management
information and management information systems. Since
one of the prime functions of management information
is the reduction of uncertainty a section on
uncertainty has been included. The last two sections of
this chapter are concerned with decision analysis and
simulation.
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2.1. THE PROCESS OF MANAGEMENT.
Henry Fayol one of the pioneers of management in 1916
defined management in the following way:
"All activities to which industrial undertakings give
rise can be divided into the following six groups
10 Technical activities (Production, manufacture,
adaption).
2. Commercial activities (buying, selling,
exchange).
3. Financial activities (search for the optimum
use of capital).
4. Security activities (protection of property
and persons).
5. Accounting activities (stocktaking, balance
sheet, costs, statistics).
6. Managerial activities (planning, organisation,
command, co-ordination, control).
8e the undertaking simple or complex, big or small
these six groups of activities or essential functions
are always present." *1
This was one of the first definitions of managem~nt
and in general is still a valid one although it could
be said that sections one to five are contained within
section six. Section six is widely used today as a
definition of management with decision making identified
as a separate activity.
*1 FAYOL (1949 Paqe 3)
19
A typical modern definition which clearly owes much to
Fayol would claim that management would consist of
the following:
1. Planning.
2. Motivating which can be divided into
(a) Leadership.
(b) Organising.
(c) Co-ordinating.
(d) Controlling.
3. Decision Making.
As Honey and others have pointed out it is useful to
recognise there are two aspects of management,
management of things and the management of people,
each having its own particular problems. *1
This definition of management will now be examined in
detail in order to explore its implications for the
information needs of management.
2.1.1. PLANNING.
steiner defines planning and plans as:
"Planning is a basic function of management. It is a
mental process of thinking through what is desired and
how l.·twl.·ll b. h' d PI it tac l.eve •••••• ans, are comm men s
to specific courses of action growing out of the mental
process of planning." *2
*1 HONEY (1968)
*2 STEINER (1969 Page 8)
20
This is general in nature and for a more specific
definition we can take Denning's definition of
corporate planning:
"A formal, systematic managerial process, organised by
responsibility, time, and information, to ensure that
operational planning, project planning and strategic
planning are carried out regularly to enable top
management to direct and control the future of the
enterprise." *1
This definition of planning indicates the range of
activities that management should ideally be carrying
out although in practice it is not necessarily quite
so formal or systematic as suggested. Denning then
goes on to suggest there are three levels of planning,
Strategic, Operational and Project planning.
The distinction between strategic and operational
planning levels is clear, it is difficult though to
differentiate between project planning and the first two.
Project planning will have to be carried out at either
the strategic or operational level and so will not
provide a separate level of planning. Therefore, I
shall only consider two levels of planning which may
be further defined as follows:
Strategic Planning:- Strategic planning is concerned
with the position of the organisation in its
changing external environment, i.e. the deter-
*1 DENNING. (1971 Page 2)
21
mination of the corporate plan and strategy.
This will include such things as future market
potential, management style, etc. It may also be
concerned with projects and their inter-relations
to the organisation. strategic plans are usually
concerned with the medium and long term periods
and are broad in concept.
Operational Planning:- Operational planning is
concerned with the implementation of the strategic
planso This will include the planning for all the
existing operations of the organisation, e.g. plant
and machinery, existing markets, etc. Operational
plans are usually concerned with the short term
period and are specific in nature.
Denning suggests the characteristics of the two levels
of planning are as shown in Figure One. These
characteristics will help in the definition and
determination of the information requirements of the
two levels of planning. *1
These characteristics are general in nature but they
do outline some of the more important differences
between the levels of planningo The separation of the
levels of planning is also used by Ansoff although with
slightly different terminology. *2 He suggests that
the difference between the levels of planning is in the
width of the decisions taken i.e. Policy decisions are
*1 DENNING.
*2 ANSOfF.
(1971 Page 6)
(1965)
22
Figure One:The Characteristics of the Two Levels of PLanning.
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wider than strategic decisions which in turn are wider
than tactical decisions. Th.e difference between the
two classifications is that Ansoff has separated the
policy plans from the strategic plans and called the
operational plans tactical plans. It can also be
seen that Ansoff has firmly introduced decision taking
into Planning.
Within each level of planning there will clearly be
various types of plan, Murdick suggests the following
five categories:
single use, repest, standing, standby and reject plans.
*1
1) Single use plan is the type of plan used to
achieve one particular goal and is never used
again, e.g. the operational plan for the
installation of a particular computer system.
2) Repeat plan is the type of plan for use in
stable situations to provide for a given set of
conditions which mayor will repeat themselves
in the future, e.g. the strategic plan for
introduction or replacement of computers under
stable conditions would possibly remain the
same and so become a repeat plan.
3) Standing is a refinement of the repeat plan
but one that automatically goes into operation
*1 MURDICK. (1971 Page 49)
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at a given trigger or time interval, e.g. a stock
control policy, stock levels are set and action
is taken when thmse levels reach a certain value.
4) Standby plan is a plan that has been drawn up to
cope with a given set of conditions should they
occur, e.g. The Government's plan with regard to
petrol rationing in 1973 is an example of a
standby plan.
5) Rejected plan is a plan that has been drawn up
but has been rejected although the rejection
may be due to condition changes and not a fault
in the plan, e.g. a plan to open a new factory
which has been rejected due to a downward trend
in demand although this may of course become a
standby plan for the time demand begins to rise
again.
The category into which a plan falls may change over time
due to changing conditions, etc. Also any plan may be
modified in its life, this modification mayor may not
change the plans category.
The processes involved within planning must now be
considered. Denning has produced a chart to show the
long range or corporate planning process. *1
This has been modified in figurm two to include the
Operational planning process.
*1 DENNING. (1971 Page 55)
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Figure Two:Outline Process Involved in Planning.
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This diagram outlines the different levels at which plans
are produced. Using information concerned with the
external and intmrnal environment top management set the
strategic plans, which may be refined later when the
feasibility of operational plans is considered. The
whole organisation then expands these strategic plans
into operational plans which are produced at varying
levels throughout the organisation.
Johnson, Kast and Rosenzweig suggest that a comprehensive
systems approach to planning would include the following
steps. *1
1. Appraising the future political, economic
competitive and technological environment.
2. Assessing the long run value, interests and
aspirations of managers and other participants.
3. Visualising the desirsd socioeconomic role of the
organisation in its future environment.
4. Analysing the organisation's resources and
capabilities for fulfilling the desired role.
5. Designing a corporate strategy which matches the
future environment, values and aspirations,
desired socioeconomic role, and organisational
resources.
*1 JOHNSON, KAST AND ROSENZWEIG. (1967 Page 55)
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6 •. Developing specific objectives and strategic
plans which will direct the efforts of the total
organisation.
7. Translating this broad planning into functional
efforts on a more detailed basis: research,
design and development, production,distribution
and services.
8. Developing more detailed planning and control of
resource utilisation within each of these
functional areas, always related to the overall
planning effort.
9. Providing a system of communications and
information flow whereby organisational members
can participate in planning processes.
10. Designing an information feedback and control
system to determine the progress and problems in
the implementation of plans.
The process of planning defined so far provides a good
model of how planning should be carried out within
organisations. Organisations carrying out good planning
will be following procedures similar to the model. The
effectiveness of planning will vary considerably across
all organisations depending on the management development
of the organisation.
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The setting of objectives is an important part of planning,
but this should not be confused with the technique of
Management by Objectives put forward by Humble, which
is merely a method of setting performance objectives for
management control and will be considered in more detail
in section 2.1.2.
The classification of objectives has been considered over
a period of time by management theorists. A variety of
classifications have been suggested but the most widely
accepted view is the one proposed by Ackoff. *1, and
supported by others. He suggests a divisions into
stylistic and performance objectives.
Stylistic objectives are involved with the management
style of the company and they tend to be non-quantifiable
in nature; an example of this form of objective would be
to improve labour relations or to improve management style
by management education.
Performance objectives are objectives which can be
quantified and are the type that individual managers
tend to be trying to achieve although they can of course
apply to the company as a whole. There is however, a
tendency ~ithin some organisations not to quantify these
objectives with the result that they then lose all
meaning and cease to be obj.ctives, e.g. a general
reduction in waste rates is not an adequate performance
objective it would be better to aim for a reduction of
*1 ACKOFF (1970 Chapter 2)
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10% in waste rates assuming that the level is a realistic
one.
It is possible to get complex objectives which could
be a mixture of the two containing stylistic objectives
and going through to performance objectives. Such a
complex objective could be split into its component parts
but makes more sense when kept together.
In addition to classifying objectives into two types it
is useful to consider in relation to the two levels at
which planning is carried out. *1 It will be recalled
that the two levels are strategic and operational
(tactical). Strategic objectives relate to the strategic
plans of the organisation and are therefore concerned with
large long term changes of state. Operational objectives
relate to the operational plans of the organisation and
are therefore concerned more with the short term and may
be localised in nature. Strategic objectives tend to be
a mixture of stylistic and performance objectives where
as Operational objectives tend to be predominantly
performance objectives.
2.1.1. MOTIVATING.
The motivating aspect of management can be split into
four categories, leadership, organising, co-ordinating
and controlling.
Leadership: This is the process by which an individual
exerts an infiuence on the behaviour of others within
*1 LOSTY. (1970 (1) )
30
the organisation. McGivering *1 with reference to
McGregor *2 states:
"The current view, therefore, is that the leader
cannot usefully be considered apart from the
situation in which he exercises his leadership
and that his personal characteristics and abilities
are seen as only one variable amongst others.
1) the personality of the leader.
2) the expectations and needs of the followers.
3) the structure of the group and the immediate
situation which confronts it.
4) the wider cultural environment within which the
group is located."
Although leadership is an important part of motivating
there are many other factors which will affect the
motivation of an individual. The amount of motivation
an individual can create in others will depend upon
his personality or "Charisma" (coined by Max Weber)
which tends to be fixed and only marginally subject to
development. The more charisma an individual has the
more he will be able to motivate others.
Organising, Co-ordinating and Control: Leadership is
an important part of organising and c~-ordinating the
plans and decisions of management, although the other
factors which involve motivation must now be considered.
Vroom and Oeci in a review of work in the field of
*1 MCGIVERING (1976)
*2 MCGREGOR (1960)
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motivation *1 put forward three approaches to the
motivation of individuals to complete a tasko
The first of these a paternalistic approach, is based on
the assumption that individuals will be motivated to
complete given tasks if they are satisfied by these
tasks i.e. the more one rewards and satisfies the needs
of the individual the more is achieved. Within this
approach rewards are given unconditionally to the members
of the organisation to increase motivation, i.e. pension
plans, group insurance, comfortable working conditions,
etc. However, work reviewed by Brayfield and Crockett
*2 shows there is little relationship between job
satisfaction and motivation. However, there is a
relationship between job satisfaction and staff turn-
over, i.e. individuals who are satisfied with their
job are more reluctant to leave than people who are not
satisfied with their job.
The second approach to motivation is based on the
scientific management methods of Taylor *3. This is
also based on rewards but these are not unconditional
and the system also makes use of penalties. The
rewards and penalties are directly linked to the
performance of the individual, e.g. promotion or lack
of, the apportionment of pay rises, etc. A considerable
amount of work has been carried out in this field of
reward and penalty and the psychologists have termed it
the Law of Effect, which suggests that rewards and
* 1* 2
* 3
VROOM AND DEC! (1970 Page 9 - 19)
BRAYFIELD AND CROCKETT. (1955)
TAYLOR. (1947)
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penalties will motivate the individual to a degree.
There is, however, a problem in determining what rewards
to offer. As Maslow *1 suggests, individuals have a
large number of needs of varying degree from individual
to individual. Therefore. any reward will have a
differing effect from individual to individual dependent
on that individual's needs. There must with this system
be an effective method of measurement of performance
and an assessment of an individual's needs to ensure
appropriate rewards.
The third approach to Motivation has been suggested by
McGregor *2 and Likert *3 and Maier and Hayes *4 and has
often been called participative management. It is a
development of the first two approaches in that it has
the paternalistic approach and uses the rewards and
penalties but in addition as its name suggests it allows
the individual to participate in the management of the
organisation. These ideas have been used by Humble *5
in the development of his motivating technique
'Management by Objectives'.
Humble defined M.B.O. as
"A dynamic system which seeks to integrate the company's
need to clarify and achieve its profit and growth goals,
with the managers need to contribute and develop himself."
*5
*1 MASLOW. (1943)
~2 MCGREGOR. (1957)
*3 LIKERT. (1961)
*4 MAIER & HAYES. (1962)
*5 HUMBLE. (196B)
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M.B.O. involves the setting of company objectives from
which each division, department and section has to develop
its own detailed objectives. In addition planning
implementation and control of these objectives is
carried out. The main stages in the M.B.O. process as
put forward by Humble are as follows.
1. Analyse Opportunities and Plan:- Indentification by
top management of areas requiring improvement remembering
that all levels of management should be allowed to
contribute to the identification of problems and
constraints and the setting of target levels of achieve-
ment. This analysis must be extended to form strategic
and operational plans.
2. Company Objectives:- Prepare short and long term
objectives to enable the operational plans of the
organisation to be carried out by management.
3. Unit, Function and Department Objectives:- To
analyse the company objectives and the actions that
need to be carried out to achieve them. Determine what
part in these actions each unit, functions and department
must take. The majority of these objectives at this
level will tend to be of the performance type.
4. Key Results Analysis:- Each manager with his
superior must now be involved in using the objectives
set in stage 2 and 3 to determine the key results which
34
the manager must achieve. The manager and his superior
must agree performance standards based on these key
results which are compatible with the company and
department objectives.
5. Improvement Plans:- This stage is an extension of
the key result analysis and it is usual for it to be
carried out during the key result stage. During this
stage the problems to be overcome are identified and
discussed. Group and individual plans are drawn up
by the manager and his superior, with the aim of
achieving the objectives decided upon.
6. Control and Review:- The agreement of appropriate
control information for the performance objectives
agreed in the key results analysis. The frequency of
the control information agreed will also be agreed by
the manager and his superior. The Manager and superior
have to periodically review the progress and results
achieved against the key analysis and improvement plans.
This control and review stage however, does not end at
the individual level, as the results are also reviewed
against the company, function and department objectives
in the preparation of the next set of short term object-
ives.
The whole M.B.O. process is cyclic and continuous.
M.B.O. becomes effective only when it becomes the style
of management of the organisation and this must include
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all levels of management and all managers. Care must
be taken in the setting of the objectives for they
should be realistic. They should not be too difficult
or too easy to meet, this realistic level being
difficult to find. There is a danger when the formalised
system of M.B.O. is used within the larger organisation
for it to become institutionalised thus tending to
reduce or damage the natural flair and spontaneity of
management.
Stages one to four in the M.B.O. process could in fact
perform a valuable role in the planning process shown
in figure two. However, in most organisations M.B.O.
is used purely to set performance objectives and not as
an integrated part of planning.
2.1.3. DECISION MAKING.
Although decision making is an integral part of the
planning and motivating process it is best considered
in its own right. Forrester suggests:-
"Decisions are made at multiple points throughout
the system. Each resulting action generates
information that may be used at several but not
all decision points. This structure of cascaded
and interconnected information-feedback loops, when
taken together, describes the industrial system.
Within a company, the decision points extended from
the shipping room and the stock-clerks to the board
of directors." *1
*1 FORRESTER (1961)
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Decisions are taken at all levels of management and are
the basis of management itself. Many attempts have
been made to classify the types of decision taken by
management. Simon *1, suggests that decisions can be
of two types "Programmed" and ~on-Programmed" and others
agree with this basic division but use slightly different
terminology. Forrester *2 calls them "implicit" and
"overt" and Blumenthal *3 calls them "analytic" and
"synthetic". Simon's category titles seem to be more
explicit than the others therefore these are the ones
I shall use. The word programmed should not be taken to
mean that this type of decision is carried out by computers.
Simon defines his two categories as follows:
"Decisions are programmed to the extent that they
are repetitive and routine to the extent that a
definite procedure has been worked out for handling
them so that they will not have to be treated de nova
each time they occur ••••
Decisions are non-programmed to the extent that they
are novel, unstructured and consequential. There is
no cut and dried method for handling the problem
because it has not arisen before, or because its precise
nature and structure are elusive and complex or
because it is so important that it deserves a
custom-tailored treatment." *4
*1 SIMON. (1960)
*2 FORRESTER. (1961)
~3 BLUMENTHAL. (1965)
*4 SIMON. (1964)
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Although Forrester *1 classifies decisions into two
groups he feels that there is no distinct border between
the two which would appear to be more realistic. Decisions
can also be multiple and within this multiplicity they
can be of the two types. For example the suite of
decisions concerned with stock control. The first decision
is that taken to introduce stock control and the type of
control to be used. To an organisation that has not
used stock control previously this type of decision will
be new and novel and will, therefore, be non-programmed,
but to an organisation which has used stock control
previously the application of stock control in another
unit could well be a programmed decision (i.e. working
to a previous procedure). The actual setting of stock
levels and the application of these stock levels will be
a series of programmed decisions. A decision may change
categories dependent on the organisation in which it
is being applied.
The classification of decisibns having been considered
the processes involved within decision taking can now
be explained. A part of decision taking is problem
solving. Indeed it could be said that almost all
decision taking should be preceeded by some problem
solving. The two should not be confused and in any
management application t~e two will not necessarily
be carried out by the same people, for example
*1 FORRESTER. (1961 Page 99)
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specialists may use problem solving techniques but the
manager actually takes the decision. Looking at the
processes involved in decision making Simon has put
forward the following general problem solving model.*1
The problem solving model is organised around aims of
three types.
i) Transformation Aims:- to transform object one into
object two.
ii) Difference Reduction Aims:- to eliminate or reduce
differences between objects one and two.
iii)Operator Application Aims:- to apply an operator to
object one to reduce differences between object one
and two.
For each of these aims is a method of achievement
associated with it, these being:-
1) Methods for transformation aims; to transform
object one to two.
(i) Notice a difference between object one and two.
(ii) Establish the aim of reducing difference between
object one and two.
(iii) Try to obtain the new aim.
(iv) If successful, find a new difference and repeat.
2) Method for difference reduction aims, to reduce
difference between object one and two.
(L) Recall an operator that is relevant to
differences of the type already defined.
*1 SIMON. (1964)
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(ii) Establish the aim of applying the operator
to object one.
(iii) Try to obtain this new aim.
(iv) If successful, return to the previous
transform aim.
3) Method for operator application aims, to apply
operator to one object.
(i) Compare conditions for application of
operator to object one.
(ii) If these are not satisfied, establish and
try to attain the aim of transformation of
object one into an object that meets these
conditions.
(iii) When the conditions are satisfied, apply
operator to object one and return to the
previous differences reduction aim with the
modified object one.
These methods give a simplified description of problem
solving. The Problem Solving Model is a model which
reasons about ends and means. It is capable of defining
ends, seeking means to attain them and in the process of
so doing, defining new subsiduary ends, or sub-goals to
the original end.
Simon's model gives a general problem solving model to
extend this to describe the decision making process
requires some further work.
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Operational Research by definition is an aid to
management decision making. Churchman, AckofF and
Arnoff *1 suggest the following stages for the appli-
cation of O.R.
" 1) Formulating the problem.
2) Constructing a mathematical model to
represent the system under study.
3) Deriving a solution from the model.
4) Testing the model and the solution derived
from it.
5) Establishing controls over the solution.
6) Putting the solution to work 'implementation'. "
Moore *2 defines the phases of G.R. as:-
" a) Definition of the problem and objective.
b) Representation (or model) of situation.
c) Test of model against actual conditions.
d) Analysis of model to select optimum conditions
to meet objective.
e) Pilot implementation test.
f) Implementation. "
By using the above two descriptions of the G.R. approach
and the general problem solving model it is possible to
construct a model of the decision taking process this
being given in figure three.
*1 CHURCHMAN, ACKOFF & ARNGFF (1966 page 13)
*2 MOORE. (1976 Page 11)
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Figure Three: The Decision Process.
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The model consists of the following six stages:-
1) Acceptance or discovery of the decision or
problem. This is the stage when decisions or
problems are sought or where decisions or problems
are accepted.
2) Determination of decision or problem type.
This stage is where the decision is put into
broad categories to determine the area of
responsibility or the area of solution.
3) Determination of constraints in operation and
relevant data for solution. This is a stage
where initial constraints are identified and
initial data and information on the situation
is sought out. There will be a feedback to the
start of the process at this stage because of
the possibility of discovering further decisions
or problems.
4) Use prob~em solving models in solution or in the
taking of decisions. This is the stage where
decisions ara taken and/or problems solved.
Within this stage will be used the techniques
or decision taking aids developed in recent
years, e.g. statistical analysis, decision
analysis, simulation and many other O.R.
techniques. There will be an information feed-
back route to stage three for the collection of
further information or data and tha further
clarification of the constraint in operation on
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the system. Also at this stage there will be a
feedback to the start of the process because of
the possibility of discovering further decisions
or problems.
S) Implementation. This is the stage that is
concerned with the implementation of the
decisions or the solution of the problem. It is
here where motivation becomes of great importance
for here it is necessary to motivate people to
follow the decisions or solutions to the problems.
There will be a feedback route from this stage to
stage 4 to allow problems of implementation to
be built into the decision or solution to the
problem. Also at this stage there will be a
feedback to the start of the process because of
the possibility of discovering further decisions
or problems.
6) Control. The implementation of decisions require
a control to be kept on them so as to determine:-
(i) Assessment of decisions:- to determine the
degree of success of the decision to be used
when taking decisions of a similar nature
in the future so as to attain more successful
results.
(ii) Change of Conditions:- to monitor the
implementation to ensure that it is being
carried out to plan (especially important
when new and complicated systems are being
introduced).
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Also at this stage there will be a feedback to the start
of the process because of the possibility of discovering
further decisions or problems.
The process will basically be the same for both programmed
and unprogrammed decisions. However, for the programmed
decision stage three and four will be replaced by the
looking for the standard pattern to use which will have
its standard implementation and control system.
2.1.4. THE WORK OF HENRY MINTZBERG.
The definition of management so far produced is very
useful when describing management systems but it tends
to break down when talking to the individual manager.
A large proportion of managers find it difficult to talk
in terms of this classification. Few managers think in
terms of 'now I shall plan' or 'now I shall motivate'.
Mintzberg *1 has taken a different approach from the
classical management theorists. He starts from a series
of studies of what managers actually do (both his and the
work of others) and has arrived at ten roles that managers
carry out.
Mintzberg has not identified any new aspects of managerial
work his contribution has been to reclassify the work in
line with the way managers think. Mintzberg does not
suggest that his classification is definitive, it is only
a start in classifying management in a way that is
meaningful to managers.
*1 MINTZBERG. (3 papers, a thesis and a book)
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Mintzberg places managerial roles in three groups.
Group one the interpersonal roles of which there are
three, Group two the informational roles of which there
are three and Group three the decisional roles of which
there are four.
2.1.4.1. INTERPERSONAL ROLES.
(i) Figurehead Role:- In this role the manager
is required to carry out a number of
social, inspirational, legal and ceremon-
ial duties. The manager must also be
available to people who require to deal
with him because of his status and auth-
ority.
(ii) Leader Role:- This role is where the
manager must try to co-ordinate the needs
and aims of the individuals with the needs
and aims of the organisation and to motivate
his subordinates to these ends.
(iii)Liaison Role:- This role is concerned with
the manager's dealings with other organ-
isational units. These may be with other
organisational units within his own organ-
isation or may be with other units from
the external environment. for example a
sales manager will deal with more units from
the external environment and production
manager will deal with units mainly from the
internal environment.
-
2
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The manager spends a considerable amount of
time performing this role developing a
network of contacts in which information
and favours are traded for mutual benefit.
Through the leader and liaison roles, the
manager gains access to privileged infor-
mation and he emerges as the 'nerve centre'
of his organisation. He alone has formal
access to every subordinate in his own
organisation, and he has unique access to
a variety of outsiders, many of whom are
nerve centres of their own organisations.
This leads onto the next set of roles.
2.1.4.2. INFORMATIONAL ROLES.
(i) Monitor Role:- "As monitor the manager
continually seeks and receives internal
and external information from a variety of
sources to develop thorough knowledge of
milieu. Because a good part of this infor-
mation is current and non-documented , the
manager must take prime responsibility for
the design of his own information system,
which is necessarily informal. Managers in
new jobs, particularly, spend considerable
time on the monitor and liaison roles in
order to build up their information systems
and bring themselves up to the level of
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knowledge needed for effective strategy
making." *1
(ii) Disseminator Role:- "As disseminator the
manager transmits some of his internal and
external information to subordinates. In
this way, he maintains their only access to
certain priveleged information (and to an
extent his position of power). Some of
this information is of a factual nature;
some relates to the values of the organ-
isation's influencers." *2
(iii)Spokesman Role:- "As spokesman the manager
transmits information to individuals outside
his organisational unit. He acts in a
public relations capacity, lobbies for his
organisation, informs key influences, tells
the public about the organisation's perform-
ance, and sends useful information to his
liaison contacts. Furthermore, the manager
must serve outsiders as an expert in the
industry or function in which his organ-
isation operates. Managers of staff groups,
because their sub-units are highly special-
ised and oriented to analysis, spending
considerable time in this expert capacity
as well as giving relatively more attention
to the other informational roles." *3
*1 MINTZ8ERG.
*2 MINTZ8ERG.
*3 MINTZ8ERG.
(1973 Page 167)
(1973 Page 168)
(1973 Page 168)
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2.1.4.3. DECISIONAL ROLES.
(i) Entrepreneur Role:- In the role of
entrepreneur the manager is responsible
for much of the 'controlled' change in
the organisation. It may be a direct
control or may be some form of delegated
control.
(ii) Disturbance Handler Role:- In the role of
disturbance handler the manager takes
charge when his organisation is threatened.
The threat can be internal or external.
This role will increase when the organ-
isation is in a period of innovation.
(iii)Resource Allocator Role:- In the role of
resource allocator the manager decides on
the allocation of his organisational unit's
resources and thereby maintains control of
its strategy-making process. This role is
carried out in three ways. Firstly the
manager by scheduling his own activities
sets the priorities for the rest of his
organisation unit. Secondly the manager
determines the work schedule of his unit,
he decides what will be done and by whom
(the further up the organisation the more
general the 'by whom' becomes). Finally
the manager authorises the actions required.
49
(iv) Negotiator Role:- "Finally as negotiator
the manager takes charge when his organ-
isation must have important negotiations
with another organisation. As figurehead
he represents his organisation, as spokes-
man he speaks for it, and as liaison and
resources allocator he trades resources
in real-time with the opposite party." * 1
Another important aspect of Mint~berg's work in connection
with management information systems and in particular
management information needs is the analysis of the
characteristics of managerial work.
To identify these characteristics he uses his own studies
and the studies of a large number of other workers in this
field, the full list of whom can be found in Mintzberg's
book 'The Nature of Managerial Work'. *2
Mintzberg suggests that the work of management can be
characterised by its brevity, variety and fragmentation,
these factors being ones which the managers grow to like.
Managers appear to prefer the more active elements of
the job carrying these elements out in preference to the
others. This is reflected in the way in which the manager
deals with his mail (documented information). Little of
his mail is concerned with live action, consequently
dealing with mail often becomes a chore for managers,
much of the mail only getting a superficial inspection.
*1 MINTZBERG.
*2 MINTZBERG.
(1973 Page 169).
(1973 Appendix A, Page 199).
50
Some ineffective managers may like routine work as they
can hide behind such work. Such routine work is then
likely to give them little time to carry out the other
aspects of the managers work which they perform badly.
The Manager has five media through which he can carry out
his function:-
1) Mail (documented).
2) Telephone (partly verbal).
3) Unscheduled meetings (informal face to face).
4) Scheduled meetings (formal face to face).
5) Tours (observational).
The evidence from the studies shows the manager clearly
favours the three verbal media, spending most of his
time in verbal contact.
On the basis of these characteristics of management
Mintzberg suggests that there is a need to reprogram the
information system of managers. This is best considered
with reference to the three basic areas of the managers
information system, monitoring, storing and disseminating.
2.1.4.4. THE MONITORING SYSTEM.
The manager needs to monitor and to carry this out he needs
information. A large portion of this information is of
the following three types.
1. Current Information. The manager requires
information to be current, and studies have shown
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he appears to be not so concerned with the
accuracy but with the speed that he receives it.
For example "Rumour takes time to become sub-
stantial fact, and it takes even longer for
that fact to find its way into a quantitative
report." *1 This would appear a valid point.
It would seem that from Mintzberg's work senior
management at least reject Myths number five,
(that accuracy is of vital importance). There
is, however, a danger that the manager falls
into the trap of the fourth myth (for infor-
mation to be available instantly increases its
usefulness). *2
2) Trigger Information. The manager prefers his
information to contain triggers which link it
to specific objectives,he wishes to hear of
specific events, ideas and problems.
3) Verbal Information. Due to the preference of
the manager for the more verbal media a large
portion of the information a manager seeks and
receives is in a verbal form.
By their nature these forms of information put the
manager in conflict with the formal information system
of the organisation. The manager seeks information of
a current, speculative or trigger kind, but the formal
information system provides him with largely historical,
precise,aggregated information. The formal system deals
mainly with control and regulation information (budgets,
*1 MINTZBERG. (1973 Page 171).
*2 SEE SECTION 3.1.4. and 3.1.5.
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costs, production, programs, etc.), essential to the
specialist for carrying out his specialist function
(although not necessarily his management function).
It does not include the intelligence information required
by senior management for their strategic decisions (these
usually being of the unprogrammed type) or the information
which is also needed concerning the external environment.
2.1.4.5. THE MANAGER AS A DATA BANK.
This conflict usually makes it necessary for the manager
to design his own system (usually mainly verbal) to
collect the information he requires. Although most of
the manager's extra information can be provided this way
such a system is usually crude, inconsistent and incomplete.
It can only be an incomplete system because the manager
does not have verbal contact on a regular basis with all
members of his organisation who could provide him with
information of value. Another problem with manager's
personal information systems is summarised by the follow-
ing quote from Mintzberg.
"Today the manager is the real data bank for an import-
ant class of organisational information. Unfortunately
he is a walking and talking data bank, but not a
writing one. Herein lies the problem. When he is busy,
information ceases to flow. When he departs, so does
the data bank." *1
This conflict between the manager's system and the
formal system stems from a lack of consultation and
*1 MINTZBERG. (1973 Page 150)
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understanding between the manager and systems designer/
information analyst. Managers must take and be allowed
to take a much more active role in the design of infor-
mation systems. This does not mean to say that the
manager's information system requires to be formalised,
which could in fact destroy the effectiveness of it.
An attempt to semi-formalise, but not to automate the
system could succeed to make it more consistent and
complete, although not more accurate as the base data
and information remains partly speculative. To carry out
effectively the semi-formalisation of the information
system there has to be a greater degree of trust and
a better relationship between the manager and systems
designer/information analyst. The semi-formalisation
means that the manager must pass on information he obtains
personally to the system along with information arriving
from different sources. Such information needs to be
stored in some type of data bank and because of its vital
and strategic nature various types of security problems
are likely to arise.
2.1.4.6. THE DISSEMINATING SYSTEM.
An important role of the manager is the disseminating
of information to his subordinates. This tends to be
carried out verbally and is dependent on the availability
of the manager's time. These difficulties could be
overcome by semi-formalising the manager's information
system but the manager may not wish all the information
to be available to all subordinates.
S4
Some systems designers/information analysts live in a
utopian world of data bases with total access by all
members of the organisation. This availability problem
will probably be a major difficulty in the setting up
of such systems. Most managers manage from a power
base, this power base being maintained by the manager's
control of the availability of information to others.
For a manager to commit such information to a free
system would probably mean his committing organisational
suicide. When devising such a semi-formalised system the
analyst must realise that no manager will commit all his
information to suoh a system and some of the information
released will be for restricted circulation only. A
manager's confidence will grow with such a system as it
proves to be secure to his requirements.
2.1.5. SUMMARY.
The classical definition works well when talking in terms
of management systems. Management can be said to consist
of the following:-
1. Planning.
2. Motivating which can be divided into
(a) Leadership.
(b) Organising.
(c) Co-ordinating.
(d) Con tr 011ing •
3. Decision Making.
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1) Planning.
Plans can be at two levels; strategic or operational.
Within these two levels, plans can be of five types:
single use, repeat, standing, standby or reject plans
although any particular plan may change its type.
over time or due to a change in conditions.
2) Motivating.
This is concerned with the implementation of the plans
or decisions and the most effective way to motivate
people in the implementation of plans or decisions
would appear to be that of· participative management.
This style of management has the paternalistic
approach and uses rewards and penalties but as its
name suggests it allows the individual to participate
in the management of the organisation. It is here
the the technique of Management by Objectives may be
used.
3) Decision Making.
Decisions can be categorised into two types, programmed
and unprogrammed, although this categorisation does
not have a clear border.
When talking of the behavioral aspects of managers the
classical definition tends to break down because the terms
used in it are not the ones readily used by managers.
Mintzberg reorganises the classical definition into a
series of ten roles which better fit the behavioral
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aspects of the manager's function. These ten roles are
divided into three groups as follows.
(1) Interpersonal Roles.
(i) Figurehead Role.
(ii) Leader Role.
(iii) Liaison Role.
(2) Information Role.
(i) Monitor Role.
(ii) Disseminator Role.
(iii) Spokesman Role.
(3) Decisional Roles.
(i) Entrepreneur Role.
(ii) Disturbance Handler Role.
(iii) Resource Allocator Role.
(iv) Negotiator Role.
It is vital that any person operating in the field of
management information understands what management is
about and is able to converse with managers in their
own terms both at the management systems level and the
behavioral aspects level.
57
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Along with the work quoted as reference material the
following works have been taken into account in the
production of this section.
ANSOFF (1969)
DRUCKER (1967 & 1971)
EILON (1971)
HUMBLE (1969)
JAY (1967 & 1972)
KEMPER (1976)
LUPTON (1966)
MANN (1970)
PATERSON (1967)
PORTER & ROBERTS (1977)
ROSE (1978)
STEWART (1963 & 1967)
58
2.2. DEFINITION' OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.
The Oxford Dictionary defines information to be:-
"Telling; what is told, knowledge, items of
knowledge, news", and Management to be:-
"Conducting the working of, have effective control
of, bend to ones will, cajole."
Management has also been defined in great detail in
section 2.1. Therefore, Management Information can be
described as knowledge, items of knowledge and news
required to ensure the effective working and control of
an organisation. A distinction must be drawn here
between data and information. Data are facts and figures
which become information after analysis and interpretation
have set them into context of particular needs. Managers
are usually aware of the distinction between data and
information although in practice they rarely use it and
call all inputs information.
Losty has suggested that Management Information can be
subdivided in the following way. The various types of
management information are concerned with two areas.
The Internal Environment, involves information about the
state of the company, its strength, weaknessess and all
its operating characteristics. The External Environment
involves information about the type of environment within
which the organisation is operating. *1
There are two types of management information and data,
*1 LOSTY. (19JO (2) ) and NAUGHTON (1974 Page 23)
59
these being formal and informal. These may be defined
in the context of the business organisation as follows:-
Formal Information and Data, is the information and data
that is committed to record or is part of a formal system
of that organisation, e.g. balance sheets, accounts,
computer files, production schedules, etc.
Informal Information and Data, is the information and
data that is not part of any formal system of the organ-
isation. It can be committed to 'record' or to an
individuals brain and usually it is available to a limited
number of individuals and not the organisation as a whole,
e.g. the internal political situation, the 'black books'
made by people just in caset *1
It could be argued that a third possible class of manage-
ment will exist, this being potential information and data
although some of this by definition will fall outside the
management information of the organisation.
External Potential Information and Data, is information
and data that exists outside the organisation and of
which the organisation is unaware. This information may
be of value to the organisation and could be collected
or assimilated by them, e.g. Government Statistics,
information about the market which could be obtained by
market reserach, etc.
Internal Potential Information and Data, is information
and data which is within the organisation but its
whereabouts or existence is unknown by a member of the
organisation to whom such information and data would be
*1 LDSTY. (1970 (1) & (2) )
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of use.
The relevance of information must also be considered,
this will vary for different pieces of information and
can also vary for any single piece of information,
dependent upon the application it is being used for.
Information Theorists define the amount or degree of
relevance of a piece of information as the effect that
piece of information has on reducing the uncertainty
associated with particular event or set of events. *1
This concept will be further explored in the latter
sections on value.
SUMMA RV •
There is a difference between data and information,
data (raw facts and figures) becoming information when
some meaning or value has been given to them, although
most managers do not draw such a distinction in practice.
Management Information and data within the organisation
can be concerned with two areas the internal and external
environment of the organisation and can be of two types
either formal or informal. We must also recognise
potential information and data as a third category.
Some of this by definition falls outside the management
information of the organisation although it may be of
value. Any piece of information will have a 'degree of
Relevance' for any application it is being used in.
*1 NAUGHTON (1974 Page 4) and KEMPNER (1976 'Information
Theory' ).
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2.3. DEFINITION OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS.
System is a ward used today within modern management
theory and in ather fields. The fallowing list of
definitions put forward by various authors in the
field of management and information shows the spectrum
of the use of the term 'system'.
"An assemblage or combination of things or
parts forming a complex or unitary whole." *1
"A set of objects with a given set of relation-
ships between the objects and their attributes." *2
"A ~et of objects together with the relationships
between the objects and between their attributes." *3
"The basic notion of a system is simply that it
is a set of inter-related parts." *4
"A system is a set of objects with relationships
between the objects and between their attributes." *5
"An array of components designed to accomplish
a particular object according to plan." *6
*1 STEIN. (Page 1230)
*2 OPTNER. (1965 Page 26)
*3 YEAR BOOK FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF GENERAL SYSTEMS
THEORY. (1956)
*4 TILLES. (1963)
*5 HALL. (1962 Page 60)
*6 JOHNSON, KAST & ROSENZWEIG. (1976 Page 113)
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"A system is a device, procedure, or scheme which
behaves according to some description its function
being to operate on information and/or energy
and/or matter in a time reference to yield
information and/or energy and/or matter." *1
"A system is a network of related procedures
developed according to an integrated scheme for
perform'ng a major activity of the business." *2
"A system is a complex of inter-related entities." *3
The following is an attempt to synthesise the important
features of the above definitions.
A system is a series of entities either physical or
non-physical that exhibits a set of inter-relations
among themselves and interact towards one or more goals,
objectives or ends. These goals, objectives, or ends
mayor may not be achieved and the end could be
intentional or accidental. The entities can be physical
entities such as men, machines, etc., or they may be
non-physical such as management activities (planning
and motivating) or they may be ideas, concepts, etc.
The entities could also be other systems, (i.e. sub-
systems making a large complex system).
A Management Information System may be defined as a
series of entities which help the process of management
*1 ELLIS & LUDWIG. (1962 Page 3)
*2 NEUSCELL. (1960 Page 10)
*3 ACKOFF. (1962 Page 121)
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by the provision of information and data, or in some cases
hinder the process of management by the provision of
misinformation, either due to poor information or data
or the variable nature of the data. A Management
Information System must by this definition be a large
complex system. It must be able to provide information
and data about the internal and external environment at
both a formal and informal level. It must also be able
to deal with the possibility of potential information
and data.
The large complex Management Information systems will be
made up of a large number of sUb-systems some of which
could be dynamic (especially informal systems). The
sUb-system can be either formal or informal or they could
be a combination of the two. They may be concerned with
the internal or the external environment or a combination
of the two. There may also be sUb-systems for the analysis
or the provision of potential information or data. The
sUb-systems produced as part of the formal system of the
organisation will as a whole be far easier to identify
and record than informal sub-systems, this being due to
the dynamic nature of informal sub-systems.
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2.4. THE MEASUREMENT OF UNCERTAINTY.
In the measuring of uncertainty managers talk of
uncertainty in such phrases as:-
probable hoped
quite certain possible
unlikely
likely
not certain
expected
doubtful
not unreasonable that
Moore and Thomas *1 took these ten phrases and asked
250 executives, on middle and senior general management
programmes at the London Business School and elsewhere
to rank them in order of certainty.
The following results were obtained:-
Phrase......
Quite certain
Expected
Likely
Probable
Nat unreasonable that
Passible
Hoped
Nat certain
Doubtful
Unlikely
Average rank Range of Ranks.
• • • • • • • • • • • • ••............
1•10
2·95
3·85
4·25
4·65
6·10
7·15
7·80
8·60
8·75
1 - 3
1 - 6
2 - 7
2 - 9
3 - 7
3 - 9
3 -10
3 -10
7 -10
3 -10
As can be seen from the above table each phrase can be
taken to imply a different degree of uncertainty by
different managers and only two of the 250 executives
arrived at the same ranking. There are of course far
mare phrases that managers use in practice to describe
uncertainty, thus compounding the problem. further
investigations by Moore and Thomas also shaw that managers
*1 MOORE AND THOMAS. (1975)
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were not consistent with their ranking over time. Thus it
would seem that phrases and words are not a suitable
vehicle for measuring uncertainty because of the
varying interpretation managers can place on them.
It would appear that a better approach would be to use
a numeric measure. There are a number at measures that
could be used for example:odds, proportions or
probabilities. Odds are commonly used in the world of
racing and are referred to in the form 2 to 1 against,
10 to 1 against, 2 to 1 on, etc. Ehrenberg *1 defines
probability in the following manner.
"The probability of a particular event pccuring can
be any number from 0 to 1. If the event is part
of a steady series, then the probability of the
given outcome should equal the proportion of
times that event occurs in the series. That is
how the numerical value of the probability is
often arrived at in the first place."
A probability of 0 represents absolute certainty an
event will not occur 1 represents absolute certainty an
event will occur. Probabilities are closely linked to
proportions, e.g. a probability of 0·5 corresponds to a
proportion of 50%. Probabilities are preferable to
proportions for two major reasons; firstly probabilities
are easier to work in a mathematical sense and secondly
probabilities can be used to refer to individual events
~hereas proportions can only refer to groups of events.
*1 EHRENBERG. (1975 Page 214)
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Figure Four:The Relationship Between Odds and Probabilities.
50:1 1-0
On
10:1 0·9
6: 1
4: 1 0'8
3: 1
0·7
2:1
0·6
Odds . Probabilities
Evens 0-5
0·4
2:1
0·3
3:1
4:1 0·2
6:1
10: 1 0·1
Against
50:1 0
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Odds can be used to refer to uncertainty. Figure four,
taken from Moore and Thomas *1 relates odds to
probabilities.
Odds can be of advantage in referring to uncertainty
when the manager has a good working knowledge of them.
However, when both odds and probability are unknown to
the manager then odds are probably less comprehensible
than probability. Odds also suffer two other major
drawbacks; 1) odds are not easily worked mathematically,
2) odds are thought of only in integer steps, the scale
is of a non linear form and so there are parts of the
scale relatively devoid of points unless odds such as
11:4 are resorted to.
It would therefore seem that the best measure of
uncertainty is by the use of probabilities. The concept
of probability must now be examined in more detail.
2.4.1. BASIC LAWS OF PROBABILITY.
Murdoch and Barnes * 2 give the following three important
laws of probability.
"1. Addition Law of Probability:- This law states
that if A and B are mutually exclusive events,
then the probability that either A or B occurs
in a given trial is equal to the sum of the
separate probabilities of A and B occuring.
*1 MOORE & THOMAS. (1975)
*2 MURDOCH & BARNES. (1973 Page 2 -4)
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In symbolic terms this law can be shown as
P(A or B) = P(A) + P(B)
This law can be extended by repeated
application to cover the case of more than
two mutually exclusive events.
Thus P(A or B or C •••) = P(A) + P(B) + p(C) + •••
These events of this law are mutually exclusive
events, which simply means that the occurrence
of one of the events excludes the possibility
of the occurrence of any of the others on the
same trial.
2. Multiplication Law of Probability:- This law
states that the probability of the combined
occurrence of two events A and B is the product
of the probability of A and the conditional
probability of B on the assumption that A has
occurred.
Thus P(A and B) = P(AB) = P(A) x P(B/A)
where P(B/A) is the conditional probability
of event B on the assumption that A occurs at
the same time (or prior).
While this law is usually defined as above for
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two events, it can be extended to any number
of events.
3. Independent Events:- Events are defined as
independent if the probability of the occurrence
of either is not affected by the occurence or
not of the other. Thus if A and B are indepen-
dent events, then the law states that the
probability of the combined occurrence of the
events A and B is the product of their indi-
vidual probabilities. That is:-
P(AB) = P(A) x P(B)."
Given these three laws of probability this makes it
possible to mathematically relate multiple events.
It is important when considering the measurement of
uncertainty that the type of data being considered should
be known. There are two basic types of data, continuous
and discrete. Continuous data as its name suggests can
take any value (although in practice the range of possible
values may be limited) for example sales figures.
Discrete data can take only a given set of values, usually
a set of positive integers for example the number of
strikes in an organisation per year, i.e. 0, 1, 2, 3,
4, •••••••• etc., there can never be 1·5 strikes per year.
The probability calculation will vary depending on the
type of data being considered.
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In recent years the Bayesian Approach to conditional
probability has become popular. The 'Bayesian Approach'
*1 is basically to take prior information and convert it
to 'prior probabilities' and then by using Bayes' Therom
these are converted into 'posterior probabilities.'
Bayes Therom is as follows:- Given that the event A
can occur only if one of the mutually exclusive events
B1, B2 ,••••••• Bn has occurred before it. The B's may
precede A in time or may occur simultaneously 81 •••••• 8n
P(8./A)=
~ P(8.) x P(A/8.)~ ~
n
L_ p (B .)
J
x P(A/B .)
J
j = 1
8ayes Therom is best considered in terms of an example.
Three urns contain the following proportion of coloured
balls.
Urn 1 Urn 2 Urn 3
White
Black 2 5
Red 3 3
If a sample of two balls of which one is white and the
other is red, is taken from one urn without knowing
*1 WHITTLE. (1976 Page B6-87) & RAFFA (1968)
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which urn is being sampled, what is the probability
that the urn sampled is:-
Urn 1(a)
(b)
(c)
Urn 2
Urn 3
It would seem reasonable to assume that each of the urns
are equally likely to occur.
p(U.) = !
~ i = 1,2,3.
Conditional probability for the event that has occurred
(A i.e. One white and one red ball drawn).
P(A/U1) = Probability of event A given it was
from urn 1•
= P(white) and P(red) or p(red) and p(white)
= 1/6 x 3/5 + 3/6 x 1/5
= 1/10 + 1/10 = 2/10 = 1/5
Similarly
P(A/U2) = 1/3
p (A/U3) = 2/11
Substitute in Bayes Therom
P(U1/A) = Probability that Urn 1 was used given that
event A has occurred.
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P(U1/A) = 1/3 x 1/5-------------------------------------(1/3 x 1/5) + (1/3 x 1/3) + (1/3 x 2/11)
= 33 = 0·28
118
Similarly
= 0·42
118
= 0·25
It could be argued that so far the cart has been put before
the horse; all that has been considered is the use and
further calculations of probability with no mention of
how probabilities are arrived at. /
The classical statistical approach to the calculation
of probabilities given in the statistical texts is that
probability of a particular event occurring is given by
the number of occurrences of the event divided by the
total number of all occurrences, i.e,
Number of occurrences of event A
Probability of event A =
total number of all occurrences.
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This method of determination of probability is effective
providing the data required is available. Although this
is the case for calculations involving decks of cards,
dice, etc., this is not true in connection with the
majority of business situations. Consider a typical
business problem that of forecasting future sales.
Past sales information can be used to determine the
probabilities of different sales figures by using vario~s
mathematical techniques from moving averages to the more
mathematically sophisticated Box-Jenkins Technique.
These methods of forecasting the probabilities of different
events are passive in nature. They assume that like the
pack of cards the sales will react along fixed lines based
purely on past information. Most business situations do
not depend completely on the past but on changing con-
ditions in the present. The oil crisis of the early
nineteen seventies is a good example of this. This crisis
had a dramatic effect on the sales of a new motor vehicle,
which were less than expected. This was just one factor
which could have had an effect on car sales, others
could have been Government legislation, social changes,
environmental issues, etc. An alternative approach to
producing a single component forecast is to carry out a
multivariate analysis. With multivariate analysis the
effect of each factor is. estimated individually. This
has the advantage that when a forecast is produced each
factor can be varied individually. This makes the
forecast sensitive to changes in individual factors.
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The effects of some factors are not predictable from the
past sales figures but must be estimated in some other
way. One possible way is by determining the effect of
these factors on the probabilities of sales in a
subjective manner. Some probabilities can only be set
subjectively as there is no past data from which to
work. One other method for the determination of the
effects of var~ous factors on probabilities and the
generation of probabilities when there is little past
information is that of simulation modelling, this
technique will be dealt with more fully in a later
section, however, there can be required within simulation
subjective probabilities.
A subjective probability may be defined as a probability
that has been set by an individual or a group of
individuals using his/her or their collective experience
and knowledge due to the fact that there is insufficient
data to allow the probability to be calculated in the
classical manner (the situation may be changeable which
could not allow the probability to be calculated in a
classical manner either).
There are many problems which can arise when subjective
probabilities are being determined. Tversky and Kahneman
*1 put forward the idea that there are three basic
Heuristics people use when setting probabilities,
1) Representativeness, 2) Availability and 3) Anchoring
and Adjustment.
*1 TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN (1974)
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2.4.2. THE HEURISTIC OF REPRESENTATIVENESS.
Suppose one is asked one of the following questions.
What is the probability that object A belongs to class
B? What is the probability that event A originates
from Process B? What is the probability that process
B will generate event A? In the determination of such
probabilities the heuristic of Representativeness is
likely to be used. To think how representative object
A is of class B or how representative event A is of events
produced by process B is a way of approaching this question.
This approach can lead to certain major problems.
Kahneman and Tversky *1 carried out some work with
occupations and descriptions of peoples characters.
For example given the following description of an
individuals character "Steve is very shy and withdrawn,
invariably helpful but with little interest in people,
or in the world of reality. A meek and tidy soul, he
has a need for order and structure and a passion for
detail" and the following list of occupations farmer,
salesman, airline pilot, librarian or physician, then
rank these from the most likely to the least likely
occupations that Steve follows.
They found that people solving the problem used the
representativeness of their stereotypes of the different
occupations in determining the relative chances of the
different occupations.
*1 KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY. (1973)
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This method for determining probabilities needs to take
account of other factors. If these factors are ignored
then the basic laws of conditional probabilities have not
been taken into account and the following mistakes could
be made.
a) Not allowing for prior probabilities.
Prior probabilities are not usually used in the process
of representativeness. Take for example the problem of
steve and determining his occupation. The fact there are
more farmers in the population than there are librarians
should have affected the relative probabilities of the
different occupations. The exact effect of the prior
probability is debatable but this is to be expected as
we are talking in terms of subjective probabilities.
Kahneman and Tversky *1 have carried out some experimental
work which suggests that the majority of people ignore
Prior Probabilities when setting subjective probabilities.
The subjects were given a series of character profiles
'chosen at random' from a group of 100 professionals.
30 engineers and 70 lawyers. The character profiles were
carefully worded so as to give no information as to the
profession of the individual for example 'Dick is a
thirty-year-old man. He is married with no children.
A man of high ability and high motivation, he promises
to be quite successful in his field. He is well liked
by his colleagues.'
Given this type of description (which is completely
*1 KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY. (1973)
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useless providing no information) the subjects ignored
the useful prior probabilities and considered the
probability of an engineer 0·5 and the probability of a
lawyer 0·5. When the subjects were given no character
profile at all and just asked for the probability of an
individual chosen at random from the group then they
used the prior probabilities and came out with the
probability for Engineers 0·3 and Lawyers 0·7.
b) Insensitivity to sample size.
Another problem of the technique of representativeness is
that of insensitivity to sample size. Kahneman and
Tversky *1 showed that when people were presented with
a problem that involved sample size this sample size was
ignored. One of the problems they used was concerned with
the sampling from a large group of men (average height
51 1011) samples of 1000, 100 and 10 men and then using
these to obtain average height figures. The subjects
were asked to estimate the probability of obtaining
samples with average heights in Bxcess of six feet. The
majority of subjects arrived at the same figure for all
three samples sizes which showed a lack of understanding
of the fact that the greater the sample size the smaller
the variation in means and therefore the probability of
such an event should reduce as sample size increases.
The subjects fared no better even when the sample size
was emphasised in the formulation of the problem, for
example lA certain town is served by two hospitals. In
the larger hospitals about 45 babies are born each day,
*1 KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY. (1972)
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and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born
each day. As you know, about 50% of all babies are boys.
However, the exact percentage varies from day to day.
Sometimes it may be higher than 50%, sometimes lower.
For a period of ona yaar each hospital recorded the
days on which more than 60% of the babies born were boys.
Which hospital do you think recorded more such days 7'
When this problem was used the majority of subjects still
thought the probabilities would be the same in all cases.
c) Lack of understanding of the element of chance.
This problem falls into two main parts the lack of
understanding of randomness and the non-appreciation
of independence. Kahneman and Tversky *1 showed that
the concept of randomness was not fully understood by
the majority of their subjects. When they asked their
subjects which was more likely when tossing a coin six
times H-T~H-T-T-H or H-H-H-T-T-T the majority of their
subjects said that the first was more likely than the
second and only a few came up with the correct answer
that they are in fact both equally likely. This shows
that people are likely to think that ordered sequenced
groups cannot be random whereas this is not necessarily
so.
The other problem concerning chance is the lack of
understanding of independence. For example if a coin
*1 KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY (1972)
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has been thrown six times and six heads have been recorded
what is the chance of obtaining a head on the next throw.
It is an understandable mistake to assume that the chance
of a head must be less than that of a tail, i.e. to assume
that one throw is related to the next, when in fact each
throw is independant (a coin cannot have a memory and
remember the prior results) Tversky and Kahneman *1 showed
that this was a common failing in their subjects.
d) Misconception of validity.
A further problem arising from the use of the heuristic
of representativeness can be the attribution of too high
a validity to subjective probabilities obtained in this
way. Most people take insufficient account of the problems
caused by lack of information or inaccuracies within such
information or misinterpretation of the information
available.
e) Misconception of regression.
Applying incorrect causal relationships can lead to bias
and error in the representative heuristic. The following
example of Kahneman and Tversky *2 illustrates an
incorrectly assumed relationship.
"In a discussion of flight training, experienced
instructors noted that praise for an exceptionally smooth
landing is typically followed by a poorer landing on the
next try, while harsh criticism after a rough landing is
usually followed by an improvement on the next try. The
*1 TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN.
*2 KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY. (1971)(1973)
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instructor concluded that verbal rewards are detrimental
to learning while verbal punishments are beneficial,
contrary to accepted psychological doctrine."
This in fact is a spurious relationship. Whatever
comments are made to the trainee, the results are likely
to be the same due to the fact that performances are
distributed about a mean for each trainee and will vary
about that mean, some better some worse. The acceptance
of spurious relationships can lead to inaccuracies in
the setting of subjective probabilities. This type of
mistake is not only made by people with no statistical
training but is all too common among people with stat-
istical training.
2.4.3. THE HEURISTIC OF AVAILABILITY.
This technique is used in situations where people assess
the frequency of occurrence of a class or the probability
of a given event by the number of times and the ease that
such occurrences or events can be brought to mind. For
example if one was asked to assess the risk of fatality
due to motor vehicle accidents one way would be to bring
to mind the fatalities encountered and use this to assess
the risk.
This like the first method of assessing subjective
probabilities can be reasonable, however, it can lead
to certain problems which can introduce bias and error.
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a) The retrievability of instances.
Tversky and Kahneman *1 suggest:
"When the size of class is judged by the availability
of its instances, a class whose instances are easily
retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of
equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable."
They showed this effect by presenting their subjects
with lists of men and women and asking them which of the
lists were the larger. Errors were frequently made when
smaller lists of famous men or women were used. The
subjects thought these lists were the larger.
other problems of retrievability are the way by which the
events arrived at the brain and the recentness of such
events. If one actually experiences an event oneself
the impact and therefore the retrievability is usually
much greater than if one records or is told of such an
event. Also the source of ones information (whether read
or told) can effect the impact of the information, the
more 'reliable' the information the more the impact.
How recently the event occurred could possibly effect the
retrievability of such an event. Retrievability can be
affected by many things and will of course vary considera-
bly from individual to individual.
b) Biases due to the effectiveness of a search set.
Biases may be due to the ineffectiveness of certain sets
*1 TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN. (1974)
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of events stored by people. Due to social, economic,
business or other reasons people form different sets of
events due to their different experiences and this could
form an element of bias. The search set of managers
(i.e. their experience) will vary from manager to manager
depending upon such factors as, the length of time the
person has been a manager, the types of management roles
carried out, the management ability of the person, etc.
c) Biases of imaginability.
"Imaginability plays an important role in the evaluation
of probabilities in real life situations. The risk
involved in an adventurous expedition, for example, is
evaluated by imagining contingencies with which the
expedition is not equipped to cope. If many such diff-
iculties are vividly portrayed the expedition can be made
to appear exceedingly dangerous, although the ease with
which disasters are imagined need not reflect their actual
likelihood. Conversely, the risk involved in an undertaking
may be grossly under-estimated if some possible dangers
are either difficult to conceive of, or simply do not
come to mind."
Tversky and Kahneman *1.
Although this is in terms of expeditions the same applies
to a large number of business decisions. There can be a
great difficulty in imagining and conceiving the factors
involved and the possible outcomes of events.
*1 TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN. (1974)
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Imaginability is not only important in terms of different
factors it can also be important in mathematical concepts.
For example if you were to ask a production manager the
number of possible schedules it is possible to draw up
by putting 50 different jobs through a six machine sequence
he is most likely to grossly under-estimate the possible
number. This lack of imaginability of certain mathem-
atical concepts can cause problems in the setting of some
subjectives probabilities.
2.4.4. THE HEURISTIC OF ADJUSTMENT AND ANCHORING.
A possible technique when setting subjective probabilities
is to start from an initial value and then adjust this
value in the light of experience or knowledge. An
example of this type of heuristic could be found in the
forecasting field. The initial forecast will be set by
using mathematical forecasting, this being the anchoring
stage. This initial value could then be adjusted by
managers to take account of such factors as, increased
amount of advertiSing by either own company or competitors,
the present economic climate etc., this being the
adjustment stage.
There are two main problems with this technique the
first the initialisation value and second insufficient
adjustment from this value. Slavic and Lichtenstein *1
carried out a series of studies concerned with asking
people certain quantities stated in percentages (for
example the percentage of African countries in the
*1 SLOVIC & LICHTENSTEIN. (1971)
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United Nations). They started the process at random
for the initialisation value and asked the subjects
whether it was too high or too low and to adjust the
values. They found that due to reluctance of the subjects
to move far away from the initialisation value this value
had quite an effect an the final estimates even though
this value had been set at random. This particular effect
is likely to be felt in the business situation when initial
values have been set by the Managing Director or a tech-
nical expert, whom other personnel would be reluctant to
challenge.
2.4.5. SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY IN PRACTICE.
Where an individual is setting subjective probabilities
it is unlikely that just one of three heuristics will be
used. It is far more likely that some combination of the
three will be used. These techniques can give quite
acceptable results providing that the problems discussed
in sections 2.4.2.,3 & 4 are overcome. An important
contribution to the salving of these problems is to
ensure that the manager has a knowledge of the statistical
concepts involved.
A concept that can be used successfully to supplement the
three heuristics is the cumulative density function (CDr).
This has the advantage that a range of valu~s can be
created instead of individual values. To create a cor
five percentiles have to be estimated the 1st, 25th, 50th,
75th and 99th percentiles. Training may need to be given
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as to what percentiles are and most people will need
some experience at setting them which can be obtained by
using a gameing simulation. There will in most people
be a tendency to set the percentiles too close together
and to give a COF with too little range as the majority
of people fail to appreciate the uncertainty associated
with situations. Raiffa and Alpert *1 and Wallace *2
have carried out experiements which seem to suggest that
this conservatism is general. With training this natural
conservatism can be overcome.
The percentiles required may be defined as follows:-
1st Percentile is a value such in the assessors opinion
there is a 1% chance that the quantity
being assessed will be b~low it and a
99% chance it will be above it (this
value could almost be .considered the
lower limit of the quantity.)
25th Percentile is a value such in the assessors opinion
there is a 25% chance that the quantity
being assessed will be below it and a
75% chance it will be above it.
50th Percentile is a value such in the assessors opinion
there is a 50% chance that the quantity
being assessed will be below it and a
50% chance it will be above it.
*1 RAIFFA & ALPERT. (1969)
*2 WALLACE. (1975)
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75th Percentile is a value such in the assessors opinion
there is a 75% chance that the quantity
being assessed will be below it and a
25% chance it will be above it.
99th Percentile is a value such in the assessors opinion
there is a 99% chance that the quantity
being assessed will be below it and a
1% chance it will be above it. (this
value could almost be considered the
upper limit of the quantity.)
A possible procedure for the setting of these Percentiles
is as follows:-
1. Select a value for the 50th Percentile.
2. Select the values for the 1st and 99th Percentile.
(i.e. the upper and lower limit).
3. The values for the 25th and 75th percentiles now need
to be set. These can be arrived at by dividing the
halves of the distribution already obtained. This
division must be carried out by dividing probabilities
by two and not the distance along the distribution.
The value arrived at by this division will be
approximately one third of the way along the scale
from the 50th percentile (one standard deviation).
An alternative approach to the setting of these two
percentiles is to produce a range within a range.
When the 1st and 99th percentile are set the range
of all values is set. The second range could be set
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within the first range but containing 50% of values.
Individual managers may have a preference for either
of the methods depending on their statistical knowle-
dge and training.
Such a procedure is quite useful when used in conjunction
with the heuristics and a basic training in statistics.
Gameing simulation can be very useful in the training
of assessors of subjective probabilities. It allows
individuals to gain experience and allows them to get
over some of the problems outlined without any dangers
to the organisation of incorrect or biased results.
Also it allows the organisation the chance to assess
the subjective probability setting of different
individuals. The techniques of simulation modeling
will be dealt with in section 2.6.
Computers will obviously be of value for gameing
simulation. Schlaifer *1 takes the use of the computer
into an interactive role. He designed a series of an-line
packages. Initially they provide a tutorial system for
the assessor to gain experience and knowledge in the
assessing of subjective probabilities. When this has
been gained they then go on to assist the assessor in the
assessing of actual subjective probabilities and provide
him with built in consistency checks. The post Office
Corporation have found that individuals setting subjective
probabilities have prefered the computer interaction
*1 SCHLAIFER. (1971)
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rather than having a statistician or decision analyst
providing the consistency checks.
The use of groups in the setting of subjective probab-
ilities will only be dealt with briefly here. The methods
of using groups will be dealt with in a separate section
as they are also important in a number of different areas
including the determination of information needs and design
of information systems. One major problem with the use of
groups is the bandwagon sffect, that is to say the group
will tend to follow ths individual or sub-group of
individuals with the stronger personality and/or most
power. This would be fine if these were the people who
were best at setting these subjective probabilities but
this unfortunately is not necessarily the case. A way
round this effect is to use techniques like Delphi.
Within this technique individuals are asked to fill in
questionnaires, the results of which are used to produce
the next questionnaire and this procedure is continued
until a consensus opinion is reached. By this approach
it is usual to eliminate a certain amount of the band
wagon effect although some individuals views will bound
to be stronger than others. Winkler *1 has suggested
that the final concensus should be a weighted average of
the individuals estimates. He suggests four methods of
weighting such values.
1. Equal weights to each individual.
2. Self-weighting.
3. Subjective weighting by a third party
*1 WINKLER. (1970)
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(possibly by members of the group or by an
'expert unbiased individual').
4. A weighting based on past experience.
The first method is of no value and the latter three
could introduce considerable bias. It should be possible
to introduce a combination of the last three that if
used carefully could reduce bias. Indeed if it is to be
co~sidered a realistic method then some method other
than the first must be used, although this will nat
praclu~e the possibility of equa1!ty being arrived at.
2.4.6. SUMMARY.
The only effective way to measure uncertainty is to use
a numeric measure such as probability. The phrases used
by same managers such as possible, doubtful, etc., are
of little value as they mean different levels of uncer-
tainty to different people. Probabilities being numeric
in nature can be used to extend the knowledge of the
situation by using the various rules of probabilities
including the more complex theromes such as Bayes'
(these can be of great use in such things as decision
analysis, decision trees, etc.).
There does occur one major problem with probabilities;
that of actually determining a value. The majority of
business situation unlike mast situations talked of in
classical probability are dynamic. Consider the prob-
ability of drawing an ace from a pack of cards, an easy
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situation. To determine a large number of business
situations would be like finding the probability of an
ace from a randomly changing pack of cards (not only
changing in terms of the number of cards but also in
terms of contents with a few jokers for good measure~.
It is not easy to calculate probabilities under these
conditions it is better to use subjective probabilities
i.e. probabilities assessed by individuals or groups
of individuals based on experience, knowledge and
information. There are three heuristic methods avail-
able which can be used individually or in a combination
these being:-
1. The heuristic of Representativeness.
2. The heuristic of Availability.
3. The heuristic of Adjustment and Anchoring.
There can be problems in using these methods and
assessors will need a certain amount of statistical
training and assistance in setting of probabilities.
This can be provided effectively by using simulation
gameing in the form of an interactive computer package.
It sometimes can be advantageous to use groups of
assessors to arrive at a more broadly based subjective
probability although this again can lead to problems.
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2.5. DECISION ANALYSIS.
The process of decision making by management has been
discussed in detail within the section on the 'Manage-
ment Process'. Decision Analysis as being discussed here
could be said to consist of a group of analytical
techniques which assist managers to make decisions.
These techniques carry out much of the problem solving
then allowing management to make the decisions.
The taking of decisions in uncertain conditions involves
the following sequences of stages. The range of actions
available to the manager must be specified. The outcomes
for each action should then be listed, these outcomes
could be different for each action and variable in nature.
Using these possible outcomes monetary values may be
placed upon the different actions open to the managers,
these may be in terms of returns and costs. The manager
then uses this information, his decision criterion and
any non-quantifiable information to try and make the
best decision.
Decision analysis as proposed by some writers in the
field of D.R. is concerned only with statistical decision
theory. Although this is an important part of decision
theory, there is in fact 8 great deal more to be
considered.
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2.5.1. STATISTICAL DECISION THEORY.
Statistical decision theory applies the concepts of
probability and expectation to provide a decision aid
for managers. The concepts of probability have been
developed in section 2.4.
Expectation is concerned with the establishment of the
Expected Return (or in some cases Expected Cost) assoc-
iated with a series of outcomes resulting from a given
action. Providing that the probability and the Monetary
Returns (or cost) are known for each outcome and that the
set of outcomes contains all possible outcomes for that
action, the expected Monetary Return (E(M) ) can be
calculated as a weighted average by multiplying the
probability by the return of an outcome and then summing
over all possible outcomes.
Suppose a person receives an amount of money M1 if event
Z1 occurs, M2 if Z2 occurs and so on to Mn if Zn occurs.
Expected monetary return = E(M) = (probability of Z,xM,)
+ (probability of Z2 x M2) + •••••••••• + (probability of
Zn x Mn), given that the sum of all probabilities equals
one.
Consider the following example from the field of life
insurance. The probability that a man aged 55 will live
for another year is 0·99. How large a premium should he
pay for a £2,000 life insurance policy for one year?
The amount of premium the man should pay for such insurance
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must be equal to his expected return from the policy.
There are two possible outcomes. Outcome one, that the
man lives, has a probability of 0·99 and a monetary return
of £0. Outcome two, that the man dies, has a probability
of 0·01 and a monetary return to the man's estate of £2,000.
therefore E(M)= (0·99xO) + (0.01x2000)
= 0+20
= £20
therefore the premium = £20 + (charges for the insurance
companies administration,
profit, etc.).
This technique can be applied in situations where a
decision needs to be taken. The following example requires
a decision. A person wishes to sell his car and has two
alternatives. Alternative one, to go to a dealer with
complete certainty of selling for £1,550. Alternative
two, to advertise in a local paper at a cost of £10 in
order to sell the car for £1,700 but he only expects a
0·6 probability of a sale. The Monetary Returns from the
actions can be evaluated as follows:-
Alternative one:- not to advertise
Outcome Probability
Monetary
Returns.
Sell to dealer 1 £1,550
therefore E(M) = 1 x 15501
= £1,550
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Alternative two:- to advertise in local paper
(cost (10)
Outcome Probability
sell through ad. 0·6
Monetary
Return.
sell to dealer 0·4
£1,700
£1,550
therefore E(M2) = (0·6x1700) + (0·4x1550)
= 1020 + 620
= £1640 this value is a grass return.
the Gost of the action must be deducted
E(M2) = 1640 - 10
= £1,630 this value is a net return.
From these figures it would appear that the action giving
the greatest return would be to advertise the car in the
local paper. This information can be presented in a
different farm which gives a greatly improved visual
impact. This method of presentation is called a Decision
Tree. The example of selling the car can be produced in
a decision tree farm and is shawn in figure five. It
can be seen from this decision tree that the calculations
stay the same but the tree has a greater visual impact
than the table. This visual impact becomes greater the
mare complicated the tree.
Decision trees are constructed with four basic steps:-
1) Construct the tree to represent the logic of the
situation; squares to shaw a decision point with
the actions coming from the square; circles to shaw
paints of alternative outcome with the alternative
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Figure Five: Decision Tree for Car Selling Problem.
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outcomes coming from the circle.
2) Write on the trees the return from different
alternatives and their probability of occurrance,
ensuring that the probabilities on any branch of
the tree add to one. Also place on the tree the
costs of the various actions open to the decision
maker.
3) Calculate the Expected Monetary Returns starting
from the right hand side of the tree and working
to the left.
4) Determine the best decision from the tree.
Classical decision theory suggest that the best
route through the tree and hence the best decision
is the one with the largest monetary return or if
expected costs are being considered the one with
the smallest Expected Cost.
The use of decision trees can be further examined by use of
an example closer to the problems facing management. The
following example although still a simplification of
reality has been used by both Moore *1 and Magee *2 to
demonstrate how to produce decision trees.
The following information is available to the manager
from three sources.
*1 MOORE.
*2 MAGEE.
(1976)
(1964)
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a) Marketing Information.
The Marketing Manager sWggasts a 60 per cent chance
of a larger market in the long run and 40 per cent
chance of a low demand developing as follows:-
Initially high, sustained high 60%
Initially high, long term low 10% )
Low 40%
Initially low, continuing low 30% )
Initially low, subsequently high 0%
2 years 8 years
10 years
b) Annual Income.
The Management accounting section have put forward
the following financial estimates:
(i) A large plant operating under high market
demand conditions would yeild i1 million
annually in cash flow.
(ii) A large plant operating under low market demand
conditions would only yield iO·1 million annually
in cash flow because of high fixed costs and
inefficiencies.
(iii)A small plant operating under low market demand
conditions would be economical and would yield
iO·4 million annually in cash flow.
(iv) A small plant operating under high market demand
conditions initially (i.e. the first two years)
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would yield £0·45 million annually in cash flow,
but this would drop to £0·25 million annually
in cash flow if the high demand market conditions
were sustained for the last eight years of
operating.
(v) If an initial small plant was expanded after two
years and was operating under high market demand
conditions it would yield £0·7 million annually
in cash flows for the remaining eight years and
so would be less efficient than a large plant
built initially.
(Vi) If an initial small plant was expanded after two
years and was operating under low market demand
conditions it would yield £0·05 million annually
in cash flows for the remaining eight years and
so would be less efficient than a large plant
built initially.
c) Capital Costs.
Estimates from construction companies indicate that
a large plant would cost £3 million to build and put
into operation. A small plant would cost £1·3 million
initially and an additional £2·2 million if expanded
after two years.
Management has two possible actions it can take either to
build a large plant or a small plant. If the small plant
is constructed there is an option to extend it after two
years. A series of outcomes of high and low market demands
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will follow these actions. Given this knowledge and the
three sets of information a decision tree can be constructed.
The decision tree being shown in figure six.
The probabilities after outcome one and two need to be
adjusted because from the information the probability of
an initial high and then a sustained high is 0·6 and the
probability of an initial high and then a long term low is
0·1. This gives a branch on the tree with a set of
probabilities that do not add to one, this then needs to
be rectified to ensure they do add to one. This is carried
out with a simple weighting process by dividing each prob-
ability by the sum of the probabilities on that branch so
ending with probabilities which add to one.
therefore Probability of initial high,
then sustained high = 0·6
0·6+0·1 = 0·6 = 0.860·7
therefore Probability of initial high,
then long term low = 0·1
0·6+0·1 =
Using Classical Statistical Decision Theory the decision
giving the greatest return is that of building a large
plant.
2.5.2. THE EFFECT OF DISCOUNTING ON DECISION TREES.
The discounted cash flow method of appraisal attempts to
value projects in terms of the future value of the money
100
-Figure Six: Decision Tree to Plant Size Problem. -..tleN)
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returned. The basic philosophy behind D.C.F. techniques
is that a pound invested in a project now could as time
progresses be earning interest and so increasing its total
value so this amount of interest that could have been
earned must be taken off the money returned from the project.
The present value (Discounted Cash Flow) can be calculated
by the following formula.
Present Value = M
where M = amount of money to be discounted
n = number of periods or times at which interest
is calculated.
I = the interest rate used for calculation of
interest in anyone of the n periods mentioned
above.
A discounting factor for any given time period will be
given by the following formula.
Discounting Factor
(for time period n) = 1
The principle argument against the use of discounting is
that as this discounting rate can only be an estimate then
the results cannot be considered reliable. In this
particular application all the other information tends
to be estimated and, therefore, one mare estimate can be
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of little consequence as the solutions are only correct
within certain limits. It must be remembered that dis-
counting rates could be expected to change during the
project life span, this will then require the use of
several discounting rates. Discounting can be carried out
by multiplying the return by the appropriate discounting
factor. The factor can be obtained from tables (Murdoch
& Barnes *1) or from the following accounting approach.
The actual choice of a discount rate is difficult and can
only be made by managers in conjunction with the accountants
looking at economic forecasts to estimate what the rate is
likely to be in the future. In the case of this example
suppose 10% was thought appropriate and factors for ten
years will be needed.
DISCOUNTING RATE 10%
YEAR FACTOR YEAR FACTOR
1 0·91 6 0·56
2 0·83 7 0·51
3 0·75 8 0·47
4 0·68 g 0·42
5 0·62 10 0·39
These discounting factors can then be applied to the
returns in the manner shown in the table given in figure
seven A,B & C. Having now discounted the returns they
can now be added to the tree as shown in figure eight.
All costs have now been taken from these returns so the
costs now added to the tree are only added as points of
information.
*1 MURDOCH & BARNES. (1970 Table 33)
Figure Seven A:Table Discounting Returns to Plant Size
Problem.
Demand Build Large Plant
Initial High High Low
Long Term High Low Low
Year Factor Return DCF Return DCF Return DCF
l.m 1m 4m
1 0·91 1 0·91 1 0·91 0·1 0·091
-
2 0-83 1 0·83 1 0-83 0·1 0·083
3 0·75 1 0·75 0-1 0·075 0·1 0·075
4 0·68 1 0·66 0·1 0-068 0·1 0·068
5 0·62 1 0·62 0·1 0-062 0·1 0·062
6 0·56 1 0·56 0·1 0-056 0-1 0·056
7 0·51 1 0-51 0·1 0·051 0-1 0-051
8 0·47 1 0·47 0-1 0-047 0·1 0·047
9 0·42 1 0-42 0·1 0-042 0·1 0-042
10 0-39 , 0-39 0,' 0·039 0·1 0·039
Total DCF !m 6·14 2·16 0·614
Less Cost lm 3 3 3
Nett Present Value1m 3·14
(0-82 ) (2·386)
Return on Capital
Invested (per L )
(0-08 )1-05 (0,27)
(0·821 indicates negative values
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Figure Seven B:Table Discounting Returns to Plant Size
Problem.
Demand Small Plant{Not Extended)
Initial High High Low
Long Term High Low Low
YQor Factor Return DCF Return DCF Return DCF
lm 1m
1 0·91 0'45 0·41 0·45 0·41 0·4 0·364
2 0·83 0·45 0·37 0·45 0·37 0-4 0·332
3 0·75 0·25 0·186 0·4 0·30 0·4 0·300
4 0·68 0·25 0·170 0·4 0·272 0·4 0·272
5 0·62 0·25 0·155 0·4 0'248 0'4 0·246
6 0.56 0·25 0·140 0·4 0·224 0-4 0·224
7 0·51 0·25 0·128 0·4 0·204 0·4 0·204
8 0·47 0·25 0·118 0·4 0·188 0·4 0·188
9 0·42 0·25 0·105 0·4 0·168 0·4 0·168
10 0·39 0·25 0-098 0-4 0·156 0'4 0·156
Total DCF Im 1·882 2·54 2·456
Less Cost Im 1·3 1·3 1·3
Nett Present Value
Am 0·582 1·24 1·156
Return on Capital
Invested (perl) 0·45 0·95 0·89
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Figure Seven C:Table Discounting Returns to Plant Size
Problem.
Demand Small Plant Extended
In itiaL High High
Long Term High Low
Year Factor Return DCF Return DCF
lm l.m
1 0·91 0·45 0·41 0-45 0·41
2 0·83 0·45 0-37 0-45 0·37
3 0·75 0-7 0-525 0·05 0-036
4 0-68 0·7 0·476 0·05 0·034
5 0-62 0·7 0·434 0-05 0-031
6 0·56 0·7 0·392 0-05 0·028
7 0·51 0-7 0·357 0-05 0-026
8 0·47 0·7 0-329 0-05 0·024
9 0'42 0·7 0·294 0-05 0·021
10 0·39 0·7 0·273 0·05 0-020
Total DCF Im 3·86 1·00
Less Cost Lm 3·5 3·5
(1,3+2,2) (1·3+2'2)
Nett Present Value 0·36 (2, 5 )
Return on Capital
Invested Ipar t) 0·10 (0·71 )
(0·711 indicates negative values
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Figure Eight: Decision Tree of Plant Size Problem showing
Discounted Returns and a Simple Rate of Return.
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2.5.3. THE ANALYSIS OF DECISION TREES.
Using a classical decision theory approach the best
decision would appear to be to build a large plant with
an expected return at present nett value of £1·09 million.
For a manager to use a decision tree to assist him in
the decision process the whole of the tree must be used.
A decision tree is a powerful method of visually
presenting the actions which can be taken by the manager
and the possible outcomes that can occur when these actions
are taken along with the expected results. The manager
must then use all of this information to make the decision.
The classical decision theory approach to choose the deci-
sion with the largest expected return is only one criterion
of choice and is in fact not a very good criterion.
Company policy could well affect the decision. Although
building the large plant brings in the greatest return
it does have a large risk element to it. With this route
there is a 0·6 chance of getting a large return, with a
0·4 chance of some amount of loss; With the small plant
route providing that it is not expanded whatever outcome
ensues some form of profit will be made. A large company
may well be able to stand the possibility of loss for the
greater return but for the small company the only option
may be to adopt the safe route as any loss could mean
their complete closure.
The financial terms are better considered in the amount
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of money being returned not purely as an amount but as
a rate per pound invested to obtain the return. The best
possible return on capital invested is £1·05 per £1
invested from the large plant operating with high market
demand. Taking into account the probabilities to obtain
the expected returns at present nett value and then using
these values to calculate the return on capital invested,
the action to build the large plant gives a rate of return
of £0·36 per £1 invested and with the action to build a
small plant the rate of return is £0·63 per £1 invested.
It would then seem a better decision to invest £1·3 million
in the small plant and try to find a project with a higher
rate of return from the remaining £1·7 million that may
have been invested in the large plant.
It must be remembered that there will be other projects
within the organisation all competing for limited
resources. Therefore, this project cannot be considered
in isolation and the returns should be considered along
with the returns from the other projects to find the
project or the group of projects best suited to the firms
requirements.
The decision maker must add into the decision making
process the effects of factors which may be difficult to
quantify. Factors such as availability of capital, the
effect of various actions on the employment of the
organisation, the effect of various actions on the 'image'
of the organisation the availability of labour to staff
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the plants, the availability of equipment for the
different plants, etc., all may need to be taken into
consideration by the decision maker and could well affect
the final action to be taken.
Finally it must be recognised that most of the figures
used in a decision tree of this nature are estimated and
the rate at which the returns are discounted can only be
an estimated rate. Given that the financial estimates
and the probabilities are estimated they can only be
correct within given limits. These limits need to be
considered by the decision maker. They could be written
on the tree and then used by the decision maker to apply
a sensitivity analysis with the use of statistical
techniques. It is likely however, that the average
decision maker could have considerable difficulty with
the concepts involved in confidence limits. One way
around this problem is to produce three trees:-
1) An optimistic tree showing all the values at their
best possible i.e. costs at the lowest returns at
the highest, etc.
2) A pessimistic tree showing all the values at their
worst possible, i.e. cost at the highest, returns
at the lowest, etc.
3) An expected tree showing all the values at their
expected or average value.
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This method has a number of advantages to recommend it.
It is useful at the stage where subjective values are
being set, it allows the manager to produce a series
of values instead of just one value and therefore it is
likely to improve the manager's ability to set such
subjective probabilities (see section 2.4.). The three
trees can then be used by the manager to allow for effect
of inaccuracies in the estimates. Given the average
value (expected value) it is possible to estimate the
standard deviation from the following formula
Standard Deviation = Optimistic Value - Pessimistic Value
6
This formula can be used to determine standard deviations
for sales or for expected values. The formula is based
on the fact that the optimistic value minus the pessi-
mistic value will give the range of values and that the
99% Confidence Limits contain six standard deviations.
Therefore, an approximate value for the standard deviation
will be given by dividing the range by six. This approx-
imation will become less accurate the more skewed the
distribution becomes. The following simplified example
shows how this technique can be applied.
A manufacturer has the choice of three different types
of machine to replace his existing plant.
Any money outlaid on machines must be returned in 3
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years which is the expected life of the machines.
The Company Accountant has produced the following cost
per unit estimates for the three types of machines.
M/C TYPE
Pessimistic Cost/Unit (i)
Expected Cost/Unit (i)
Optimistic Cost/Unit (i)
A
3.BO
3·00
2·60
These costs include all costs associated with the
production, administration and selling of the product
e.g. the cost of manufactaring, distributing, etc., but
excluding the initial purchase cost of the machine.
The Sales Manager has produced the following estimates of
sales over the three year period. These sales estimates
are independent of machine type and are in unit sales.
PESSIMISTIC ESTIMATES.
Sales over three year period
Probability of OCCurrance
EXPECTED ESTIMATES
Sales over three year period
Probability of occurrance
OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATES
Sales over three year period
Probability of occurrance
BODO 15000 25000
0·2 0·5 0·3
10000 20000 30000
0·2 0·4 0·4
12000 25000 35000
0·1 0·5 0·4
112
The cost of the machines are considered fixed and the
price at which the machines can be purchased is as
follows: Machine A at £20,000, Machine 8 at £30,000
and Machine C at £40,000. The selling price of the units
is £5 per unit. Splitting the information into three
groups pessimistic, expected and optimistic then three
decision trees can be produced. The figures have not
been discounted for ease of calculation but would be in
practice. The pessimistic tree is shown in figure nine,
the expected is shown in figure ten and the optimistic
tree is shown in figure eleven.
The results from the tree can be brought together for any
point on the tree,working on the point of the greatest
interest the final box decision, although it is important
in any practical case to consider other points on the tree.
These final decision box figures can be summarised.
MACHINE A Pessimistic Return
Expected Return
= (£80)
£24.000 StandardOevlation = £7,760=
Optimistic Return = £46,480
MACHINE 8 Pessimistic Return = £6520
Expected Return = £36,000 Standard
Deviation = £8687.
Optimistic Return = £58,640
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Figure Nine: Pessimistic Decision Tree to Machine Choice Problem.
30000 1·20
17600 2·20
E(MA}= i-80 E(M~)=l36520
E(Me)=16520
Buy MIC 2 33000 2·20
E(MC)=!6480
Cost l30000
55000 2·20
22400 2·80
R9turn R9turn p9r
L Un it L
9600 1·20
)IIt:-------- 18000
P=0·5
1·20
3 JIIE:-------- 42000
E(M3 )=/46480
2·80
70000 2·80
E(111 ) = (0'2 x 9600) + (0·5 K 18000) + (0-3 K 30000)
= 1920 + 9000.,. 9000
= i19920
E(H 2 )= (0·2 K 17600) + (0·5 K 33000) + (0-3 K 55000)
= 3520 + 16500 + 16500
=136520
£(113 )=(0·2 K 22400) + (0'5K 42000) + (0-3 x 70000)
= 4480 + 21000 + 21000
=i46480
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Figure Ten:Expected Decision Tree to Machine Choice Problem.
60000 2.00
30000 3·00
'\0000 n.
E(M2)=L66000 S0\\ '?~oE(MA)=L24000
E(Me)=!36000 60000 3·00
E(MC,=137000
('It 90000 3'()0
0
\1\..... 1-
~0 35000 3·50
~ ('I ~oo~ ;...\ ,\CJ 0:2-':P '?~
3 70000 350
E(M 3)=L77000
105000 3·50
E(111 )= (0,2)( 20000) + (0,4)( 40000) + (0,4)( 60000)
= 4000 + 16000 + 24000
= J41,.000
E(M 2)=(0'2)( 30000) + (0,4)( 60000) + (0,4)( 90000)
:: 6000 + 24000 + 36000
=/66000
Return R9turn per
L Unit l
20000 2·00
00
~\ ,\OQ "O:}.
Se v-
40000 2·00
P=0·4
E(M3)=( 0·2)( 35000) + (0·' )( 70000) + (0·4 I( 105000)
= 7000 + 28000 + 42000
=J77000
115
£(1'12)=( 0'11( 384001 + (0·5 x 80000) + (0,1, x 112000)
= 3840 + 40000 + 44800
=1.88640
£(1'13,=(0·11( 444001+(0·51(92500)+(0·l,x 129500)
= 4440 + 46250 + 51800
= l102490
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MACHINE C Pessimistic Return = £6,480
i,37,000 Standard
Deviation = i,9,335Expected Return =
Optimistic Return = i,62,490
These results are best presented in a visual form so as
to have maximum impact on managers this is shown in
figure twelve. Such a presentation can be valuable even
to managers with little statistical knowledge. The greater
the manager's statistical knowledge the more probablistic
the analysis can become. Normal distribution theory can
be used to determine the probability of achieving given
returns or given expected (average) returns.
The disadvantage of this method is that all the tree is
say optimistic whereas the manager may only want part of
the tree or some of the values of the tree to be optimistic.
This problem could be possibly overcome with the use of an
interactive computer simulation package to enable the
manager to monitor the effects of various changes in the
tree. There is also a problem of the amount of work
involved. Such an analysis increases the work in
collecting estimates, etc., but the time spent gaining
a range of value should greatly improve the quality of
such estimates. The work in the production of the trees
will be increased two fold and the work in analysis will
also be increased. Extra benefits gained from the extension
of decision trees in this manner, i.e. better estimates,
a greater awareness of the variability of decision trees
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Figure Twelve:Graph Showing Relationship Between Expected
Returns of the Three Machine Types in the
Machine Choice Problem.
Expected Return
1
60000
50000
40000
37000
36000
30000
20000
10000
o
I----~--------~+-- Machine C
"_ __ ~ _"L:,+-- Machine 8
24000
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and a measure of this variability, should outweigh this
extra work.
2.5.4. BAYESIAN DECISION THEORY AND DECISION TREES.
Bayesian ideas are important for decision theory.
Consider the following example used by Emery *1 in
determination of value of information.
Suppose the introduction of a new product is being
considered and to simplify the analysis we assume a
given profit if the product is a success and a given
loss if the product is a failure.
Actual Outcomes
(£000)
Success Failure
INTRODUCE 100 -50
ACTION
DO NOT 0 0
INTRODUCE
from past information marketing management determine that
60 per cent of the time new products have been successful
and therefore 40 per cent of the time failure. This in
Bayesian terms give the prior probabilities.
The problem is whether or not to produce a Market Research
Study and again we find that from past records the pred-
ictions of such surveys are correct 80 per cent of the time.
*1 EMERY. (1971)
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We now require the probabilities of predicting success
and actually getting success, predicting success and
actually getting failure, etc. By using Bayes Therom
we can arrive at the following mathematical form for the
probability of a failure given a prediction of a failure
(Prob(F/PF)) (See section 2.4.)
Prob(F/PF)= Prob(PF/F.Prob(F)
Prob(PF)
=
where Prob(F/PF) = probability of failure given a
prediction of failure.
Prob(PF/F) = probaility of predicting failure if
it actually would occur.
Prob(F) = probability of failure.
Prob(PF/S) = probability of predicting failure if
success actually would occur.
Prob(S) = probability of success.
Thus giving in this example:-
P(F/PF) = 0·BxO·4~0-.*8~x~0-.4~+-r(1~-~0~.~8~)-x~0~.~6
= 0·BxO·4
0·BxO·4+0·2xO·6
= 0·32 = 0.32 =
0·32+0·12 0744 ·7273
Similarly. the other posterior probabilities can be
calculated to give the following table of posterior
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probabilities.
ACTUAL OUTCOME
SUCCESS FAILURE
SUCCESS 0·8571 0·1429
PREDICTED
OUTCOME
FAILURE 0·2727 0·7273
All this information can now be used to produce a
decision tree of this situation. The cost of the market
research has not been placed on the tree as the value of
this piece of information is being determined. The cost
must then be at most equal to the value of the information
before it can be considered economic to carry out the
market research. If the cost is less than the value of
the information then it could be said that there is an
'Information Profit'. The returns on the tree have not
been discounted so as not to complicate the example
although in practice some form of discounting may be
considered necessary. The decision tree for this problem
is shown in figure thirteen.
E(M1) = (0.6x100,000)+(0·4x-50,000)
= 60,000 - 20,000
= £40,000
E(M2) = (O·S571x100,000)+(·1429x-50,OOO)
= 85,571 - 7,145
= £78,426
,
s-
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Figure Thirteen: Decision Tree to Market Research Problem.
====== Indicates Decision Chosen
(500) Indicates Negative Value
E(M)=i4
E(M)=!43919
Returns
l
100000
(50000)
o
100000
(50000)
o
100000
(50000)
o
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= (0'2727x100,000)+(007273x-50,000)
= 27,270 - 36,365
= £-9,095
E(M4) = (056x78426)+(0044xO)
= £43,919
NOTE:- The probability of 0044 for the prediction of a
failure comes from the underside of the Bayesian
expression to obtain the probability of a
failure given a prediction of a failure.
From the tree the value of the Market Research information
could be taken as £3,919 and providing that it could be
carried out for this value it would be economic. If it
could be carried out for less then it could be said that
an 'Information Profit' is being made. The full inter-
pretation of the tree will need to be carried out as for
the previous example of a decision tree. For example we
may have our own Market Research Section who are at the
present moment going through a slack period (only of a
temporary nature). In such cases even though the survey
may cost £6,000 it may still be considered necessary to
carry out the survey to keep the Market Research Section
in full employment. It must be remembered though that
such a value of the information is based upon an 80%
success rate of predictions. If this falls its value
will be reduced but if it can be increased then the value
will increase, but will level towards the 100% success rate.
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In this case the prediction rate of success and failure
have been taken to have the same value, in practice this
is not necessarily the case and different rates may need to
be used.
The use of Bayesian decision theory within decision trees
allows for the use of prior and posterior probabilities
which takes account of the fact that predictions and
outcomes are not necessarily the same thing. Providing
that the success rate of predictions is known it can be
taken into account and can be used as one method of setting
value to information. The use of Bayesian decision theory
bypasses the need for confidence limits on the conventional
decision tree and eliminates some of the difficulties
associated with decision trees.
2.5.5. SIMULATION AND OTHER QUANTITATIVE TECHNIQUES AND
DECISION TREES.
Simulation can have two major impacts on decision trees.
First it can provide information relating to business
decisions. By the use of simulation models with many
parameters predictions can be made of future events. Models
can provide probability elements, costs, returns, etc., to
place on the tree. This predictive mode of simulation
will be discussed at length in section 2.6.
The other major impact of simulation is in the provision
of an interactive simulation package, almost certainly
computerised. The first part of the package would provide,
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with the use of programmed learning, the manager's
introduction to decision analysis. This would then be
followed up with a further part providing support for
the manager's decision making. This would carry out all
the calculation work for the manager although from the
first part of the Package he would have an understanding
of the calculations involved. There would need to be a
question-answer procedure to construct the detail of the
decision tree and then to enable the manager to ask such
questions, as "what happens if I take the following ac t Lori"
etc. It would have advantages to provide such a package
on an on-line computing facility in that managers appear
to prefer to work with a computer than a decision analyst
in person. The manager would not have as many consultative
problems with the computer, he would not have to admit
lack of knowledge or ask the help of another member of
the organisation.
It must be remembered that many quantitative techniques
may be used in the determination of the various actions
and associated returns on the decision tree. Stock Control,
Mathematical Programming, Replacement and Reliability
Theory, etc., might all be used. Decision Analysis could
be said to involve many quantitative techniques and must
also take account of non-quantifiable factors.
2.5.6. SUMMARY
Decision Analysis can be of ~reat value to management.
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Decision trees provide a clear pictorial presentation of
any particular decision whatever quantitative techniques
have been used to determine results and outcomes of the
different actions which can be taken. It must be remem-
bered though that decision analysis is only an aid to
managers and such an analysis should be considered by the
manager along with all the non-quantifiable aspects of
the decision.
It is possible to use decision analysis as one method
of setting a value for a particular set of information.
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2.6. SIMULATION.
The technique of simulation modelling was developed for
three major reasons. First the basic approach of people
in the solution of problems is that of experimentation.
If one wants to change the layout of a room in a house
the basic approach by most people would be to experiment
with different layouts, until the best is found. The
penalty cost involved with disruption, relayout costs,
etc., are probably small and only limited to a little extra
backache. If this approach of direct experimentation was
to be applied in the redesign layout of a production area
within an organisation then the disruption and relayout
costs, etc., would be considerable so making the approach
uneconomic. Simulation modelling though allows a form of
experimentation to be carried out economically. To build
a model of the actual system provides a vehicle which can
be used at relatively little cost to carry out experiments.
The second major reason could be said to be mathematical
in origin. Simulation modelling can provide solutions to
problems that may require complicated, if not intractable
mathematics to solve. Queueing Theory is a good example
of this. The mathematics involved in the production of
equations for a simple queue are quite reasonable but
unfortunately simple queues are not found in many practical
examples. When queues are complicated by limits to their
size, varying arrival rates, complicated service rules,
etc., then the mathematics becomes very complex so making
simulation the easiest and the most economical approach.
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The third reason is in the development of O.R. itself.
Practitioners in the field of O.R. found that the techniques
frequently used were basically experimental in nature which
naturally led to the development of simulation. An
important part of O.R. is the implementation of results,
i.e. the 'selling' of the results to management. Sophis-
ticated mathematical solutions and concepts are all very
well between O.R. workers, but are unlikely to carry a
great deal of weight with the average manager. The old
proverb is very true: "People would rather live with a
problem they cannot solve than accept a solution they
cannot understand".
The average manager will be familiar with the methods of
simulation although not necessarily the jargon. Providing
that the methods are not obscured by massive computer
programs and fancy jargon he should be able to understand
clearly the processes used to obtain solutions.
Simulation models can be divide~ into three basic types.
2.6.1. ICONIC MODELS.
An iconic model represents certain aspects of a system
pictorially or visually. A model aircraft used in a wind
tunnel is an iconic model. Iconic models are frequently
used to display to customers a company's product range and
to help them visualise products which are either too large
or too small. They can be of great value when used to
provide visual information of this sort. They can also in
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a limited sense be of value in prediction i.e. in the
case of the aircraft it is far cheaper to make design
changes at the model stage of development than at the
prototype stage.
2.6.2. ANALOGUE MODELS.
An analogue model employs one set of properties to
represent some other set of properties which the system
being studied possesses, e.g. for certain purposes the flow
of water through pipes may be taken as an analogue of the
flow of electricity in cables or visa-versa. Maps, graphs,
and flow charts are further examples of analogue models,
where colours lines and positions are used to show physical
or other characteristics of the entity being studied.
These types of model have a considerable value in the
provision of information but like the Iconic model this is
principally in the provision of visual information and only
to a small degree in prediction and control.
2.6.3. SYMBOLIC MODELS.
A symbolic model is one which employs symbols to represent
properties of the system under study by means of a math-
ematical equation or set of such equations and mathematical
rules. The symbolic system is of the three the most diff-
icult to conceive and the most general and abstract.
This problem can be overcome in part by using a corres-
ponding iconic or analogue model, whose function is more
often explanatory than predictive. Symbolic models are
well suited to the prediction or determination of effects
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of changes on the actual systems. Symbolic modelling is
the type frequently used in Operational Research where
effects of change, etc., need to be discovered. This type
of modelling can be either carried out manually or on a
computer. In practice the majority of O.R. applications
of simulations are carried out with a digital computer,
which has a very much greater speed of operation and is
usually more accurate. The type of problems to which
solutions have been found by simulation include queuing
problems, stock control, production balancing, production
planning and scheduling, market and corporate planning,
etc.
Any particular simulation application may use more than
one type of model.
2.6.4. CONSTRUCTION Of A SIMULATION MODEL.
The best way to describe the construction of a simulation
model is with the aid of an example. Consider the following
example: A large building company has four sets of a
certain piece of specialised equipment (a cement spraying
machine). The company keeps the sets of equipment at a
central depot and they are sent out to the company's
different sites when required.
The first stage in the construction of a simulation is
that of determining the problem to be solved. This is
extremely important as it will affect the construction of
the model. It is also useful at this stage to try to
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consider possible future uses of the simulation to try and
make the work mare economically viable. In this particular
case the problem is that the company have found that four
sets of the equipment are not sufficient and require to
know the effect of different methods of operation of the
existing equipment and the effects of purchasing more sets
of the equipment. Given this statement of the problem
the model can now be constructed.
The next stage is to define the system. Within simulation
a simplistic definition of system can be used. The system
can be defined by the boundary drawn around it. Everything
inside the boundary is 'the system' everything outside the
system is 'the environment'. The drawing of this boundary
can be difficult. Too wide a boundary and the simulation
is large, difficult to construct and possibly uneconomic,
too small a boundary and the simulation is easy to construct
but is unlikely to represent the situation correctly.
The boundary should then be drawn as small as possible for
economic reasons but wide enough to allow an accurate
representation of the factors affecting the problem.
This definition of the system could well change as the
situation is analysed in more detail. In the case of the
example being considered a reasonable definition of the
system would appear to be the sets of the equipment and
the jobs on which they are used.
Having now defined the system the next step is to analyse
the system and to decide how detailed the simulation needs
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to be. How detailed the simulation is to be is a similar
problem to that of defining the systems. The more highly
detailed the model the more it will reproduce the real
system, it will however be large, cumbersome and expensive.
A model with little detail will be general in nature and
it will be relatively inexpensive but the results obtained
from it will have a wider margin of error. Within the
example do we need to create a separate entity for the
operator? This will depend upon the relationship between
the operator and equipment. If the operator comes with the
equipment or if anybody can operate the equipment then no,
but if there are only a limited number of operators
within the organisation all operating any of the sets of
the equipment then it may be possible that they could
affect the utilisation of the machine. If so then it
would be necessary to create separate entities for the
operators and machines. In the case of the example it will
be assumed that the equipment can be operated by any indi-
vidual, so such a model will require two sets of entities,
one to represent the sets of equipment (four initially but
will need to be increased when model is used for prediction),
and the other set to represent the jobs requiring the
equipment, (number unknown). Continuing the analysis of
the system the entities need to be described further. The
best way to describe a real system is by describiog the
states of the entities and the rules affecting the trans-
ition between states. Within this example the states of
the two entities and the relationship between the states
can be produced.
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ENTITY:- Set of Equipment (4 such entities).
LIST OF STATES: STATE 0 Not in use waiting at depot
STATE 1 In use at building site
NOTE:- in an actual example there would be far more
states for example; brokendown, waiting transport,
etc. These have not been included so as not to
over complicate the example.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATES: Such relationships are
better shown in diagramatical form as below.
STATE 0
Not in use waiting at
depot.
STATE 1
In use at building site.
ENTITY:- Job (number dependent on length of simulation
run)
LIST OF STATES. STATE 0 Job Arises.
STATE 1 Waiting for piece of equipment
to become vacent.
STATE 2 Job being carried out by equipment.
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STATE 3 Job completed.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATES: This ,relationship ear job
entity is shown in figure fourteen.
The next process in the production of a simulation model
is to determine the rules of transition between the states.
Some transitions are due to logic, the majority though
occur because of the progression of time. For example
for the entity job to move from state 2 to state 3 the
time taken to complete the job must have elapsed. For the
example being considered the following distribution of
times taken to complete jobs has been determined.
TIME TAKEN TO COMPLETE PROBABILITY OF
JOB IN DAYS. OCCURRENCE.
1 0·35
2 0·30
3 0·20
4 0·08
5 0·05
6 0·02
The time taken to complete a job is not fixed but is
variable and this variability can be built into the model
with Random Numbers. If a random number stream of two
digits is taken (00 to 99) and 35 of those numbers assoc-
iated with 1 day, 30 of them with 2 days and so on, then
such a table with the use of a random stream can create
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Figure Fourteen: Diagram ShowingRelationship Between the
states of the Job Entity for the
Simulation Example.
STATE 0
Job arises
..&
Is there Noa set of equipment
fr99
Yes
STATE 2 STATE 1
Job being carried out Waiting for piece of
by equipment equipment to become
vacant.
STATE 3
Job completed.
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job times randomly, but following the same pattern as
would be expected in the real situation.
LOOK UP CHART ONE TO CREATE JOB T I ME S •
RANDOM NUMBER DAYS.
00 - 34 1
35 - 64 2
65 - 84 3
85 - 92 4
93 - 97 5
98 - 99 6
Also needed to complete the model will be the number of
new jobs arising in any time period. For this example
the .numb ar of new jobs arising in any day is given. New
jobs arising at the beginning of the day.
2
4
6
PROBABILITY
OF OCCURRENCE
0·40
0·35
0·18
0·05
NUMBER OF NEW JOBS
ARISING IN ANY DAY
o
8 0·02
Converting this to a look up chart gives
136
LOOK UP CHART TWO: TO CREATE NUMBER OF JOBS/DAY.
RANDOM NUMBER NUMBER OF JOBS/DAY.
00 - 39 0
40 - 74 2
75 - 92 4
93 - 97 6
9B - 99 8
The mechanics of the simulation can now be constructed in
the form of a flow chart and operational tables. The flow
chart for this example is shown in figure fifteen A,B
and C.
Before a table/s to operate these instructions can be
determined a method for determin~ng time needs to be
introduced. The simulation needs a clock, this usually
being a simple counter. The 'tick' of the clock being
determined for each simulation as large as possible and
yet small enough to allow for the detail of the simu-
lation. In this case things occur daily so it would seem
that a day would be an appropriate 'tick'.
Now the time scale has been determined the tables to
carry out these rules can be constructed, in this case
one to record the M/Cs and one to record the jobs. These
tables are shown with the simulation being run for 15 days.
Figure sixteen shows table one the record of machines and
figure seventeen shows table two which records the job
Figure Fifteen A: Flowchart for Simulation Example.
Set M=number of
days in run
i= 0
n=O
i= i + 1
Seleet Random
Number
Detennine number
of jobs (Look up
chart two)
Set j =number of
jobs
Yes
A
No
n= n + 1
c
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Figure Fifteen B: Flowchart continued.
A
Set job number
to n ; add to job
list
Select Random
Number
Determine job
time( Look up
cncr+ one); add
time to job list
Allocate job to a
machine(first one
available),detenn ..
ine Jobinformatio
j= j-1
No
No
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Figure Fifteen C:Flowchart continued.
E
Run complete:
Determine control
measures
1)Average number
of days late
per job
2)Average number
of machines in
use per day
END
Note: Job information comprises the following:
1)Start day
2)Required completion
3)Actual completion
4)Oays late
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Figure Sixteen: Simulation Operating Table On@the Record of
Machine Operations.
Run No ___J.____Sheet No __.1_____No of Dcys , __l~.____ TABLE ONE
TIME Number of Jobs No MICs
MIC 1 MIC 2 MIC 3 MIC 4
Days R.N. Jobs In Use
1 09 0 0
2 54 2 1 2 2 21
3 80 4 3 4 3 4 5 45 6 ,
4 79 4 7 8 49 10 6 7 9
5 59 2 11 12 8 4
6 35 0 11 12 4
7 91 4 13 14 10 415 16 14
8 55 2 17 18 15 413
9 47 2 19 20 16 18 417
10 52 2 21 22 19 20 4
11 96 6232425 4262728 21 22
12 86 4 29 30 24 431 32
13 20 0 23 25 26 27 4
14 26 0 28 29 4
15 90 4 33 34 30 435 36
16 34 32 33
17 31
18 35
19
20 36
21
22 ,
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Figure Seventeen: Simulation Operating Table Two the Record of
Job Information.
Run No •.• 1... Sheet No•.J....No of Days ._1.~._._ TABLE TWO
Job Number of Days Start Req Compltn Actual Compltn Days
Number RN Days Oay (End of Dcy ) (End of Day) Late
1 42 2 2 3 3
2 01 1 2 2 23 06 1 3 3 3
4 06 1 3 3 3
5 26 1 3 3 3
6 57 2 4 4 5 1
7 52 2 4 5 58 80 3 4 6 6
9 45 2 4 5 5
10 68 3 6 6 8 2
11 48 2 6 6 7 1
12 12 1 6 5 6 113 89 4 7 10 10
14 49 2 7 8 8
15 33 1 8 7 8 1
16 10 1 9 7 9 2
17 60 2 9 9 10 1
18 19 1 9 8 9 1
19 55 2 10 10 11 1
20 48 2 10 10 11 1
21 49 2 11 11 12 1
22 54 2 11 11 12 123 80 3 12 13 11, 1
24 05 1 12 11 12 1
25 17 1 13 11 13 2
26 23 1 13 11 13 2
27 56 2 13 12 14 228 15 1 14 11 14 3
29 08 1 14 12 14 2
30 18 1 15 12 15 3
31 95 5 15 16 19 332 73 3 15 14 17 3
33 79 3 15 17 17
34 57 2 16 16 17 135 01 1 18 15 18 336 97 5 18 19 22 3
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Figure Eighteen:Random Numbers.
09 49 09 99 52 98 05 19 45 89 27 98
54 54 62 47 02 49 03 36 27 75 35 38
42 96 32 08 14 42 14 45 89 76 42 81
01 80 91 76 14 29 39 41 34 85 93 93
80 OS 69 21 49 46 06 96 20 70 (J7 68
06 17 48 57 19 66 86 53 24 27 61 22
06 23 07 77 48 73 87 89 OS 22 68 52
26 S6 64 54 62 13 17 64 89 56 24 52
57 15 69 96 04 17 17 37 42 92 56 53
79 86 44 02 33 94 77 15 89 03 70 72
52 08 72 73 05 S4 66 07 37 74 47 08
80 18 11 76 53 01 14 57 11 00 86 64
45 9S 31 56 29 91 68 05 75 53 77 09
68 73 35 96 70 36 26 32 47 74 80 07
59 20 99 68 17 97 85 52 16 07 84 66
4B 26 31 05 05 06 11 90 24 75 49 96
12 90 80 45 02 30 16 80 94 40 09 03
3S 79 88 45 35 38 26 28 38 8B BO 1S
91 57 90 19 53 94 95 50 01 63 72 47
89 01 46 37 67 26 67 S1 47 18 91 50
49 97 54 93 31 32 97 46 SO 80 85 06
33 33 51 04 34 06 73 72 67 72 76 92
10 64 43 52 00 76 75 40 73 09 68 48
SS 01 62 85 48 64 642S 27 92 79 78
60 SO 51 62 74 19 26 22 18 74 20 07
19 29 10 83 35 09 45 47 16 87 44 32
47 34 25 24 17 80 01 94 54 60 77 83
55 46 48 76 03 34 87 1S 96 81 99 01
48 11 89 53 OS 45 20 10 56 02 43 69
52 43 25 83 23 02 01 50 82 15 87 SO
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Figure eighteen gives the random numbers used in the
simulation.
NOTE:- Days shown are only working days, non-working days
need not be shown as jobs will not arrive or be
worked on during them.
Over this 15 day period
Average number of days late
per job = 43~ = 1·2 days
Average number of M/Cs in use
per day = 54E = 3.6 M/CS.
Before this model can be used in prediction it is nec-
essary to determine that it is modelling the real situ-
ation within the limits of accuracy acceptable. There ~s
need for the verification and validation of the simulation
models, a step not always carried out in practice.
2.6.5. VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF SIMULATION MODELS.
The ve~ification of the simulation model is to ensure that
the model is behaving in the manner intended by the modeller,
testing the machanics of the simulation. Testing things
like the random number generator or the random numbers
to ensure they are random. In the majority of simulations
pseudo-random number generators are in fact used. They
produce random numbers but after a few million they tend
to repeat themselves. This stage is like a program test
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ensuring that all the sUb-systems operate as intended.
In the example being considered this is a relatively easy
stage. The simulation uses a set of standard random tables
*1 and the rules of operation are relatively simple.
Within a large complex simulation carried out on a computer
this can be a difficult and time consuming stage. The
programs as well as the systems need to be debugged.
Having now verified the simulation and decided it is
following the rules set down by the modeller it must now
be validated. Validation is the process where the simil-
arity between the model and the real system is tested.
The model is run with parameters for which there are known
results from the real system and then checked to ensure
there is no significant difference between the model and
the real system. Not only should various means be tested
but also the variance of the measures to ensure similarity
between the model and the real system. To carry this out
there are various statistical tests. In the case of the
example measure such as average number of days late per
job, average number of machines in use and their varia-
bility could be compared from the model and compared with
the real system. This stage of verification and validation
can be likened to the calibration and testing of a scien-
tific instrument. It can be very important when it comes
to the implementation stage of the simulation results. It
can be used to convince managers that the simulation
replicated the real situation faithfully.
*1 SEE FIGURE EIGHTEEN.
MURDOCH & BARNES.
(for more random numbers
1970 Table 24).
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Models will usually have two modes of operation an
initialisation phase and then a steady state. The
initialisation phase of the example is when all the
sets of equipment are in the depot and there are no
jobs waiting to be processed i.e. the start up. The
steady state will be reached in a few days operation,
with the possibility of machines being out and jobs
waiting. Depending upon the application it may not be
desirable to have the initialisation stage. This should
be taken into account at the verification and validation
stages and also when the model is used for prediction.
2.6.6. USE OF SIMULATION MODELS IN PREDICTION.
Once the model has been tested it can be used to predict
by running with different parameters to obtain the
information required. This information used with further
data such as cost information can then be used in the
decision process. Care should be taken to ensure that
the relationships used within the simulation are valid
over the range of the parameters used in the predictions.
If this is not known this should be taken into account
when working out the confidence limits of the predictions.
In the example being considered runs (the length of the
run being determined by standard sampling procedures)
could be carried out to predict the effect of working
rest days, operating 5, 6 or 7 sets of the equipment,
etc. The results of these runs would then be used with
such costs as, costs of set of equipment, cost of days
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late, cost of working days, etc., alongside company
strategies and policies to assist management in deter-
mining a solution to the problem of waiting time.
The more complex the simulation and or the more runs
required of the model the more likely it will be economic
to computerise it. Computer models have the advantage of
speed and accuracy, but are difficult to conceptulise and
understand to the non-specialist. Therefore, when it
comes to presenting the results of the simulations to
management it may be necessary to employ an analogue model
to assist their understanding and the operation of the
simulation.
Simulations are of considerable value in the provision of
prediction information and data to management both at the
operational and strategic level.
2.6.7. USE OF INTERACTIVE SIMULATION MODELS.
Interactive simulation models can be used ~n the field
of Management Information. By combining simulation models
with programmed learning a package can be put together
possibly with the use of real time computing, to assist
managers to assess such things as uncertainty, value of
information, etc. Such a package could provide initial
training and practice for managers. Such e package could
also provide consistency checks, etc., when actually
setting such values. The Post Office Corporation have
found that individuals setting subjective probabilities
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have preferred the computer interaction rather than having
a statistician or decision analyst providing the consist-
ency checks. Sometimes the impersonality of the computer
can have advantages.
2.6.8. THE SIMULATION OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS.
Models can be used in the design stage of information
systems. The models can be simple analogue models to
show the manager the proposed layout of a computer
system's output. They can be much more complex for example
a dry run of a new system. Before a system goes into
operation it can be run giving typical outputs to ensure
there are no bugs in the system and to ensure that managers
are getting the outputs they require. Simulation models
can also be used in predictive and interactive modes in
the design stage of information systems.
2.6.9. SUMMARY
Simulation provides for managers a method of experimenting
with processes which it would be impossible or very
uneconomical to experiment with in real life. Models
can be used in demonstration or can be used to make
predictions which can then be used by managers in decision
making and planning. By combining simulation with
programmed learning such a package can be used by managers
to develop skills in areas such as assessing uncertainty,
setting value to information and many other subjective
assessments. Models can also be useful when information
systems are being designed.
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CHAPTER 3, ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION: THE PRODUCTION OF A
METHODOLOGY.
This chapter is the cars of the thesis: the production
of a methodology for the economic appraisal of management
information. It builds on the work already coversd in
Chapter 2 the analytical background. The first ssction
of the chapter examines some of the myths surrounding
management information. This is then developed into a
section covering the basic concepts in the economic
appraisal of management information. The next three
sections cover the determination of management information
needs, value and cost. The next section in the chapter is
entitled Cost Benefit Analysis of Management Information
and looks at the relationship between the value and cost
of information. There is then a section that looks at the
role of the information analyst as a consultant within the
organisation. The final section summarises the chapter
and outlines the methodology for the economic appraisal
of management information.
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3.1. THE MYTHS OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.
People who have concerned themselves with Management
Information appear to fall into two groups: individuals
who are optimistic, some almost to the point of euphoria,
and individuals who are pessimistic, some almost to the
point of cynicism. A number of people have put forward,
with a degree of pessimism, various 'myths' of management
information. Tricker *1 identified the following ten
myths which encompass the majority of myths suggested by
other people.
1. The study of management information systems is
about the use of computers.
2. More data in reports means more information
for managers.
3. The accountant aims to keep the cost of
information to a minimum.
4. For information to be available instantly
increases its usefulness.
5. Accuracy in reporting is of vital importance.
6. More frequent reporting means more useful
information.
7. Total integration is the ultimate goal in
information system design.
8. One corporate data base will ultimately provide
common data for all application programmes
and produce the data for management information.
9. Managers' information needs can be determined
by professional systems study.
10. We understand what management information is.
*1 TRICKER. (1971)
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The last one Tricker refers to as the supreme myth of
management information. These myths will now be considered
in detail.
3.1.1. THE STUDY OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS IS
ABOUT THE USE OF COMPUTERS.
"In a bibliography published in 1969 there were more
than 500 references to books and papers which were
to some extent, concerned with the subject. Since
then the interest and the number of papers have
multiplied. There must be as many definitions of
information systems as there are writers: indeed
more, since some of us change our views over time.
Yet the predominant focus has been on harnessing
the computer's potential in business and other
systems. Glib claims have been made about the
possibility of providing "better management infor-
mation". The major applications, however, have had
little to do with management information. Almost
exclusively they have involved work at the operating
level." *1
Tricker appears to be justified in his statement as far as
the sixties, early seventies are concerned. M.I.S. was
taken to be computer systems and even then purely at an
operational level. Recent work has moved away from this
to a more realistic view of M.I.S. to include Informal
Information Sy~tems and the non-computer formal information
*1 TRICKER. (1971)
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of the organisation. More thought is also being given to
the information needs of management. Also work is being
carried out in the O.R. field for the provision of infor-
mation from corporate models to assist management in
strategic decision making, (most of the~e being computer
based due to the complexity of the computations). The use
of modelling for the provision of information to management
has been dealt with in section 2.6. Although it is now
generally agreed that the study of M.I.S. is not just the
study of computers, whenever a computer is used in an
organisation it can, provided it is used correctly, become
a powerful tool for the provision of some of the information
required by management. The use of computers within
management information systems will be considered later.
3.1.2. MORE DATA IN REPORTS MEANS MORE INFORMATION
FOR MANAGERS.
"This is a classical misapprehension. The hoary
tales of massive computer printouts which are
ignored by managers are legion. The accountant
frequently fails to recognise that there is a
difference between data in which he deals and
information which involves the use made of data
by managers". *1
Tricker's paper was aimed at accountants but his
criticisms could equally be levelled at other members
of organisations. The myth that Tricker talks of is
that more data means more information and is based on
*1 TRICKER. (1971)
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the difference between data and information. Grindlay *1
takes this further and suggests that it is wrong to assume
that a manager needs more information although he does not
really follow this through to say why. At this stage the
relevance of the information (see section 2.2.) must be
considered. Information will be of greater value the
greater the relevance. Management therefore will need the
information with the greatest degree of relevance, but it
may be possible to take several pieces of low relevance
information and collate them to produce information of a
higher relevance. So it may be said that the amount of
information a manager needs will depend upon its relevance.
3.1.3. THE ACCOUNTANT AIMS TO KEEP THE COST OF
INFORMATION TO A MINIMUM.
"The cumulative cost of providing data increases with
the volume of data. Moreover the relationship is
not linear; costs tend to escalate as more and more
data are handled. True there are plateaux on which
extra data can be produced for little extra cost but
the curve rises steeply again as the next clerk, new
accounting machine, or additional computer has to be
added. In these circumstances, the accountant seeks
to keep the demands for additional data to a minimum,
recognising that each extra report involves the cost
of reanalysis, recalculation, perhaps reprogramming
and a computer rerun, yet each set of data has a
potential information value to a capable decision
maker. It is the relationship between cost and value
*1 GRINDLAY. (1973)
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that the accountant should have in mind (see figure
19)." *1
Figure Nineteen: Relationship Between Cost and Amount of Data.
(this corresponds to Rg 1Tricker. 2 )
t
!
Amount of Data ...
It is very important not just to try and minimise the cost
of information but to look at the relationship between cost
and information. It is a difficult relationship to
consider because of the problems of determining cost and
value of information, these problems being especially
apparent when determining the value of information.
Stigler said of the value of information:
"One should hardly have to tell academicians that
information is a valuable resource: knowledge ~
*1 TRI CKER.
*2 TRICKER.
(1971).
(1971).
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power. And yet it occupies a slum dwelling in the
town of economics. Mostly it is ignored: the best
technology is assumed to be known; the relationship
of commodities to consumer preferences is a datum.
And one of the information - producing industries,
advertising, is treated with a hostility that
economists normally reserve for tariffs or monopo-
lists." *1
The estimation of value and cost of information is diffi-
cult and therefore often not attempted. One of the aims
of this study is to remedy this defect. The ways in which
a value can be placed on information will be considered in
section 3.4., the cost of information in section 3.5., and
the relationship between cost and value of information in
section 3.6.
3.1.4. FOR INFORMATION TO BE AVAILABLE INSTANTLY
INCREASES ITS USEFULNESS.
"At the operating level, the time from step one to
implementation is short. Here decision makers do
need access as quickly as possible to data •••••••
At the managerial level, the decision process is
extended. There is a larger thinking process.
Instant access to data is less important. At the
strategic level. instant information is unnecessary
and unreliable. Senior executives involved in
strategic considerations do not want to know how
*1 STIGLER. (1968 Page 171).
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many one inch screws are in stock.
They need condensed reports, synthesised from many
data sources. Fortunately, the overall length of the
decision process can be counted in days, weeks even
months. Data can be prepared in advance of the
board meeting; the call for additional data need not
be met instantly. Indeed calls for instant infor-
mation at the higher level tend to indicate senior
decision makers with low decision horizons." *1
The speed of the requirements of information will vary
depending on its use. Paretta *2 uses a slightly different
classification than Tricker. Instead of classifying by
the level at ~hich the information is used he uses a
system of classifying by the type of decision. He uses
the following three types of decision:
I. Decisions improved by the speed of the infor-
mation flow. There are some decisions in the
management situation which will be improved by
having quick access to information. Most of
the decisions within this group will occur
with control type decisions within the oper-
ational level of management, for example a control
mechanism set up to ensure that a production line
was producing items within limits. Information
needs to be available quickly when the process
has gone out of control to enable decisions to
*1 TRIeKE R.
*2 PARETTA.
(1971)
(1974)
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be taken to bring the process back into control.
(The faster the production the quicker the infor-
mation is needed to save defective components).
The sort of technique to ensure this is carried
out effectively would probably be some form of
control chart. The same type of decision can
occur at the strategic level, for example if the
demand of a product changes dramatically then
information to show this will be required rapidly
so that action can be taken.
II. Decisions unaffected by the speed of the infor-
mation flow. These are the type of management
decision where an increase in the speed of the
information will be of no value (it may also be
possible actually to decrease the speed of infor-
mation without any loss of the value of the infor-
mation and possibly with a reduction in the cost).
Deardon makes a valid point in connection with
these types of decisions. *1
"In the area of performance evaluation, real-time
management information systems are particularly
ridiculous. When a division manager agrees to
earn, say $360,000 in 1966 he does not agree to
earn $1,000 a day or .1000/24 per hour."
Similarly with any decision that must wait for a
particular piece of information then the remaining
*1 DEARDEN. (1966)
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information need not be available to the decision
maker until the last piece of information is ready.
Therefore, any increase of speed of any of this
other information will be of no value. If the
value of any piece of information for a given
decision is completely unresponsive to the speed
of the information flow then it would suggest that
within the case considered that a particular
piece of information 'is of no value ( it may be
of value to some other decision within the
organisation.)
III.Decision hindered by the speed of the information
flow. These are the type of decisions where an
increase in the speed of information would only
hinder the decision to be taken. Paretta suggests
there are two conditions where this could occur.
Firstly when dealing with data of a very unstable
nature the speed of the data arriving can detract
from the decision, i.e. the initial values
received could be very different from the overall
trend due to wide variations in the data and so
if a decision was based on these initial pieces of
data it could be faulty. The second type of
decision which may be hindered by the speed of
the information is where the information arrives
faster than it can be dealt with which in the
worst case would lead to no decision being taken
because the decision taker would be always anal-
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ysing the most recent information.
There are some fundamental problems in accepting the
latter two classifications of decisions which are hindered
by an increase in the information flow. With the first
case it would seem to be that it is a problem of an
'incomplete decision maker' (i.e. someone not fully
versed in decision taking) rather than a problem of infor-
mation systems. It must be agreed that if the information
is for an 'incomplete decision maker' then it is possible
for this case to appear. It would seem to be more logical
to develop the decision maker's risk taking ability and
improve his statistical and other knowledge. Then the
increase in speed of return of the information could be
reliably evaluated. The second of the two types of
decision would seem to suggest that decisions involve
definite time from start of analysis to arrival at the
decision. A more logical view would seem to be that each
decision can be 'solved' within a range of different times
(time to some extent being a function of accuracy of the
decision). So it could be said that any decision could be
solved immediately but the longer the decision takes the
better the result and solution. This statement is a
generalisation and once a decision passes a certain point
in time taken to obtain a result then the laws of dimin-
ishing returns are likely to apply. It would seem again
that the speed of the information should be determined
by the value of the information to the decision process,
the length of the decision interval being determined by the
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accuracy wanted at the end of the process (once this
decision interval has been set the information is only
required at the speed it is needed and used and any further
increase will be of no value).
3.1.5. ACCURACY IN REPORTING IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE.
"The popular belief is that accuracy is good,
inaccuracy bad. At the operating level this is true.
The dispensing of medicine, the control of aircraft,
the design of a bridge, all involve decisions for
which accurate data are essential. [althOUgh not
always available or there would be no disasters] •
Accuracy, however, is a relevant, not an absolute
idea. High levels of accuracy involve high cost.
At higher decision levels, great accuracy is
irrelevant and a waste of money •••••••••
If those using published financial reports recognised
that the data were probably plus or minus 20% or
more there would be less fanatical about accuracy." *1
At the operational level then there are many cases where
accuracy is vital. Moving through the organisation to the
strategic level then the pursuit of total accuracy can
become a red herring, although not all operational level
activities need a great degree of accuracy. Slonim *2
gives the following example within the field of sampling.
The Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. designed a sampling
system to estimate their claim on interline freight fees
*1
*2
TRI CKER.
SLONIM. (1971)(1968 Page 45)
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due to the railroad. During the test period using a
sample size of less than 10% of total transactions their
claim was estimated to a level of 99·8% accuracy, (assuming
the 100% check to be accurate?). This shows an example
where a degree of accuracy is accepted (the cost of such
inaccuracy being far outweighed by the savings from using
sampling) within the field of accountancy, the traditional
bastion of accuracy, calculating values to the nearest
penny whatever the cost. (It is doubtful this could ever
be calculated to 100% accuracy due to errors which will
occur in any system designed or operated by man whatever
the espenditure has been to eliminate error). If a more
statistical approach to date was taken and it was accepted
to be within certain limits a far more cost conscious view
could be taken in the collection and analysis of such data.
Moving to the strategic level there occurs a different
problem in accuracy. Here we are not concerned with using
data to determine measures in retrospect but in the use of
data and information for the predictions of measures for
the future either by 'management intuition' or some
statistical or simulation method. There is a tendancy in
this technological age to confuse accuracy with complexity
of calculation. The majority of the techniques used in the
provision of information for use in predicting the future
tend to be of a complex nature, a lot of them require
involvement with the computer and it is very easy to confuse
this complexity with a false level of accuracy (a belief
not always dissipated by the expert). Another danger of
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these techniques is that they produce a single 'answer'
to the problems of management in the prediction of future
strategies, whereas what would be of more value to manage-
ment would be a series of alternative strategies and their
consequences for use in the changing environment of the
organisation.
3.1.6. MORE FREQUENT REPORTING MEANS MORE INFORMATION.
This myth is very similar to the fourth myth and so has
been dealt with in section 3.1.4.
3.1.7. TOTAL INTEGRATION IS THE ULTIMATE GOAL IN
INFORMATION SYSTEM DESIGN.
This myth was first put about in the sixties with the
original computerised information systems and it stems from
the natural development of systems thinking into the total
system. This way a useful way of thinking of the organ-
isation as a whole but it is very difficult to put into
practice. It has now been accepted that it may' be possible
to integrate partially at different levels but the ideas
of total integration will not be possible with the present
level of computer technology.
3.1.8. ONE CORPORATE DATA BASE WILL ULTIMATELY PROVIDE
COMMON DATA FOR ALL APPLICATION PROGRAMMES AND
PRODUCE THE DATA FOR MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.
This myth is very similar to the previous one that total
integration to form one data base is sound in theory but
almost impossible to achieve in practice. Again the more
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practical approach is to produce a series of data bases of
related information. The problem of data bases will be
considered later in the section concerned ~ith the use of
computers within information systems.
3.1.9. MANAGERS' INFORMATION NEEDS CAN BE DETERMINED
BY A PROFESSIONAL SYSTEMS STUDY.
"This is an outstanding myth. Every systems analyst
knows that if a manager is asked what information he
needs there will be one of three replies: "I do not
know", "I will have what I am getting now", "I will
have everything you can give me". Each is as unhelpful
as the other in designing an information system.
Consequently, the analyst not infrequently takes
matters into his own hands and determines what the
manager should need." *1
Burgstaller and Forsyth *2 suggest there are at least five
responses to the question of a manager's information needs.
(i) Bottomless-Pit Manager:- This is the manager who in
response to the question what information do you
require to complete your job will reply 'everything'.
He requires any information that can be given to him
just in case it may be of use to him. There could be
many reasons why he requires this information, for
example he has in fact not defined his job to himself
and so he does not know his information requirements.
(assuming the average manager can determine his
information requirements).
*1 TRICKER. (1971)
*2 BURGSTALLER & FORSYTH. (1973)
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(ii) Accounting-Informatid~ Manager:- This type of
manager can only, consider management information to
be accounting information. He works in Pounds, Pence
and Variances, he finds these easy to work with and
considers all other forms of information to be of
little value. If this type of manager is involved in
the design of any information system it can cause
serious problems. To quote an example from personal
experience. An accountant within a certain organ-
isation designed a cost control system to replace an
existing one. The existing system was a series of
graphs updated weekly by departmental managers based
on departmental costs. This system was replaced by
a very sophisticated system based upon a large number
of variances. The system lost credibility due to the
fact that only a handful of people understood the
concepts of variances (this not necessarily being the
people who calculated them). The majority of managers
extracted basic cost figures from the system and
plotted them on a graph, disregarding the rest of the
information.
(iii)In-8asketManager:- When this type of manager
determines his information requirements he t~es
rather a myopic view and determines his requirements
from the problems, decisions, etc., he is working on
at present, taking no account of future information
requirements.
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(iv) The Closed Door Manager:- This type of manager is
the reverse of the bottomless pit manager. He
requires little or no information, usuallY for the
same sort of reason as the bottomless pit manager.
(v) The Mississippi Gambler Manager:- This type of
manager 'plays his cards close to his chest'. He
is usually reluctant to divulge his information needs
for political reasons. This could be because he
worries for the safety of his job or he is planning
to extend his sphere of influence (empire building).
Although there are many problems in determining the
information needs of managers some attempt must be made
and there are many different techniques available. The
determination of management information needs will be
discussed at length in section 3.3.
3.1.10. WE UNDERSTAND WHAT MANAGEMENT INFURMATIUN IS.
"Here, surely, is the supreme myth. Generations of
accountants have been providing what they call
management information; likewise a decade or so
of management scientists has been developing models
and methods to provide management information.
Nevertheless, understanding of management, as
distinct from data is abysmal. Of course we know
how to handle the data processing, to provide reports,
to prepare model solutions. We do not however,
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necessarily understand information.
What is not understood is the decision process, how
a human being recognises the need for information, how
he perceives problems, seeks information out of
available data, evaluates, filters, excludes alter-
natives and, finally, chooses. This is not only not
understood; it has not been accepted into the area
of concern. We stop short at providing management
information; our subject has been the provision of
management data." *1
It would now seem that the statement made by Tricker that
we know how to handle data processing is a little in doubt.
As Mr. Peter Hermon, Group Management Services Director of
British Airways, one of the country's largest computer
users stated. *2
"We are enmeshed in a jungle of complexity and somehow
we must get out of the softwear straight jacket we
have cut for ourselves, reduce the overheads and
banish the complexity so as to restore the economies
that are fast disappearing down the drain."
When such an important user of computers queries our state
of knowledge in the Data Processing field it is difficult
to justify a statement that we know how to handle data
processing.
*1 TRICKER. (1971)
*2 HERMON. (1976)
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3.1.11. ACKOff'S fIVE MYTHS.
Ackoff queries five of the assumptions that are made by a
number of designers of management information systems.
"1) The critical deficiency under which managers
operate is the lack of relevant information.
2) The manager needs the information he wants.
3) If a manager has the information he needs his
decision making will improve.
4) Better communication between managers improves
organisational performance.
5) A manager does not have to understand how his
information system works only how to use it." *1
Assumption two is one of the problems of trying to determine
the information needs of an individual, this being a
difficult task but one that must be tackled. The techniques
used and the problems encountered will be dealt with in
section 3.3.
Assumptions ona and three are ones that are commonly made
when dealing with information systems. They develop from
a misinterpretation of the phrase information and the
belief in tha perfect manager. It is a misinterpretation
to assume that the only problem management has got is a
lack of information, there are many other problems. This
is understandable however as the information analyst is
too close to management information to consider the
manager's other problems. The third assumption should in
*1 ACKOff. (1967)
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fact be true except that a lot of management information
provided by management information systems turns out to be
data which the manager is not necessarily equipped to deal
with and turn into information. Even when the management
information system produces information the manager may
still not be equipped to deal with it. The information
analyst should compare his situation with that of a rail-
way. The railways are in the transport business and not
the railway business and if they had realised this then
they might not be having problems now. Information
analysts are in the information business not solely as the
providors of data or information but also to assist with
the understanding and use of such data and information.
The fourth assumption again assumes the perfect manager.
Improving the means of communication between managers does
not mean the managers will communicate any more effectively.
The improvement of communications between managers is not
just the provision of better mechanisms of communication
but also an improvement of communicating skills of the
manager a behavioural problem.
The last assumption, that a manager does not have to
understand how his information system works only how to
use it, is a particularly false one to make. It would be
fair to say that the manager does not need to know the
mechanics of how a computer or a data processing install-
ation works. He will want to know, however, a considerable
amount about any information produced by a management
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information system before he will be able to use any of
the information with any degree of confidence. He should
want to know how the data has been collected, and the
accuracy of the data, he should want to know how that data
has been analysed to turn it into information, especially
so if some statistical or other technique has been employed,
he should want to know how good an analytical.tool is the
particular technique used, with what accuracy can the
information be used and possibly what value the information
has. Without such details the information may be of
reduced value or it may be used incorrectly, for example
a forecast may be taken as being an absolute value when in
fact the confidence limits of such value should be taken.
into consideration. This is best summarised in a quote
from Ackoff. *1
"No Management Information System should ever be
installed unless the Managers from whom it is intended
are trained to evaluate and have control of it rather
than be controlled by it."
Our concept of the process of management may also need
to be revised when talking to the manager of his infor-
mation needs. It is very useful when designing infor-
mation systems to consider such management activities as
planning, motivating and decision making although when a
manager considers his information needs he is unlikely to
think of his work in such terms. Mintzberg *2 has suggested
a new approach to the defining of managers' tasks which
*1 ACKOFF. (1967)
*2 MINTZBERG. (1973)
appears to be better than the classical definition.
Mintzberg's work has already been discussed in section 2.
3.1.12. SUMMARY
In the design of information systems there are a number
of pitfalls which must be avoided.
1. Information systems are not solely concerned with
computers.
2. There is a significant difference between data and
information.
3. More data in reports does not mean more information
for managers.
4. Where possible all information should be cost-
justified which requires a value to be attributed to
it.
5. Any increase in the speed at which information is
provided needs to be justified.
6. Absolute accuracy is not essential in every case
(it is impossible when the base data itself is not
accurate). However, the degree of inaccuracy in any
information should be given along with that infor-
mation.
7. More frequent reporting does not mean more information.
Again any increase in the frequency of reporting must
be justified.
8. The total integration into one corporate data base
should not be the aim of system designers. Integration
and the formation of data bases should only be used
when they will be of advantage. This will usually
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mean only partial integration at varying levels within
the organisation and a series of data bases.
9. The information needs of managers are a very difficult
factor to determine by interviewing due to the fact
that the majority of managers do not know their
information requirements. It is equally dangerous
for systems designers to 'decide' the managers infor-
mation needs themselves as few have experience of
management. However, with a combination of various
techniques an attempt can be made to determine the
information needs of the manager.
10. The provision of the 'correct' information is not
necessarily going to produce good management. The
manager's managerial skills and abilities may need
to be developed so he can take full advantage of the
information provided. It is however arguable that we
should not provide information until the manager has
been trained to use it.
11. The provision of communication mechanisms does not
by itself mean that the communications within an
organisation will improve, the behavioural problems
will also have to be dealt with.
12. The managers who are receiving information from an
information system should have sufficient knowledge
of the system to be in control. The information
system should be run to serve tha organisation and
not visa-versa. This statement assumes a high lavel
of competence from the individual managers and before
such a stata of affairs could occur in a lot of
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organisations there would have to be considered staff
development.
There are many problems to be faced by the systems
designer in the design and operation of management infor-
mation systems. A pessimistic view of them would be that
we are not capable of designing a system at the present
state of knowledge. The optimistic would consider that we
are more than capable, the truth lying somewhere between.
Reasonable management information systems can be produced,
there are problems but providing we keep these in view and
try and eliminate them a system can be operated.
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3.2. BASIC CONCEPTS IN THE ECONOMICAPPRAISAL OF
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.
There are six basic concepts that need to be considered
when estimating the value of any piece of information. In
any particular case anyone or more need to be considered.
These six basic concepts are common to any method that may
be used to assess the value of information. The six basic
concepts are concerned with
1 ) Time
2) Knowledge
3) Prior Information
4) Accuracy of Information
5) Quantity
6) Power
and will now be dealt with in more detail.
The value of any piece of information is related to time.
The most simplistic view to take is that the value of the
information reduces as time increases. This is shown
diagramatically in figure twenty.
This view implies acceptance of one of the myths of
information that the quicker the information is available
the greater its value. The true relationship of time to
information is likely to be more complex than this.
Paretta *1 suggests that this relationship is connected
with the type of decision been taken. (See section 3.1.4.
for more detail.) He puts forward the following three
*1 PARETTA. (1974)
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Figure Twenty: Simplistic Relationship Between Time and Value of
Information.
Value of
Information
f
Time -- ....
types of decision.
(a) Decisions Improved by the speed of the information
flow.
(b) Decisions Unaffected by the speed of the information
flow.
(c) Decisions Hindered by the speed of the information
flow.
The simplistic relationship described above will apply to
decision type (a) for example control information, but even
in this case an alternative formulation is more useful.
This will be in terms of the cost of not having the infor-
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mation, which will increase as time increases, and is
shown diagramatically in figure twenty one.
Figure Twenty one: Relationship Between Time and Cost of Not
Having the Information.
Cost of Not
Having
Information
1
Time ..
strictly speaking this will be the case when the process
is not in control. When the process is in control the
value of the information is limited, but the purpose of
control information is that of monitoring and therefore,
this relationship will apply whether the process is in
control or not.
The second of the three types of decisions are those
unaffected by the speed of the information flow. This
definition should not be taken too literally. The type
of decision is the type where an increase in the speed
of the information retrieval will be of no extra value to
the decision process. for example the quote from Deardon.
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"In the area of performance evaluation, real-time
management information systems are particularly
ridiculous. When a division manager agrees to earn,
say $ 360,000 in 1966 he does not agree to earn
$ 1000 a day or t 1000/24 per hour". *1
In this type of decision the more important consideration
is the decision interval when determining value of the
information. The information is of little value until
the decision interval is approached, it then increases in
value until the decision interval is reached and it may
then falloff in value. This is shown diagramatically in
figure twenty two.
Rgure Twenty two: Relationship Between lime and Value of
Information Showing Decision Interval.
Value of
Information
t
Decision Interval
lime ..
*1 DEARDON. (1966)
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In this case of Deardon's example the information concerned
with his divisional earnings only becomes of value with
regard to performance evaluation at the decision interval
i.e. the end of 1966. The information concerned with say
the earnings per day, although of no value to this point
in time performance evaluation will almost certainly be of
value to the manager in terms of his control of the divi-
sian.
In a large complex decision there may be a series of
sub-decisions each of which may involve the gathering of
information. Some information may be used to determine
further information requirements. Information for this
type of decision could have a value time relationship
shown in figure twenty three.
Figure Twenty three: Relationship Between Time and Value of
Information Showing a Sub Decision and
a Final Decision.
Value of
Information
f
I
I Sub
I Decision
Ii Final
: Decision
r
TIme ----" ....
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This cannot be considered a general pattern as the value
may fall between the two decisions or it may increase for
the second decisions or it may decrease. This will become
more complicated the more decisions that are involved with
the piece of information. It may be possible to consider
theoretically information that has a constant value,
however, I doubt that such a relationship exists within the
managerial sense.
In the third type of decision, those hindered by the speed
of information flow, the relationship will vary. These
type of decisions must be considered in two states that of
unstable data and that of high variability data and also
the difference between information and data needs to be
considered. An unstable process is one where the under-
lying trend of the data changes considerably and possibly
quickly but with little or no variability, and a process
of high variability is one where the underlying trend
changes slowly if at all, but there is a high degree of
variability about this trend. These relationships are
shown diagramatically in figure twenty four.
High variability data requires a given amount of time
before the extent of the variability can be assessed so
enabling a check to be kept on the movement of the under-
lying trend. The combined group of data then becomes
information. Fresh information being created with the
advancement of one time unit by disregarding the oldest
piece of data and taking account of the most recent ie.
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Figure Twenty four: RelaHonship Between lime and Value for a
High Variability Process and an Unstable
Process.
HIGH VARIABILITY
Value
of
Data
f
--1 ......TIme
Value
of
Information
r
I
I
~~----------------l Point at which
data becomes
information.
----Time
UNSTABLEPROCESS
Value of
Data or
Information
t
Time
moving average principle or by using exponential princi-
ples and not rejecting information so drastically. With
the unstable process the most recent information or data
is the most important. When as often happens we get
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a process that is unstable and highly variable then the two
relationships are combined. This is shown diagramatically
in figure twenty five.
An example of such a process is likely to be found in
process control. Here the output of a production process
is monitored to ensure that the items produced are
acceptable. Some process control systems have fixed time
interval sampling of the process but there will be some
systems with a variable time interval sampling. With the
variable time interval sampling the sampling will be
carried out at a fixed time interval until it is thought
the process is going out of control. The time interval
will then be reduced to check on the process, if it is out
of control then this will be rectified, if a false alarm
has occurred then the fixed time interval sampling will
be resumed. With examples of this type the timing of the
information becomes more important when there are indic-
ations the process is out of control.
Before leaving the relationship between time and value
of information two more points need to be considered.
First it may also be possible for information to have a
peak value later in its life.
Secondly it must also be remembered that three types of
decisions talked of here are not generic groupings but are
merely useful groupings for use when talking in terms of
information.
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Figure Twenty five: Relationship Between Time and Value for a
High Variability Unstable Process.
Value of
Data
t
Value of
Information
t
Time --
..,._------ Point at which
data becomes
information
Time ..
3.2.2. KNOWLEDGE.
Before discussing, the effect of knowledge on the value of
information the term knowledge must be defined. The
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines knowledge as follows:-
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"KNOWLEDGE - Knowing, familiarity gained by experience,
(of person thing, fact); person's range of information;
theoretical or practical understanding (of subject,
language, etc.); the sum of what is known."
For thp, purpose of this thesis a more positive definition
of the term knowledge can be used. It may be said to be
that body of fact relating to the principles and practices
of management and any related facts necessary for the
successful management of an organisation (these related
facts will to some extent vary from industry to industry).
It would be foolish to consider that every manager would
personally know all of this knowledge but it would not
seem unreasonable to suggest that a manager should be
able to have access to this knowledge through the 'manage-
ment team' of an organisation and through management
education.
Knowledge will determine the extent to which the inform-
ation will approach its true value. Knowledge will not
add to the true value of the information but a lack of
knowledge will not allow the true value to be achieved.
An individual's perception of his state of knowledge is
not necessarily reliable. Individuals may have a
pessimistic or an optimistic view of their state of know-
ledge.
The factor of knowledge is extremely import~nt when talking
in terms of information needs for there is no point in
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providing information if the knowledge of how to use it
is not there. It would therefore seem to be reasonable that
the information analyst should also provide access to the
knowledge as well as the information.
3.2.3. PRIOR INFORMATION
In determining the value of a piece of information all
the other information connected with this information must
be considered. For example a company must decide whether
or not to carry out a market survey into the sales of a
commodity. The value of the information produced will be
affected by the information already available. If the
product is new and no other sales information is available
the value of such a survey in most cases will be more than
if the product is an established one with past sales figures
which can be used to forecast i.e. the market survey will
only be used to supplement the other sales information in
the setting of forecasts. The factor that could reverse
this relationship could be termed the surprise factor.
The larger the surprise factor of a piece of information
the greater the value of that piece of information.
3.2.4. ACCURACY.
In general terms it may be said that the greater the
accuracy of a piece of information the greater the value
of that piece of information.
There are a large number of cases where accuracy is of
great importance especially at the operational level.
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There are also quite a number of cases where absolute
accuracy is a both unnecessary and possibly unreliable.
(See Section 3.1.5.). This will have the effect of
levelling out the end of the relationship. See figure
twenty six.
Figure Twenty six: Relationship Between Accuracy and Value of
Information.
Value of
Information
t 100 0/0Accuracy
Accuracy II'
Accuracy is also related to time and/or cost; as a general
principle it could be said that the greater the accuracy
required the more time and lor cost will be incurred. If
information is being prepared for a time dependent decision
the level of accuracy and/or cost could well be forced on
the manager by the time constraint. Figure twenty seven
""shows the type of relationship which could exist between
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accuracy and time and/or cost.
Figure Twenty seven: Relationship Between Accuracy and Time
and lor Cost.
Accuracy
t
TIme and lor Cost ...
For any particular decision it is likely that several
pieces of information will be required. A network
representing this information and the time required to
collect it could be produced. The critical path of such
a network is likely to highlight areas where time and
accuracy are likely to cause problems.
It is important to consider the relationship for
'circumstantial or ~earsay' information which is often
used by senior managers. The actual assessment of the
accuracy of given information in these latter cases
can only be carried out subjectively. Managers also carry
out subjective assessments of accuracy on quantitative
data which can lead to problems of personality.
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Comments such as follows are now unknown in industry,
'Bill's department has made mistakes in the past therefore
his departments information has a low accuracy, whereas
David's department is a good one and his information is
more accurate.' This sort of statement may owe more to
personalities than to true assessment of the individual
pieces of information coming from the different depart-
ments.
3.2.5. QUANTITY.
The size of a particular piece of information can affect
its value. If the piece of information is so large as to
overload the manager the value may be reduced. All managers
suffer under a time constraint, therefore, there is the
chance that some of the value of a large piece of infor-
mation may be lost because of insufficient time to study it.
Similarly if a large number of pieces of information are
provided for a particular decision or series of decision
there can be a similar effect.
3.2.6. POWER
Before leaving the major factors affecting the value of
information the relationship between power and the value
of information must be considered. Managers may use some
information to create uncertainty rather than to reduce it.
It would be an understatement to say that Information is
Power. Information is not the only source of power but
it can be quite an effective one. It is not suggested
that managers hold information back completely for this
189
would be to commit corporate suicide if discovered. To
gain power from information it needs to be released but
it may be released by a manager only to a select number
of other managers or it may be held back and released at
an appropriate time to give the manager (or group of
managers) a boost to their prestige and power rating in
the organisation. This can give a piece of information
an increased value although not necessarily an increase
in value to the organisation. The increase in value is
only personal to the manager concerned. Such information
a manager will not release willingly to the information
system unless he is sure that any benefits to increase
or maintain his power structure (or erode some other
managers) will accrue to himself.
3.2.7. SUMMARY
Whichever method of setting a value of information is used
one or more of the following six factors need to be taken
into account.
1) Time:- the speed at which the information can be
obtained and is required.
2) Knowledge:- the knowledge level of the recipient/s
of the information.
3) Prior Information:- the amount and type of other
information that is available to assist
with the decision the piece of information
is to be used for.
4) Accuracy:- the accuracy of the information (this
may be subjective dependant on personality).
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5) Quantity:- the size of the piece of information or
the amount of information available for a
particular decision.
6) Power:- information can be closely linked to power,
and as a result this may enhance the value
of the information to the individual but not
necessarily to the organisation.
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3.3. DETERMINING THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF MANAGEMENT.
Before any attempt can be made to value information it is
important to determine the information needs of manage-
ment. By determining the information needs this will limit
the amount of information to be valued (potential infor-
mation will be an exception to this but this will be
dealt with later). In addition the determination of
information needs will help both management and the infor-
mation analyst when valuing information.
3.3.1. DETERMINATION OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION NEEDS.
The determination of management information needs has been
thought necessary by a number of different disciplines.
It started before the advent of the computer with organ-
isation and methods. This discipline has now fallen out of
favour and since the advent of computers its role is being
carried.out by the systems analysts and the systems
designers. 0 & M practitioners seem preoccupied with form
design and not to be interested in the computer side of
information processing. Systems analysts and systems
designers seem preoccupied with running everything on the
computer (possibly justified in personal survival terms as
they usually work for the computer department) and they do
not seem to be interested in what happens to data and infor-
mation before or after the computer except in computer
terms, i.e. data capture, etc. This preoccupation with the
computerising of everything sometimes leads to jobs being
carried out by the computer that could best be carried out
by other means.
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By taking the best of these two disciplines and some of
the more recent work carried out in this area from other
disciplines it will be possible to arrive at a reasonable
and workable method of determining management information
needs. It will then be possible after the needs have been
determined to find the value of the information and cost
of producing it (possibly by differing means) thus prov-
iding a decision framework for information provision.
In determining information needs it must be decided at
which level to operate. Are we attempting to produce the
perfect information for the perfect manager (or to produce
the perfect information in the hope it will turn managers
into 'perfection'). This approach seems widely accepted.
I would suggest that this approach is a false one and real
life is not quite as simple as this. Management Information
needs to be considered on at least two lavels, the perfect
information and the actual information and probably a
series of levels in between. It is a very dangerous thing
to assume perfect managers and it is also dangerous to
assume perfect knowledge on the part of management. Our
knowledge of management techniques is changing at a rapid
rate. If we could arrive at 'perfect' information then it
would be very unlikely we would change the manager or
necessarily improve him. There are many other factors
involved in management deveopment than just providing
managers with perfect information. If this approach is
adopted all that is likely to be arrived at is a confused
manager not fully understanding the information provided
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for him. It would therefore seem better to operate at
two levels, first provide the manager with the information
he needs and understands and then to develop information
along with the managers' development to improve management.
The example of the case study Robert Livesey will be
applicable here. A cost control soheme was developed by a
clever and able accountant. The aim of the scheme was to
provide managers with information to enable them to monitor
and control their costs. The scheme gave managers four
pages of output each week, the first page showed the base
data and the remaining three pages giving a series of cost
variances which would in theory enable the managers (from
departmental managers to Managing Director) to carry out
effective monitoring and control of their costs. The
scheme was operated for quite a number of years (and only
in fact changed due to a merger). With regard to cost
accountancy the scheme was advanced for the time it was
designed and so it would seem fair to say it was close to
providing the perfect management information (it is
important not to confuse perfect information with accurate
information, the information is only perfect in knowledge
terms). The problem was that only a handful of people
could actually understand the scheme, the majority of
managers either ignoring it completely or just taking some
of the base information from the first sheet and using this
as a crude basis for cost control. Such a scheme would
appear to be a failure because it was designed at the
wrong level. The scheme would have been more successful
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had it been designed to meet the initial requirements and
knowledge of the managers, and so provide management with
information they can understand and use although it would
be unsophisticated in accounting terms. And then as
accounting knowledge was developed within the managers
(probably with internal courses and discussions) so could
the scheme be advanced in accounting terms. I believe it
very important to provide the knowledge and then deveop the
scheme in that order and not vice versa so as to create
confidence on the part of the manager in a field he may
not be familiar with. It may also be necessary to incor-
porate levels in the system, not levels in respect of
the organisational hierarchy but levels related to the
manager's individual knowledge.
The greater the knowledge of the individual the more
complex the scheme he will have access to. To a degree
political effects will have to be considered with such
access. Some managers may want access to the more complex
scheme although they may not understand it. The reason for
requiring access could be to boost status within the
organisation or some other political reasoning.
It would therefore seem reasonable to split the information
requirements of managers into two levels but with each
level at a number of stages. The first level being the
manager's present information needs. The second level
being the manager's potential information needs.
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When asking the manager his information needs the futility
of the question 'what information do you need?' will soon
be appreciated. Answers such as 'I don't know' or 'as
much information as you can provide me with' are likely.
Consequently some systems analysts/designers draw the
conclusion that managers cannot determine their own infor-
mation requirements. Such a conclusion is not justified,
the problem is in the question being asked. Information
and data are used by a manager to carry out his function
therefore the start of the determination of his information
requirement should be to describe his management function.
If an organisation produces job descriptions for individ-
uals then these can be of great value although they will
probably have to be updated and extended. If there are no
job descriptions then the managers function will need to be
determined. This could be carried out by the manager and
the information analyst although in some organisations a
member of the personne! department may be invo!ved because
it will be a job description that is produced. The infor-
mation ana!yst wil! find the work of Mintzberg (see section
2.) provides a terminology he can use that wil! be readily
understood by the manager. Once the manager's work has
been defined the information required to carry out this
work can be determined. If a management function falls
across several managers the information analyst should
determine with each individual his own job function (each
manager may see the shared function in a different light).
The information analyst should then form groups of managers
to determine needs of the shared function. Informal
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information needs will also be brought to light by this
approach and the information analyst must resist the urge
to formalise all of them.
3.3.2. DETERMINATION OF MANAGEMENT'S PRESENT INFORMATION
NEEDS.
The approach to this problem is basically the same from
both 0 & M and systems workers. They put forward three
basic methods.
(i) Interviews.
(ii) Questionnaires.
(iii)Observation and Record Inspection.
(i) Interviews.
This method is basically face to face contact with the
investigator and the operator of the system or the
recipient of the information. This method will provide
quite effectively the existing information systems at the
operational level. )t is also more effective when dealing
with formal systems. It must be remembered though that it
is effective at providing a description of the existing
systems which is not necessarily managements present
information needs. When it comes to determining infor-
mation needs in excess of existing systems or information
needs at the strategic level or in the informal systems
area then the procedure of interviewing as advocated by
O&M Systems Worker proves to be ineffective, due to
a number of reasons.
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1. Interviews are conducted with only one person so
one only gets the views of individuals unmodified
by group effects and possibly very biased by
political motivations (political effects will
be moderated by working with groups).
2. Managers information needs in excess of the
existing system could be difficult to arrive at.
Managers do not necessarily know what further
information they need when first asked. This
can only be arrived at with considerable discussion
with the manager and between managers, and such a
discussion is unlikely to take place if the
accepted interview practice from the fields of
O&M or Systems Analysis are followed. Daniels
and Yeates when talking of the skills of the
interviewer.
"He should be impartial, tactful and more positively
have skill in influencing others to accept advice
they would prefer to ignore. Interviewing is the
process of obtaining information - without
upsetting the other party by means of conversation;
this entails being a good listener, being apt at
keeping the ball of conversation rolling and being
able to keep the subject on the right lines." *1
Such a non-commital and non-involvement role may
keep everybody happy but it is unlikely to discover
management information needs.
*1 DANIELS AND YEATES. (1976 Page 21).
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3. When managers are being interviewed about informal
informatirin or one off strategic decision it must
be remembered that the relevant information
sources are variable, possibly unrecorded and
transient. With information of this nature the
interviewer must rely on the memory of managers,
and as the memories of managers are not necessarily
reliable, they could give excessive weighting to
certain information because of its ease of recall
or forget some pieces of information completely.
(ii) Questionnaires.
Questionnaires are most unreliable ways of trying to
determine information needs. They are open to bias,
misinterpretation, lack of involvement by the participant
and incorrect completion to name but a few of the problems.
The only valid reason for using questionnaires is speed.
They can be of use to add a structure to an interview but
then they are no longer a true questionnaire.
(iii) Observation and Record Inspection.
This approach to observe the conversation of data to
information and the information flows, etc. provides a
very useful way of examining existing information systems,
the major problem being that it is very time consuming.
There has been some work carried out to provide methods
to be used in recording informal systems and one off
decisions. The method could be said to be part obser-
vation and part questionnaire. Stuart *1 developed the
*1 STUART. (1967)
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use of diaries (forms of questionnaires that managers fill
in as they are completing their normal work) and Edstrom,
Broman and Levin *1 developed this into Communication
Analysis specifically for use in the management information
field. The basic approach is to get managers to fill a
diary form (communicogram) as they are performing their
normal job. This makes these techniques particularly
applicable to the variable, possibly unrecorded and transi-
ent information that one tends to find when dealing with
informal or one off decisions. It is essential to design
the diaries carefully in order to facilitate later analysis.
Standard systems and 0 & M techniques such as interviews
communication analysis, etc., can provide for the infor-
mation analyst effective descriptions of the existing
information systems. In any analysis of management infor-
mation such information needs will be required. But this
information must then be extended to give a picture of
management information needs.
Given that the standard methods of 0 & M and Systems will
not completely determine managements present information
needs some other method needs to be applied. The method
adopted within some organisations is that the analyst
assumes what management should need and then provides them
with this. The analyst then seems surprised when the
manager either cannot understand or will not use the
information provided. The only people who can determine
the information requirements are the managers themselves.
*1 EDSTROM, BROMAN AND LEVIN. (1973)
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It is often said by analysts that managers do not know
their own information requirements. To some extent this
statement is correct. Managers at first may appear not to
know their requirements, this being due more to poor
questioning than lack of knowledge. The interviewer
should bear in mind the manager's information needs in
relation to his job. It may also be necessary to place
managers in groups where information needs are discussed.
The picture that then arises may not be perfect but will
be better than one arrived at by traditional means.
There are many problems associated with the use of groups
and the involvement within these groups of the information
analyst. These will be looked at in more detail in the
section 3.7. The group should comprise of all the inter-
ested parties to the information and the information anal-
yst should act as a catylist and enable the group to develop
an effective set of information needs. It can only be
through such development that managers will see their infor-
mation needs developed and will understand and be able to
use the information provided for them. If we take the work
of Mintzberg to be a reasonable description of the proced-
ures operated by managers, the following quote outlines
the characteristics of the information managers seek.
"These characteristics put the manager in direct
conflict with most formal information systems. He
seeks trigger, speculative, current information, but
the formal system gives him largely aggregated, precise,
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historical information. Furthermore, the manager
demonstrates a thirst for external information, where-
as formal systems provide largely internal inform-
ation. [ThiS applies more to the senior managers J
The formal system deals with information for control
and regulation (production schedules, sales reports,
standard costs) that is primarily useful to the spec-
ialist in middle and lower echelons. [AlthOUgh it is
very necessary so that they can complete their
specialism] • It excludes much of the intelligence
information that senior managers need for their
unprogrammed decisions.
As a result the manager must often ignore the formal
information system. Instead he designs his own
system, which provides him with the information that
he believes he needs. He develops external contacts,
subscribes to periodicals, joins trade organisations
and encourages subordinates to circumvent the estab-
lished lines of communication to bring him inform-
ation." *1
I would not suggest that the answer to such a problem is
to formalise all the manager's information systems. I
think such an approach would be doomed to failure as a
large portion of the informal system is not suitable for
formalisation. I do think that the situation could be
improved by actively involving the managers in the deter-
mination of information needs at the design stage of such
*1 MINTZBERG. (1973 Page 149).
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systems. It should not be forgotten that the needs of
the specialist (accountants, production controllers, etc~
must also be met and so they must also be involved in the
discussion of information needs. With such an involvement
of managers, specialists, etc., it should be possible to
arrive at formal systems that satisfy both the specialists
and manager (the formal system will not provide all the
information needs of the managers some will still need to
be met by informal systems). Such formal systems should
be made easier to provide with the development of inter-
active computer systems both in software and hardware terms
and these are likely to be developed even further by the
advent of the micro computer.
Having determined what management's present information
needs are the information must now be justified and a
value and cost determined so that manager's can decide which
of the needs they can cost-justify.
3.3.3. DETERMINATION OF MANAGEMENTS' POTENTIAL
INFORMATION NEEDS.
This is a particularly difficult task. Some attention to
this problem needs to be payed when designing information
systems. Information systems should be sufficiently
flexible to enable changes to be easily made when the
information needs change and develop. This problem can be
surmounted by encouraging the manager to develop his know-
ledge (often not considered to be the function of an infor-
mation analyst). If the information analyst would like
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the managers to use more advanced information then he must
in some way provide the appropriate extra knowledge.
There are many sources of such specialist knowledge
(accounting, management science, computing, etc.) within
the organisation and these could be incorporated with the
group system described in the previous section. Altern-
atively the information analyst could organise 'in house'
courses (to prepare managers for more advanced information,
either staffed by internal specialists or external educa-
tionalists). An extremely dangerous practice is to provide
the more advanced information and then expect the manager
to find out how to use it. Such a practice can build
blocks in managerial attitudes against the person designing
the system, the specialism concerned and the system itself.
Such blocks can be very difficult to remove at a later date.
It is a far better practice to let the managers develop
their knowledge (or take an active part in developing that
knowledge) and then through the group system allow the
managers to develop (with guidance) their own system in
conjunction with the specialists. This may appear a slow
process but surely it is better to have information systems
developed slowly stage by stage becoming gradually better
but well understood and used by managers (better used and
understood because the manager took an active role in
their design) rather than a sophisticated system designed
at one stage but not understood or used by the managers it
is supposed to serve.
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3.3.4. SUMMARY.
One of the most difficult tasks facing the information
analyst and the manager is the determination of manage-
ment's information needs. Management's information needs,
can be effectively determined only if they are considered
at two levels. These being, managements present infor-
mation needs and managements potential (future) infor-
mation needs.
In the determination of management's present information
needs the standard 0 & M and Systems techniques are
quite effective in discovering what information is received
by managers at pre6ent but they tend to fail in discov-
ering what extra information a manager could use (at this
stage information which managers cannot understand or use
should not be considered). To get a manager to think of
his information needs it is necessary to get the manager
(or managers if shared information is concerned) to define
their jobs and then to use this definition to establish the
information needs. Any decision about what information is
provided must take into account value and cost.
To determine management's potential information needs is
even more difficult. It is necessary to determine these
needs when information systems are being designed so that
the final system is flexible enough to take account of
future changes. These potential information needs can be
determined by the information analyst in consultation with
various specialists (Accountants, Management Science, etc.)
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within the organisation (or possibly external consultants.)
This potential information is by definition information
that the managers would not be able to understand or use
effectively. Such information should not be presented to
the managers until their knowledge has been developed by
such things as 'in house' courses, discussions with spec-
ialists, etc. The information analyst will have to take
an active roll in such management development if he hopes
to produce an acceptable management information system.
The information analyst must also realise that quite a
large proportion of the manager's information will be
gathered by the manager through informal systems. It would
be a mistake for the analyst to try and formalise such
systems. What would be of value to the manager is for the
information analyst to help managers improve the organisa-
tion of their own informal systems.
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3.4. DETERMINING THE VALUE OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.
Before moving to the value of information let us first
consider a typical organisation in terms of the inform-
ation it will need to operate, this is shown in figure
twenty eight.
Most methods of measuring the value of information have
ignored the areas where the information was to be used and
have been claimed to be a general method for the assessment
of the value of all information. Most of these were
doomed to failure on account of generality but may be
found to work reasonably well in specific areas. Therefore,
the approach adopted within this section will acknowledge
the diversity of types of information required by an
organisation and will devise a series of methods to deal
with different types of information.
Another key issue is the time at which the value of infor-
mation is actually determined. (see figure twenty nine).
There are three possible points at which the value of
information can be determined.
1. At a point before the manager takes any decision or
constructs any plans. The data to construct the
information mayor may not have been collected by the
'information system'.
2. At a point in time after the manager has considered
all the available information and decided what action
is to be taken.
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Figure Twenty eight: Levels of Information Requirements for a
Typical Organisation.
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Figure Twenty nine: Times at which Information can be Valued
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3. At a point in time when the actions of management
have been made and it is possible to observe the
effects of such actions on the external and internal
environment or both.
At the first point in the process the setting of a value
of a piece of information will be concerned with predictions
of the value that the information is going to have in the
future. It is the logical place to set a value as the
information has not yet been obtained and in most cases
it would seem reasonable to produce a value and cost in
order to determine whether that information should be
produced. It will be easier to predict value at the oper-
ational level than at the strategic level. The more
difficult the prediction (i.e. the more uncertain the
information or the effect of actions taken) the more
important it is to obtain an estimate at this stage but it
will have wider confidence limits.
At the second point in the process the value of the
information will be set by looking at the result of the
manager's decision or planning process. By looking at the
actions that were decided upon and by looking at the
process by which these actions were arrived at (i.e.
decision rules, etc.) it should be possible to obtain the
value placed on the information during the managerial
process. The value may be capable of accurate measurement
or it may be an estimate. There are a number of problems
that can OCcur with obtaining a value at this stage, the
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first being that the information needs to be collected
before a value can be set, thus making it a little late to
decide that the information need not be collected or derived.
This is a more acute problem with unprogrammed decisions
where the information is required only once. The partic-
ular approach assumes the perfect manager. Within this
approach if we obtain the value of the information from
the action taken we assume that the manager has taken the
correct action from all the information available, and
understood all the information and used it in a correct
manner. Managers being human this will not always be the
case. If the value is to be obtained at this stage then
questions like, 'is the manager using the best decision
rules?' or 'how deep is the manager's understanding of the
information?', need to be asked and taken into account when
the final value is set. If ,a value is set for a piece of
information for a programmed decision where repeatability
is possible it should be remembered that due to the dynamic
nature of business organisations such a value can only be
an estimate for future decisions. The decision may remain
the same but the conditions under which it is operated are
likely to vary.
At the third point the value of the information is deter-
mined after the effects of the actions taken have been
observed on the external Or internal or both environments.
Valuing at this point suffers the same problems as point
two plus additional problems. It is very difficult when
observing changes in the different environments actually
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to attribute any of these changes to a specific action.
The time scale involved can also be considerable. The
effect of some actions taken when a strategic problem is
being considered can take several years to show. It is
suggested by some that with simulations the effect of
certain actions can be determined (by closely controlling
other factors) and the time problem can be overcome. It
is true that simulation can overcome the time scale problem
but the first problems cannot be overcome. Simulation
models can only be predictive in nature therefore any
results from them must be considered within their range of
accuracy. To a degree a large number of simulation models
assume that things in the future will remain as they have
in the past (i.e. it is difficult to build the surprise
factor into simulation models) and will react in the same
manner. Also simulations will only predict what may happen
given certain management actions and therefore do not really
belong at point three but at either point one or two.
Having considered the level at which the information is
to be found and the point at which it is to be valued it
is possible to move on to value information. An approx-
imate method of valuation will have already been carried
out when the manager's information needs have been deter-
mined. The information required by the manager will have
some value and the information not required will be of no
value. It must be remembered that although the information
required by the manager will have a value it may not be
sufficient to make it worth collecting or producing. Given
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that the information is required by the manager then one
of the following methods can be used to value it:
1. Decision theory approach.
2. Simulation and valuing information.
3. Accounting approach.
4. Estimation Heuristics.
3.4.1. DECISION THEORY APPROACH TO THE VALUATION Of
INfORMATION.
One approach to the valuation of information is by the use
of Decision Analysis (Decision trees and Bayes' Decision
Theory). This approach has been taken by a number of
people being developed best by EmerYe *1
This approach is best explained by using an example.
The example is the one used in the section on Decision
Analysis (2.5.4.) Considered the launching of a new
product such that we get a profit if the product is a
success and a loss if the product is a failure, the values
being given below.
ACTUAL OUTCOMES.
(£000 PROfIT)
SUCCESS fAILURE
INTRODUCE 100 -50
ACTION
DO NOT 0 0
INTRODUCE
*1 EMERY. (1971)
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From past information marketing management determine that
60% of the time new products have been successful and
therefore 40% of the time failure. The problem is whether
or not to produce a Market Research Study, (a Market
Survey) and again we find from past records that the
predictions of such surveys are correct SO% of the time.
Using these probabilities and Bayes' Theory we can arrive
at the following probabilities.
ACTUAL OUTCOMES
SUCCESS FAILURE
SUCCESS 0'S571 0'1429
PREDICTION
OUTCOME
FAILURE 0'2727 0'7273
Using this information the decision tree shown in figure
thirty can be drawn.
For a full explanation of how the values and tree are
derived see section 2.5.4.
From the decision tree it can be seen that the expected
monetary return if the research is carried out is £43919
compared with an expected monetary ret~rn of £40,000 if we
do not carry out the research. Therefore it can be said
that the value of the research is £3919. How accurate is
this valuation of the information.
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Figure Thirty: Decision Tree to Market Research Problem.
Indica tes Decision Chosen
(500) Indicates Negative Value
EIM)=i'-
EIM)=!43919
Returns
1
100000
(50000)
o
100000
(50000)
o
100000
(50000)
o
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There is a great danger with this method that it formal-
ises the situation too much. It would appear from this
decision tree that the value of the information is £3919
and that the 'automatic' decision open to management is
that if the information can be bought for less than this
then it is worth obtaining.
The first thing is to consider the value itself, at £3919
it would appear to be quite a precise value. This is a
false impression because it is made up from values which
are only estimates or averages. The profits used can only
be estimates of what may be. The probabilities will either
be estimates or average values based on what has happened
in the past, and given the dynamic nature of business there
is no guarantee the same probabilities will apply in the
future. If only one estimate is asked for then the persons
optimism or pessimism will affect the result. The same
problems in estimation occur when obtaining time estimates
for networks. This problem is reduced in P.E.R.T. Analysis
by asking for a range of estimates. This also makes it
possible to consider the values as distributions and not
individual estimates. The three estimates asked for are:
1 ) An Optimistic Estimate showing all the values at
their best possible, i.e. costs at the lowes~,
returns at the highest, etc.
2) A Pessimistic Estimate showing all the values at
their worst possible, i •e. cost at the highest,
returns at the lowest, etc.
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3) A Most Likely Estimate showing all the values at
their most likely or average value.
These estimates can then be used to produce three trees an
optimistic, a pessimistic and a most likely and from these
then a range of possible values of the information can be
arrived at, going from a pessimistic value of the inform-
ation through a most "likely value to an optimistic value.
This approach is much more realistic because it gives a
distribution of values rather than giving one apparently
precise value in this case £3919. for more detail of this
approach see section 2.5.3. Simulation can also be used in
conjunction with such trees to give !"~ypical' results to
give managers a better picture of what is happening.
Having arrived at an estimate of the values of information
the actual decisions need to be considered. It should be
remembered that the decision tree does not take automatic
decisions, it should be used only to assist managers in
their decision taking. It will be up to the manager to
take into account all the non-quantifiable aspects of the
decision. For example we may have our own Market Research
Section who are at present going through a slack period
(only of a temporary nature). In such a case even though
the survey may cost £6000 it may still be considered
necessary to carry out the survey to keep the Market Res-
earch Section in full employment. Also within this method
it is assumed that management will always take the decision
indicated by the tree. This is not the case as there may
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well be some non-quantifiable reason for not taking such a
decision. Such a change in decision making could then well
affect the value of the information arrived at.
There are more factors that must be considered to affect
the £3919 value of the information. The method as so far
used has taken no account of the basic concepts discussed
earlier in this chapter. (see section 3.2.).
1) TIME:- no account has been made of time. with
such market research information time must be an
important factor. The information will not be
required until the decision is made to produce
or not produce so up to then it will only be of
limited value. It will assume its full value
during the time the decision is made (this time
will include preparing to take decisions). Its
value will then fall away, after the decision has
been taken. The rate of fall will be dependent on
the product, the more unstable the sales figures
the quicker the falloff.
2) KNOWLEDGE:- The knowledge of the managers need to
be taken into account when using this value. This
method of valuation assumes that the manager can
fully understand the information, if this is not
the case the value of the information may be red-
uced.
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3) PRIOR INFORMATION:- Prior information will not
add anything to the value, but having prior infor-
mation could reduce the value of this particular
piece of information. Such a complex decision as
deciding whether or not to produce a product is
unlikely to be taken on the basis of one piece of
information. Figure thirty one shows the relat-
ionship between value of information, successful
product introduction and the success rate of pred-
ictions for this example as calculated by Emery.*1
From this diagram it can be seen that the value
of the information rises to £12500 if the predic-
tion rate is O·g and a maximum of £20,000 if the
prediction rate is perfect 1·0.
4) ACCURACY OF INFORMATION:- This method of valu-
ation does allow for the accuracy to be taken into
account by building it into the prior probabili-
ties. In practice it may be necessary to use a
little more complex method of prediction of this
accuracy level. In this example the figure was
set by looking at the result of past market
research projects. It would probably be better
to predict the probability of an accuracte estim-
ate of market demand by taking into account other
factors for example, the type of market being
investigated the methods used in the investigation,
etc. The accuracy of the information may relate
to the amount of money spent. The bigger the
*1 EMERY. (1971 Page 7).
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Figure Thirty one: The Effect of Accuracy and Probability of
Success on the Value of Information.
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Prior Probability of a SUccessful
Product Introduction
Where A = The Probability of an Accurate Estimate
of Market Demand.
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sample size the greater the accuracy but there
will be diminishing returns.
5) QUANTITY:- The quantity of this information is
unlikely to have any serious affect on its value.
The value could be effected if the report itself
was badly written and was either too long or
contains much irrelevant information. If the
decision taker for the product launch is presented
with a large amount of extra information concerning
the decision as well as the piece of information
b~ing considered then there is a danger that
quantity may result in some information not reach-
ing its full value. The decision taker may not
have enough time to consider all the information
and therefore may miss some valuable information.
6) PDWER:- Issues concerning power could well over-
ride the procedures for cost justifying the infor-
mation. Power cannot affect the value with regard
to the organisation but it can with regard to the
individual. for example suppose the Marketing
Director thinks that this survey could affect his
standing in the organisation. He may then give
the go-ahead to the project whatever the cost or
value in order to enhance his position and change
his power rating. Such things may not be desirable
for the organisation but as any organisation is
made up of individuals most of whom will see their
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relationship with the organisation in power terms
such events must be accepted as a fact of life.
If an information analyst expects to survive and
operate successfully within an organisation then
he must take account of power in the valuing of
information especially when dealing with individ-
uals or groups with greater powe~ than himself.
All that has been said up to now does not mean that the
decision theory approach should be abandoned completely.
What it does mean is that the value arrived at by using
decision analysis cannot be taken as a single value but it
must be modified by a number of factors.
The way in which the example of marketing information
relates to figures twenty eight and twenty nine will now
be considered. Taking figure twenty nine first this method
of valuation as applied so far is carried out at point (1).
This is before the information is collected or collated.
Next consider the type of information areas to which it is
applicable as classified in figure twenty eight. The
example considered is of strategic type and is in fact the
evaluation of a project. It would seem fair to say this
method of approach will work reasonably successfully within
this field of operation. It must now be considered how
successful it is likely to be in other areas.
Let us now consider an example from the operational level.
Suppose we have the choice of purchase of two machines to
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carry out a particular function within the organisation.
The operating costs and the output and its quality are
similar for both machines. The following data is avail-
able for the two machines.
Mic A. PURCHASE PRICE RESALE VALUE MAINTENANCE COST
(at year end) (including lost)
~Of Mic purch-)(prcduction time)
ased in year)
(1•)
YEAR t. e £
1 12000 9000 300
2 12500 7500 200
3 13000 6300 350
4 13400 5400 480
5 13800 5000 690
6 14200 4600 1200
7 14400 4200 1800
Mic B. PURCHASE PRICE RESALE VALUE
~~;~i~rendl
(purchased
(in year 1
£
MAINTENANCE COST
(including lost)
(production time)
YEAR
1
2
14000 9000 250
300
3
14100
14200
14300
14400
8250
7300 380
4 6500 460
5 6100 580
6
7
14500 5800 1150
14600 5500 1600
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These situations show that machines gradually deteriorate
with age this being shown by the increasing maintenance
cost and the decreasing resale value. The purchase price
figures have been discounted back using year one as the
reference point and the resale value and maintenance costs
have also been discounted. The way of deciding between
these two machines is to determine the average yearly
running cost of using both machines. This will be depen-
dent on the time when they are replaced. So the first step
in this problem will be to work out the optimum replace-
ment policy for both machines.
REPLACEMENT POLICY CALCULATION FOR Mic A.
Replacement at
end of year. 1 2 3 4 567
Maintenance
Costs. 300 200 350 480 690 1200 1800
Cumulative
Maintenance
Costs. 300 500 850 1330 2020 3220 5020
+Purchase
Price of M/c.12000 12500 13000 13400 13800 14200 14400
-Resale Value. 9000 7500 6300 5400 5000 4600 4200
-Total Cost. 3300 5500 7500 9330 10820 12820 15220
Average
Annual Cost. 3300 2750 2517 2333 2164 2137* 2174
~the optimum replacement policy would appear to be to
replace the machine at the end of year 6 at an aver-
age cost of £2137.
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REPLACEMENT POLICY CALCULATION FOR M/C 8.
Replacement
at end of Year. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Maintenance
Cost. 250 300 380 460 580 1150 1600
Cumulative
Maintenance
Cost. 250 550 930 1390 1970 3120 4720
+
Purchase
price of
M/C. 14000 14100 14200 14300 14400 14500 14600
Resale
Value. 9000 8250 7300 6500 6100 5800 5500
=Total cost. 5250 6400 7830 9190 10270 11820 13820
Average
Annual Cost. 5250 3200 2610 2298 2054 1970* 1974
~the optimum replacement would appear to be to replace
the machine at the end of year 6 at an average annual
cost of £1974.
The two machines can best be compared by presenting these
average annual costs in the form of a decision tree see
figure thirty two.
The best decision would appear to be to purchase Machine
8 and replace at the end of the sixth year, but the final
decision must be made by management using the quantified
information on the tree and using this in conjunction with
all the non-quantifiable information to arrive at a
decision.
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Figure Thirty two: Decision Tree for Machine Replacement
FToblem.
Replace at end of
Year Six l 2137
Replace at end of
Year Six L1970
,
Choosen Decision
Average Annual
Cost L
3300
2750
2517
2333
2164
2137 •
2174
5250
3200
2610
2298
2054
1970 •
1974
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The problem comes now to set a value on the piece of
information. This final piece of information is made up
of some base data and the knowledge to develop this data
into the final information. To value this information
let us consider what would be the outcome if there was no
information, if this was the case then the decision could
be considered to be taken at random, see figure thirty
three. The number of years between replacement in this
tree has been kept at seven, in theory this could go on to
infinity. In reality some limit must be put on the number
of years used in the calculations. The error produced by
limiting the number of years in the calculation will be
on the safe side for it will reduce the amount df value
attributed to the information.
E(M1) = (O·14x3300)+(O·14x2750)+(O·14x2517)+(O·14x2333)
+(O·14x2164)+(O·14x2137)+(O·14x2174)
= £2482·14
E(M2) = (O·14x5250)+(O·14x3200)+(O·14x2610)+(O·14x2298)
+(O·14x2054)+(O·14x1970)+(O·14x1974)
= £2765·14
E(M3) = (O·5x2482·14) + (O·5x2765·14)
= £2623·64
From diagram nine it can be seen that the average annual
cost assuming a random decision pattern will be £2623·64.
By using the information and knowledge the average annual
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Figure Thirty three: Random Tree tor Machine Replacement
Problem.
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cost can be reduced to £1970 (see diagram eight) and
therefore one estimate of the value of the information
will be to take the difference of these two values,
(the resulting value must then be multiplied by six years
the period over which we are concerned).
Information Value: = (2623·64 - 1970) x 6
= 653·64 x 6
= £3921·84
within the range of £0 to £19,680
The range is calculated in the following manner. The
lowest value to the information (£0) occurs if the random
chosen decision is the same as the best decision from the
decision tree. The highest value to the information
(£19,680) occurs if the worst decision from the random
decision tree (£5,250) is compared with the best decision
from the decision tree (£1,970). (the resulting difference
being multiplied by six years the period over which we are
concerned). This range is concerned with the possible val-
ues that can result by comparing trees; it takes no
account of possible errors in the estimates and figures
used in the analysis.
This value must now be related to the other factors
involved in the valuing of information.
1) TIME:- This information will not reach its full
value until the taking of the decision of which. machine
is to be bought and until the decision is taken of when
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to replace the machine purchased.
2) KNOWLEDGE:- The knowledge of the managers need to be
taken into account. It has been assumed that managers have
adequate knowledge to make use of the information.
Clearly lack of knowledge could reduce the value of the
information.
3) PRIOR INFORMATION:- There might be some prior infor-
mation concerned with the prediction of some of the data
parts, for example the maintenance costs and downtime,
then this could be built into the analysis by using
Bayesian statistics.
4) ACCURACY OF INFORMATION:- In this estimate of the
value of the information little account has been taken of
the possible inaccuracies in the component data parts, ie.
estimates, costs, etc. As previously stated the range so
far calculated does not relate to any possibility of errors
in estimates, costs, etc. One way of producing such a
range is to give three estimates for all the base data as
in P.E.R.T. Analysis. A pessimistic, a most likely and an
optimistic estimate are given and so producing three
decision trees, thA tree that has already been constructed
is the most likely. The pessimistic and the optimistic
tree will give the r.ange. This, however, would
considerably increase the amount of work in
the production of final values but it would give a reason-
able estimate of the range. It is a fallacy to think that
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the use of Bayesian statistics and prior probabilities
produces results of increased accuracy. This form of
.analysis still depends on forecasting the prediction rate
for future events which is not quite as straightforward as
Bayesian statisticians would lead people to believe. One
very useful aspect of Bayesian statistics is that the
effect of accuracy of the predictions can be related to
the value of the information. (as was shown with the prev-
ious example, Market Research Survey).
5)QUANTITY:- The size of a particular piece of infor-
mation can affect its value. Excessive size can reduce the
value of the information. All managers are subject to a
time constraint and therefore there is the chance that
some of the value of the large piece of information may
be lost because there is insufficient time to study it.
The more complex the decision becomes the larger becomes the
decision analysis and therefore, this problem may start
to Occur.
6) POWER:- Power could well be a factor that overrides
the value of the information. Power cannot affect the
value with regard to the organisation but it can with
regard to the individual. If an individual thinks that
the presentation of such information is likely to increase
his status within the organisation then no matter what
its value it may still be collected and developed. Such
things may not be desirable for the organisation, but as
any organisation is made up of individuals most of whom
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will see their relationship with the organisation in power
terms such events must be accepted as a fact of life.
Having taken these six factors into consideration along
with the first estimation it should be possible in
conjunction with management to arrive at a reasonable
value for the total piece of information, ie., the total
decision analysis.
This leaves the estimation of the value of the component
parts of the information, in this particular case the
purchase price, resale value and maintenance costs for
each machine (the data) and the knowledge to turn this data
into the decision analysis. The value associated with the
total piece of information £3921.84 must now be apportioned
between the data and the knowledge. It may be that mana-
gement feels that the data on its own is of no value and
only takes on a value when it becomes part of the full
decision analysis. Or it may be that management may feel
that the data on its own is of limited value. For example
management may feel that by just looking at the data it
may be possible to estimate a replacement time. If this is
the case then management must estimate what proportion of
the £3921·84 can be associated to the data itself, ego they
may assume £2000 has an estimate of the value of the data
(£1000 for each Mic's data). The value for data in this
particular application can never exceed the value of the
total piece of information. But the total value of the
data to the organisation may exceed this figure because
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it may be of use in other applications. In the example
being considered the. maintenance cost data will probably
be used in planned maintenance schemes so its total value
to the organisation may exceed the initial estimate of
£2000 and depending on the value of its other uses it
could exceed the £3921·84 value.
The way in which this piece of information relates to
figures twenty eight and twenty nine will now be consid-
ered. This example is concerned with the operational
level as shown in figure twenty eight. It can be consid-
ered as the implementation of strategic plans and poss-
ibly as a project. When looking at figure twenty nine
the information can be valued at point one before the man-
ager takes the decision but after the data has been collec-
ted and processed into information
If we apply this approach of valuation to a more conven-
tional decision tree in the operational level, the results
will be similar to the case of Concord Insulators Limited.
Concord Insulators Limited is a case study given in
Appendix E. Concord Insulators is a case study concerned
with the operational level decision of a choice between
two machines. The product life is expected to be three
years with probabilities of achieving particular sales at
each stage. Each of the machines can be either bought or
hired. One of the advantages of hiring is that the type
of machines can be changed at the end of each year. The
full decision tree and all the calculations are given in
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the case study. Because of the size of the tree and the
calculations only a summary of the tree is given in
figure thirty four.
For a full analysis of the decision see the case study
itself. If we assume that without this information only
a random decision can be taken and at each point where a
decision is required the routes are given equal probab-
ilities of occurrance then the resultant tree will be the
information value tree given in the case study and summar-
ised in figure thirty five.
The expected return from the best decision using the tree
is £38656. The expected return from random deci&on making
is shown in the information value tree and is £33895·75.
VALUE OF INFORMATION = 38656 - 33895.75
(all information and)
(knowledge)
= £4760·25
within range of £0 to £7871
For a full analysis of the other fa~tors involved with
this value see the case study itself. In terms of figure
twenty eight and twenty nine this study is very similar to
the last example. It can be considered as the implementa-
tion of strategic plans and possibly as a project. When
looking at figure twenty nine the information can be valued
at point one before the manager takes the decision
but after the data has been collected and processed into
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Figure Thirty four: Summary of Concord Insulators Ltd Decision
Tree.
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Figure Thirty five: Summary of Concord Insulators Ltd
Information Value Tree
c:
~~~
VI c:::I +-
c: +- c: <::> N'- :J -.0 Ln:J VI 0 LJ"I co <::> ...t+-+-u NCIJ VI u -.0 c- o-£t:: S Cl co <::> ...:t <c-"
._ 0 m m m m+- ~ +-~ c:
~ ::: .-
E(M1}:: (0·5 x 38656) +(0·5 x30785)= J34720·5
E(M 2) = (0·5 x 34200) + (0·5 x 31942)
= L33071
E(H3)=(0·5x34720·S) +(O·S x33071)
= 133895 ·75
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information.
One important aspect of Concord Insulators is that it
shows how large decision trees can became. The problem
before Concord Insulators is not a particularly large one
but as can be seen the decision tree itself and the calcu-
lations involved have became quite exte~sive. In this
particular project I estimate there to be 130 man hours of
work from data collection to presentation to management.
A reasonable'estimate for the total cost of management
services personnel at the time of the case study (March
1979) would seem to be £6 per hour (£10,920 per man year).
This ~ould give a total cost of the information of £780.
Taking this into account gives an information profit of
£3980·25. For this information to be of no value we would
need to take 793 man hours which is nearly half a man year.
So even with quite a large analysis as in Concord Insu-
lators there is still plenty of information profit.
SUMMARY OF DECISION ANALYSIS APPROACH TO VALUING INFORMATION.
The first example considered uses Baye's theorem to create
a decision tree which presents the two alternatives-to
produce the information or not produce the information.
This is accomplished using prior probabilities (past
success rates) to predict values for what will happ~n in
the future. There are however some problems with this
technique. First it assumes that the future will be like
the past and that the prior probabilities will be valid in
the future, unfortunately this is not always the case for
238
management. This problem can be overcome to an extent by
producing results based on a series of alternative prior
probability values. For example figure thirty one shows
the effect on value of information of varying the prior
probabilities of a successful product introduction and
the probability of an accurate estimate of market demand.
These types of illustration are also of value in demon-
strating this effect to management also to help them in
assessing the other ,actors involved in valuing inform-
ation. The second problem with the Bayesian approach is
that there may not be any prior probabilities because the
project concerned may be a novel. type. This problem can
be overcome by getting management to estimate these probab-
ilities and provided that management is trained in the
estimation of probabilities (see section 2.4.) this should
present few difficulties.
Classical Decision Theory provides a further method of
valuing information. A value can be achieved by comparing
the best return from the decision tree against a value
obtained by taking random decisions (this would be the
case if no information existed), the resultant difference
being the value of the information. This approach can be
applied across a wide variety of quantitative techniques
and the second two examples show this method of valuation.
The first is a replacement theory problem, and the other,
Concord Insulators, being a standard classical decision
analysis problem. This method can be applied in many areas
such as simulation, queuing and others and provides a way
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of measuring the contribution of such techniques to the
value of· the total piece of information. Like the Bayesian
approach this approach suffers from the possible inaccuracy
of the base data used to produce the analysis. This prob-
lem can to an extent be aleviated by taking a similar
approach to that of P.E.R.T. and produce three estimates a
pessimistic, an optimistic and a most likely estimate of
values in the tree. This will give rise to three trees
and so provide a range of values for the total piece of
information. Such an approach is also of use to the mana-
gers in their decision analysis.
,
These two approaches suffer from the fact that neither of
them makes any allowance for the basic concepts discussed
earlier of time, knowledge, prior information, accuracy,
quantity and power. As can be seen from the examples
these can be taken into account later when the value has
been produced by making adjustments in consultation with
management.
Each of the two approaches can be applied at both an
operational and a strategic level within the organisation.
However, they are best applied to the project type of
decision which will include a large proportion of non-
programmed decision and some programmed decisions.
It would be difficult to apply either of these two approac-
hes to the type of information used for control, e.g.
process control, stock control, financial control and other
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control information. These methods value the information
at a point in time after the data has been collected but
before the decision has been taken. It may seem a point-
less exercise to value a piece of information after it has
been produced, for it would be of no value at this stage
to say the information is not of sufficient value to
warrant production. However, by keeping records of infor-
mation value it would be possible before the data is coll-
ected to produce a reasonable estimate of the value of
information, the final value of the information being
. determined to update the records and improve the estimation
of the future values.
Decision Analysis also provides'a useful tool for exam-
ining decisions after they have been taken and the results
of the decision seen. It can be used in retrospect with
the decision taker to examine the information, and also to
try to determine what extra information would have been of
value (this is always much easier in retrospect). Such
analysis can then be used in improving estimates of value.
3.4.2. SIMULATION AND VALUING INFORMATION.
Simulation techniques can be used to provide a value for
information. This should not be confused with the use of
simulation to provide information. The technique of
simulation is often used for prediction under varying
conditions, so providing management with information they
can use in their planning and decision making. This form
of information can be valued in a similar manner to the
decision tree techniques by providing a datum from which
to measure. The most reliable datum would seem to be the
result of a random decision, as used previously. Other
datums such as the decision that would have been taken
without that particular piece of information would seem to
be less reliable. Such a datum would also be difficult to
actually determine. Managers would not take kindly to
being given a little information and being asked to take a
decision or produce a plan then being given a little more
information and then being asked to repeat the process so
that any changes in the pattern of the decision or plan
could be noted. This process would then be repeated until
the information analyst had valued the information. For
such a process to produce reasonable values for the infor-
mation would require a large time committment on behalf of
the manager by repeatedly taking the same decision but with
different information. It would also require that the
manager would be totally consistent with his decision making
which being realistic is unlikely. The approach of prod-
ucing the random decision would get around most of these
problems.
Having obtained the best result for the decision from
simulation this can be compared with the random decision
results and so a value for the information can be determ-
ined in the same way as previous examples (Concord Insu-
lators). When dealing with a piece of information that is
made up of a series of small parts care should be taken if
it is to be compared with a random datum. There will be no
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extra problems if the information as a whole is compared
with the random datum but problems can occur if each part
is separately compared to the random datum. There will be
a danger of over estimation of the total value of the
piece of information if it is arrived at by summing the
value of the parts.
Simulation can also be used to provide information for the
imput into decision analysis, for example market models and
so can be used to provide a value for the information as in
the first section. Simulation models can also be produced
to provide a value for information more directly. The
model when initially devised would have to be designed
specially for this application which would, with the cost
of production of such complex models would almost certainly
make such an application uneconomic.
Possibly the most important aspect of simulation as
applied to the measurement of information is in the train-
ing of managers in the setting of subjective measurement
concerned with information. This involves the provision of
initial training in assessment followed by the provision of
consistence checks, etc., to ensure that the manager's
ability in subjective assessment is consistent and develop-
ing. Such a use of simulation will be discussed later in
this section.
Simulation can be used at any level within organisations
and on any form of decision. With regards to figure
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twenty nine simulation is best used at point G)but because
of its predictive nature it allows a prediction to be made
of the results of actions at point~ Although simulation
models can produce predictions with a reasonable degree of
accuracy it must be remembered they are still only predic-
tions of what might happen at point ~ they are not what
will or has happened at point ~
3.4.4. ACCOUNTING APPROACH TO THE VALUATION OF INFORMATION.
It is possible to approach the valuation of information
from an accounting point of view, that is to determine the
value of the information by equating this to the cost of
not having the information, and determining this cost. To
illustrate this method of valuation let us consider the
example of the use of moulds in the production of ceramic
ware.
In the production of a plate a plaster of paris mould is
used, the surface of the mould being in the shape of the
upper surface of the plate. Clay in a plastic form (green
clay) is then placed on this mould, the mould is rotated
and a former is lowered to produce the desired shape of
the underside of the plate. The plate in its green clay
form is allowed to dry before being removed from the
mould. The mould is then used to produce further plates,
but before the process can continue the mould needs to be
dried due to the fact that the plaster of paris draws
moisture from the green clay. The mould will eventually
become unusable for the following major reasons.
244
1) Wear on the edge of the mould caused by contact with
the upper former resulting in incorrect sized plates
and plates with faulty profile.
2) Deterioration of the plaster of paris with the
continued wetting and drying of the mould. This
causes a flaking to take place on the surface of the
mould giving incorrect dimensions and poor surface
finish.
3) Damage to the mould may occur in various stages of
handling varying from total smashing to chips and
cracks.
Let us now move on to the other major use of moulds in the
ceramic industry. This is in the casting process to make
larger or more complex shapes for example w.es. and figures.
In order to cast complex shapes the moulds are made up of
several parts. In use the mould is filled entirely with
slip (slip is water with clay in suspension). When the
slip comes into contact with the plaster of paris mould
the mould absorbs the water and so a skin of clay is
formed on the inside of the mould. The longer the slip is
left in the mould the thicker the layer of clay becomes.
When the product reaches the required thickness the
remaining slip is poured from the mould. The product is
then left in the mould to dry until it is sufficiently
rigid to be removed. Slight shrinkage usually takes place
during this drying which eases the removal of the product
from the mould. The mould when it has been dried can then
be reused. The mould eventually becomes unusable for two
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major reasons.
1) Deterioration of the plaster of paris with the con-
tinued wetting and drying of the mould. This causes
a flaking to take place on the surface of the mould
so giving incorrect dimensions and poor surface
finish. This fault is much more prevalent with this
type of mould than with plate moulds due to the fact
that the slip gives up more water to the plaster of
paris than the plastic clay so causing the need for
more drying.
2) Damage to the mould may occur in various stages of
handling varying from total smashing to chips and
cracks. Such chips and cracks can cause problems if
they occur at the union of parts of the mould and so
causing flash to occur on the final product.
Having described the process involved with the use of
moulds in the ceramic industry it is now possible to look
into methods of valuing the process control information
concerning the moulds. The basic aim of the process
control information is to determine the optimum point at
which to replace moulds. It will also (almost incident-
ally) provide data to be used in product costing, etc.
The way in which moulds produce faults will be similar to
that of machine tools and can be shown diagramatically
in figure thirty six.
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Figure Thirty six: Distribution of Faults in the Life of Moulds.
Probability 1
of Fault
Occurrence
Time ...
This type of distribution is standard for most items that
deteriorate with time. After the peak at the beginning,
caused by defective mould production then the level of
faults will settle down (most faults at this stage being
produced by operative error, material error, etc). As
time goes on then the problems previously explained start
to take an effect and the number of faults starts to rise,
and it becomes necessary to decide the point where the
mould should be replaced. Other factors that are rele-
vant to replacement policy are:-
1) The cost of the mould. Moulds themselves are relat-
ively expensive to produce, requiring a high degree
of skill in the labour force and being made from a
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relatively expensive material.
2) When a fault occurs, provided it is found when the
clay is green it is possible to recycle the clay.
There will, however, still be a loss due to the loss
in overheads, etc., already used in the production
of the product. The next stage, firing produces a
chemical change in the material so not making it
possible to recycle defective products. If a mould-
ing fault goes undetected to this stage the cost
incurred is obviously much higher. If a moulding
fault goes undetected through further stages of
glazing and refiring then the fault can become very
expensive.
3) At present the production of larger castings and
hollow ware castings (teapots, coffee pots, etc.)
is labour intensive where the mould can be monitored
by the operative. With the present trend towards a
more automated process it will not be possible for an
ope~ative to monitor the mould and so the product will
need to be monitored. A large producer of sanitary
ware has already developed a machine that will
automatically cast w.es although it is experiencing
union difficulties in getting the machine into prod-
uction. The production of plates and cups is also
becoming more automated and the production of ceramic
tiles has become totally automated so making it neces-
sary to monitor the product and not the moulds to
identify the defective moulds. The moulds used to
produce tiles are metal and the tiles are stamped out
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of powder and not plastic clay.
The actual methods of process control which could be used
are well tried and reasonably successful. The important
thing at this stage is to determine the value of the
information they provide. The approach so far used,
decision analysis, requires that the value of the infor-
mation be based around the decision. The decision in this
case is when to replace the mould. The moulds are suff-
iciently expensive to make it necessary to treat them
individually, so each mould is used until it produces poor
products. At any point in time the decision could be rep-
resented by the decision tree shown in figure thirty seven.
This figure shows how the decision concerning the replac-
ement of moulds would appear at anyone point of time.
Point five on the tree causes somewhat of a problem which
is why it has been shown with symbols both for a decisi.on
and an alternative outcome. H~ving taken the route of not
carrying out process control the possibility of a company
not changing moulds at all can be discounted as such a
strategy would end with the liquidation of the company
similarly a random approach to replacement would also be
discounted by any right thinking management. The only
approach to the removal of process control at the casting
stage would be to replace all moulds at fixed intervals,
the interval being fixed by the probability distribution
of faults in moulds (see figure thirty six). It is a
decision to replace moulds at a fixed time but in a formal
Figure Thirty seven:Decision Tree for Process Control.
• Not Completly
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sense it can also be considered an alternative outcome
so at this point both symbols are used. Having now looked
at the tree in general terms the individual components of
the tree can be dealt with in turn, firstly the costs.
COST A:-
COST 8:-
COST C:-
COST 0:-
COST I:-
This cost will be zero due to the fact that the
appropriate action has been taken.
In this situation a non-defective mould has been
rejected so the cost involved will be the lost
good production from that mould. This is not
an actual loss of production. Production will
continue as a new mould replaces the mould rej-
ected. What will be affected will be the unit
cost of the mould that has been rejected because
it could have produced more good production.
Such a cost would be almost impossible to deter-
mine exactly so only an estimate could be used.
If a defective mould is not replaced then defec-
tive items will be produced. Thus cost C will
be the resulting cost incurred. The further
such items get through the process the greater
the cost becomes (especially if they are put
through kilns and glazing processes).
Like cost A this cost will also be zero because
this is also a correct situation not replacing
a non-defective mould.
To replace a mould incurs the cost of the actual
replacement mould which are expensive items.
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COST 11:- Not to replace the mould must be zero (the
effect of the length of use on the unit price
of the mou~d will be allowed for in cost 1).
COST 111:- This cost will be the one involved in the
carrying out of process control. It may be as
small as the marginal cost of an operator
checking that the item has been produced corr-
ectly in a manual casting process or a greater
cost for more sophisticated systems required
for automatic processes.
The cost of not carrying out any process controlCOST IV:-
will not be zero. The only sensible alternative
to carrying out process control is to replace
the moulds at fixed intervals. Studies will
need to be carried out to determine the optimum
time to replace the moulds. The cost of these
studies would be included in cost IV. Addit-
ional cost will be incurred with the good
moulds that are thrown away when the fixed rep-
lacement time arrives.
After considering the costs the next thing is to consider
the probabilties all of which will be related to time(in
the lifespan of the mould). The relationship between time
and the probability of a fault occurring has already been
shown diagramatically in figure thirty six.
Probability A:- Probability A can be calculated using
Bayes Therom as follows -
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Prob A = Prob (O/PO) E Prob (POLO~ • Prob (D)
Prob PD)
= Prob
Prob
• Prob
• Prob + Prob • Prob
Where Prob (O/PO) = Probability of defective mould given
that a prediction of a defective mould
has been made i.e. bad mould rejected.
Prob (D) = Probability of a mould being defective
at a point in time. *1
= Probability of a mould not being
defective at a point in time. *1
Prob (PO/D) = Probability of predicting a defective
Prob (NO)
if a defective mould would actually
occur (the success rate of the method
of process control in predicting defec-
tive moulds when defective moulds
actually occur). A detailed study of
the operations and the process control
system would need to be carried out to
determine this probability and it would
also only be an estimate of what might
occur in the future.
Prob (PO/NO)= Probability of predicting defective
mould if a non-defective mould would
actually occur 1 - Prob (PO/D).
Probability B:- Probability 8 can be calculated as follows
Prob 8 = Prob (NO/PO) = 1 - Prob A.
or the expression can be expanded using Bayes Therom.
where Prob (NO/PO). Probability of a non defective mould
given that a prediction of a defective
*1. N.D. Doth these probabilities will vary with the point
in time taken in the mould life cycle. (SeB
figure thirty six).
253
mould has been made i.e. good mould
rejected.
Probability C:- Probability C can be calculated using
Bayes Therom as follows -
Prob C = Prob (NO/PNO) = Prob(PNO/NO) • Prob (NO)
Prob (PND)
= Prob
Prob • Prob• Prob + Prob (PNO/O • Prob 0
where Prob (NO/PNO/ = probability of a non-defective mould
given that a prediction of a non-
defective mould has been made i.e.
Prob (0)
good mould not rejected.
= probability of a mould being rejected
at a point in time. *1
Prob (NO) = probability of a mould not being
defective at a point in time. *1
Prob(PNO/NO) = the probability of predicting a
non-defective mould if a non-defect-
ive moul~ would actually occwr (see
Prob (PO/D) in last expression for
further expansion of determination of
this probability.
Prob (PNO/O) = probability of predicting a non-
defective mould if a defective mould
would actually occur
• 1 - Prob (PNO/NO).
Probability 0:- Probability 0 can be calculated as follows:
Prob 0 = Prob (O/PNO) = 1 - Prob C.
or the expression can be expanded using Bayes Therom.
where Prob (O/PNO) • probability of a defective mould given
*1 N.B. Both these probabilities will vary with the point
in time taken in the moulds life cycle. (see figure
thirty six).
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= that a prediction of a non-deFective
mould has been made i.e. bad mould
not rejected.
A large part of all the data making up the tree is related
to time, the point in time at which the mould is in its
life cycle. Such time related variables make the analysis
and final results in any situation very difficult to
produce and understand. The results will vary with the
point in time so much that process control appears not
needed when the process is under control it is only needed
when the process goes out of control. To carry out process
control in this way is a nonsense because it is the job of
process control to determine when the process doss go out
of control.
Due to the time factor the standard valuation approach of
expected values and probabilities so far used will not be
successful for any type of control information. Although
a different approach to valuation will be required it will
still be necessary to determine the costs and probabilities
used on the tree. These costs and probabilities can then
be used in a different approach.
Given that the system of valuing based around decision
analysis will not be particularly successful another
approach must be taken, I have called this alternative
approach the accounting method because it is based around
cost. It is an approach used by managers but not much
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considered in theoretical studies in this area. The
approach is to consider the cost of not having the infor-
mation and using this to determine a value. This is similar
to the approach used in the Non-Bayesian Decision Analysis
method where the result in using the decision analysis
was compared with the result not using the decision anal-
ysis, the difference in the result giving the value of the
information.
In the accounting approach it is required to determine the
cost of the process going out of control. Some of the cost
is easily quantified, e.g. the cost of waste raw material,
rectification of the product, lost labour content in
producing defective pieces, waste in later processes if
defective pieces pass through, etc. Some of the costs will
be a little more difficult to quantify and may need to be
estimated, e.g. the loss of customer good will when defec-
tive pieces are delivered, etc. It should be possible to
obtain a reasonable value for the cost, of the process.going
out of control which will be related to time and will be
zero while the process is in control and then rising
relative to the production rate, when the process goes out
of control.
This cost could then be translated into value. As a result
of having the information the process would be brought
under control and the cost would be zero without the infor-
mation the cost would continue to rise; therefore the value
of the information will be equal to the cost of going out
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of control. Such a valuation of the information should
be used with care because the value would behave in the
same manner as the cost and rise with time, so making it
possiblp. to arrive at the incorrect conclusion that the
longer the correction to the process takes the greater
the value of the information. The approach to take with
this valuation is to relate it to the cost of providing
the information. When the two are equal or the cost is
less than the value then the information is viable. The
value of the information will be related to the time
taken by the information system to respond to the process
being out of control. The value of the information at
this point in time should be related to the cost (see
figure thirty eight).
There will always be some delay in any systems response
to an out of control process due to the normal variations
in the process (normal variation of the process must not be
interpreted by the system as being out of control). More
about how quickly information is required can be found in
section 3.1.4. The approach of relating value to cost in
this manner would make sure that the system provided
would be cost effective and would also make sure that the
system would respond at the economic rate.
The Accounting Approach to valuing information, that of
determining the cost of not having the information and
using this to determine the value of the information would
appear to be effective in arriving at a value for process
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Figure Thirty eight: Valuing Process Control Information.
Cost of
Process
Going Out
of Control
I
A
1
B
Value of Improved
System
(
Value of Information
from Existing System
TIme
POINT A: The point at which the process goes out of
control.
POINT B: The point at which the process is discovered
to be out of control by the existing control
system.
POINT C: The point at which the process is discovered
to be out of control by the new improved
control system.
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control information. Such a valuing system could be succ-
essfully applied to any control information for example cost
control, production control, stock control, etc. Such an
approach would not be successful for the type of unprogra-
mmed decision information considered previously, the best
approach to this is to use the decision analysis method.
There is one more technique to add to the accounting appro-
ach. This approach is basically to determine the cost of
not having the information. In this case the value is
produced as part of the information itself. It is produced
in most management services projects (e.g. work study, O.R.
O. & M., Systems, etc.). When a report, for example a
stock control report, is produced it is good practice as
part of that report to include a section on savings.
This work can be defined as information for management,
therefore, the savings must be the value of that information.
Such values have to be produced before the information will
be accepted or used by management.
3.4.4. ESTIMATION HEURISTICS APPROACH TO THE VALUATION
Of INfORMATION.
Information can be valued by determining how much the
information reduces uncertainty. The method of valuing
using statistical decision theory comparing a random
decision to the best decision using the decision tree
follows this basic approach. By comparing the random
decision with the best decisio~ the amount the information
reduces uncertainty can be quantified. This method can
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also be used with other O.R. techniques, an example already
given in the text being of Replacement Theory.
The amount that information reduces uncertainty can be
quantified in some cases but there are situations in
business when it is not possible to formally quantify. In
these situations the approach that is left is to use heur-
istics to estimate the value of the information. It must
also be remembered that in some of the cases where the
value has been quantified the basic probabilities are
obtained by estimation rather than direct measurement i.e.
subjective probabilities (see section 2.4.2., 2.4.3., 2.4.4.,
and 2.4.5.). The value of information in some cases will
be variable because of the dynamic nature of business.
The production of estimates of the value of information
must be carriad out with care. To ask the average manager
for a value for a piece of information is almost as bad as
asking him how many beans make five. Information valuing
is an area that is not very effectively carried out intu-
itively. In the section Myths of Management Information
some of the common pitfalls of management information are
examined. A knowledge of these will be absolutely vital to
a manager if he is going to be able to produce meaningful
values for the information. The manager having made him-
self conversant with the pitfalls in the area of measurement
of information is then likely to apply one of three basic
approaches or some combination of them. The basic approach
of estimation of information value is similar to that of
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estimation of uncertainty, the three heurietics being the
same.
1. THE HEURISTIC Of REPRESENTATIVENESS.
This process involves determining how representative a
piece of information is of a general class of information
and so determining the value. There are some problems
involved with using this heuristic some of which are in
common with measuring uncertainty and as these have already
been dealt with in another section they will only be
listed here; there are however, some problems specific to
valuation of information.
a) Not allowing for prior probabilities.
b) Insensitivity to sample size.
c) Lack of understanding of the element of chance.
d) Misconception of validity.
e) Misconception of regression.
f) Lack of representative classes to use as reference:
Most managers have limited experience if any of
valuing information and so lack a set of repre-
sentative classes to use as reference points. Such
sets could be provided for managers as part of
their training in the setting of information value.
Problems with the lack of representative classes
are more likely to be encountered with the valu-
ing of information than with estimating uncertain-
ty.
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2. THE HEURISTIC or AVAILABILITY.
This is where the information is valued by bringing to
mind other such similar occurrences. Again like the first
method there are some problems in using it that are common
to measuring uncertainty and as these have already been
dealt with in another section they will only be listed
here.
a) The retrievability of instance.
b) Biases due to the effectiveness of a search set.
c) Biases of imaginability.
The first two of the problems tend to be more important in
the valuing of information because of managers' limited
experience in this field.
3. THE HEURISTIC Of ADJUSTMENT AND ANCHORING.
When valuing information this last approach is to start
from an initialisat~on value and then adjust until a
satisfactory value is found. When setting subjective
probabilities it was found that two problems were encoun-
tered these being:
a) Difficulty in setting the initialisation value,
b) Once this value has been set there is a reluc-
tance by people to move away from it.
The first of these problems can be solved to a degree by
setting the initialisation value to the cost of obtaining
the information. In some cases this cost also will be
an estimated value. If the adjustment moves below the
cost then the informat~on is not viable. If it moves above
the cost it is viable. The second problem will probably
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still occur; there will be a reluctance to move aw~ from
the initialisation value. It must be emphasized to the
setter of the information value that there is no relat-
ionship between cost and value, that the cost cannot affect
the value and it. is merely a start point. It could be
argued that once it is established that the value is greater
than the cost it is worth obtaining that piece of infor-
mation, but unfortunately this simplification is not always
true. for a piece of information to achieve its full value
it must be used by management. With the present reducing
costs in information technology the cost of providing
information is falling. Also with advancing technology and
information theory it is possible to improve the quality of
management information. This means that with costs falling
more information will have a value greater than its cost.
If the above simplification is taken then management will
be provided with more and more information until the stage
is reached where there is more information than management
can use in the time available. If there is more informati-
on than management can use then two things are likely to
happen.
1. The information that has not been used by management
will not have contributed any value, therefore, any cost
incurred in collecting, collating, analysis, etc., of the
information will have been lost.
2. When the manager is presented with too large a volume
of information there is a danger that some pieces of
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important irlformation could be overlooked or not fully
used. Such missing of important information could have
considerable bearings on particular decisions of the
manager.
The way to avoid these problems is to take the initial-
isation value as the cost and adjust this to the inform-
ation value. The adjustment could ba made in the light
of other values given to information (some of which could
have been determined by one of the quantifying techniques
already discussed). The other values would provide a
reference list to compare the new value with. Such a list
would provide a consistency check for the information value
setter which would be made even more powerful with the
addition of some quantified values into the list. Such a
list would also help to remove the problem of reluctance
to move from the initialisation value by providing a
realistic framework onto which the value being considered
can be placed. Also the use of a framework will allow the
dynamic nature of business to be taken into account each
time a new value is added to the list, the rest can be
updated if necessary either a global update or a partial
update, because specific conditions have changed.
It is not suggested that these three heuristics should be
used individually or that one is better than the other.
The best approach would be to use the coat of the inform-
ation as the initialisation value and then use represent-
ativeness and availability to adjust the value and set it
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into a framework of past valuations (these valuations
including some carried out by one of the quantification
techniques). At the same time as valuation the framework
can be updated if this is thought to be necessary. This
approach will lead to certain problems which can be dealt
with as outlined previously with the setting of subjective
probabilities. Techniques such as cumulative density
functions (COf), gaming simulation to give a training and
then as on-going backup in the setting of information
values, a training in statistical theory and techniques,
and the use of groups (the Oelpli techniques, etc.) can all
be used to remove the problems associated with setting
estimated information values. (see section 2.4.). Also
will be required a knowledge of the basic concepts in
management information measurement:
1) Time,
2) Knowledge,
3) Prior Information,
4) Accuracy,
5) Quantity,
6) Power,
for more detail on these points see section 3.2.
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3.4.5. SUMMARY.
There are a number of ways of valuing management information
the most useful of which have been considered in this
section with the aim of producing a methodology of value
measurement. The following summary gives the techniques
considered with their applications and limitations.
1. Classical Approach using Statistical Decision Theory
in this approach. This approach is the one used in most
papers on the measurement of information value. It uses
Classical Statistical Decision Theory and/or Bayesian
Statistics to arrive at a value. This approach can be
applied at either the operational or strategic level within
the organisation. However, it is best applied to the
project type of decision which will include a large prop-
ortion of non-programmed decisions and some programmed dec-
isions. It would be difficult to apply this approach to
the type of information used for control, e.g. process
control, stock control, financial control. The valuation
of the information is carried out after the information has
been gathered and the anlysis produced.
2. Simulation used as a technique for valuing information.
Simulation can be used to provide information but here we
are concerned with the use of simulation in valuing infor-
mation. Although it is possible to produce simulation
models purely for the valuation of information, because of
the high cost of producing them it is very unlikely that
any of them would be economic. The best use of simulation
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in the valuing of information is in the use of gaming simu-
lation to train managers to set values for information.
3. Accounting Approach to information valuing. There
are two ways to approach this method of valuation. First
to determine the cost of not having the information and
then equating the cost to value. This approach works well
for control information but due to the amount of estimation
does not truly quantify the value of project information.
The second approach works within some project applications
and is the saving accrued due to using the information i.e.
the savings from carrying out the project.
4. Estimation Heuristics:- The best approach of the
heuristics available would appear to be to use the cost of
the information as the initialisation value and then use
representativeness and availability to adjust the value
and set it into a framework of past valuations (the valua-
tions including some carried out by one of the quantifica-
tion techniques above). At the same time as valuation
the framework can be updated if it is thought to be requi-
red.
Given that there are four major ways of valuing information,
which should be used? The answer to this is that all of
them can be linked in a methodology which can produce
reasonable, realistic values to information at an economic
cost.
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The first part of the methodology will be to train the
information value setters, managers, in some basic ideas.
Because uncertainty plays such an important role within
information valuing, training in this will be necessary.
Training will also be required in the basic concepts of
information measurement and the methods of valuation.
This training could be given in a number of ways from
formal training to the use of programmed texts backed up
with gaming simulations.
Having been trained in the basic ideas the managers will
be able to set estimates of information values. The
initial process in information valuing will be to estimate
the information value using technique four. The ather
techniques cannot be used at this initialisation stage due
to the necessity to actually obtain the information before
they can effectively be used. If the estimates show that
the information is sufficiently economic it can be obtained.
If the information has been collected and it is possible
and economic to obtain a quantified value using techniques
one or three then this value can be fed back into the
estimation framework. Such a feedback should help to
ensure updated and consistant estimates in the future.
Good effective records are absolutely essential if this
procedure is to be carried out successfully and when a
new valuation is added to the framework then there may be
a need to update the whole or part of the framework. To
supplement this framework and keep it up todate it may be
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necessary to carry out attitude surveys on existing ongoing
information, e.g. control information to ensure it is main-
taining the value associated with it. It should be
remembered that the use of groups of managers involved in
estimating will usually achieve better results than individ-
ual managers estimating.
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3.5. DETERMINING THE COST OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.
It might be expected that the cost of information will
be easier to determine than its value. This may not be the
case.
Although the word cost is used with apparent confidence it
can have different meanings to different people; economists,
businessmen, managers, accountants, etc. Therefore, the
word cost should not be used on its own; a more full def-
inition of the type of cost being considered should ba used.
The following is a selection of some of the types of costs;
fixed costs, variable costs, sunk costs, marginal costs,
acquisition costs, operating costs, and so on. It would
be very time consuming to list and define all tha different
types of cost. Moreover some of these costs will not be
relevant to the determination of the cost of information,
so I shall only consider the types of cost which ara rele-
vant to the determination of the cost of management inform-
ation. This is not an exhaustive list but a definition of
some cost types that will be required before methods of
measurement can be discussed, soma other cost types will be
introduced within the section on methods of measurement of
costs.
305.1. SOME TYPES OF COST.
There are two basic levals on which costs can operate,
these being macro and micro levels but in the sense of the
organisation and not the economy. Macro costs are incurred
when equipment to run a new information system is purchased
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and micro cost incurred when additions are made to existing
systems. The purchase of a new computer would incur costs
at the macro level but the running of a new program on an
existing machine would only incur costs at the micro level.
Another approach to separating costs is to talk in terms of
acquisition costs and running costs. These cost catego-
ries are relatively self explanatory the first being the
purchase cost the second being the cost of operation. Yet
another approach to separating costs is to use fixed costs
and variable costs. These may be defined in terms of
production of information as follows. Fixed costs are the
costs which will remain constant for different levels of
information production (either quantity or quality) whereas
the variable costs are costs that will vary directly with
the level of information production. The above costs
should not be confused with each other as all the three
classifications of costs are different. Macro and micro
costs refer to the level at which the costs are operating.
The other two categories refer to the way a cost can be
split up. The two however, should not be thought of as the
same, consider the following example. Suppose there is a
main frame computer with 9 operators operating a three shift
system. If the first system of splitting costs is used,
the cost of the computer will be the acquisition cost, the
cost of the operators going to form part of the running
cost. If the second way of splitting cost is used then
the cost of the computer will form part of the fixed cost.
The cost of the operators would also become part of the
fixed cost as the number would be difficult to reduce at
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will and the number of hours the computer is being run
cannot be increased beyond three shifts. This cost
therefore would remain fixed despite the amount of work
carried out on the machine. The variable cost in this case
being paper, cards, electricity, etc. In this case the
two systems are not similar but it is possible to find
examples where the fixed cost will be the same as the
acquisition cost and the running cost the same as the var-
iable cost but this should not be taken as a general rule.
When costing management information then only costs that
are relevant should be used. There will appear an area of
cost that will have already been allowed for and claimed
back from the result of a past decision. As these costs
have already been allowed for and claimed back it will be
wrong to claim them or some portion of them for present or
future decisions. Suppose a computer has been cost just-
ified and purchased and then it is to be considered whether
or not to run a new piece of work not previously allowed
for in the cost justification of the computer. The orig-
inal cost of the computer, or some portion of it, would
appear to be relevant to the cost of the new work. It
would be wrong to charge this cost or some portion for a
second time the only fair approach would be to use a margi-
nal cost approach and just to count extra cost to that
already occurred.
Another approach to using costs in decision making is
that of using sunk costs. Sunk costs are all past costs.
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When taking decisions past costs can no longer represent
meaningful alternatives, they can only be represented by
future or incremental costs. This can be a useful way to
look at costs affecting decision taking.
3.5.2. METHODS OF DETERMINING COSTS.
Having outlined some of the terms used in costing, methods
of determining such costs can be examined. There are
three basic approaches that can be used when determining
information costs.
1. Estimation of resources required and their costs:-
This approach is to determine the resources required
to collect, process, distribute, etc., the information
and then to determine their costs. The total cost of
particular pieces of information can be split into
the following elements using classical accounting
terminology.
ELEMENTS OF TOTAL INFORMATION COST.
DIRECT MATERIALS )
DIRECT LABOUR ) PRIME COST)
DIRECT EXPENSES ) )
)
INDIRECTS ) ) TOTAL
ADMIN.EXPENSES )OVERHEAD) COSTS
DIST.EXPENSES )CbSTS -y
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Direct Materials.
All the materials that are part of the final product can
be classed as Direct. With information as the final prod-
uct these costs can be quite small.
Direct Labour.
Monies paid to people actually employed in the production
of the product. The product being information this means
that Direct Labour will be made up of people actually
working on the production of the information. They may
include clerks, computer operators, etc.
Direct Expenses.
These are expenses other than direct materials or direct
labour that are directly attributable to the production of
the information. These will be things like systems and
programming costs, 0 & M costs, and any facilities bought
in from Bureau whether Software or Hardware.
These three cost elements then form the Prime Cost of the
information. These prime costs will vary directly with the
amount of information produced.
Indirects.
These Indirects will include Indirect Materials, Indirect
Labour and Indirect Expenses incurred during the production
of the information. This cost element will include the
proportion of mainten~nce, maintenance staff, rates,
electriCity, heating, special conditions, depreCiation, etc.
275
attributable to the production of the information
The last two elements of the total cost are also Indirects
but they are separated as they can be important costs
areas in taking some decisions.
Administration Expenses.
These are all the costs incurred in the running of the
information production unit such as Data Processing
Manager's salary, etc. It will also include an element of
administration charge from the organisation within which
the information production unit is operating.
Distribution Expenses.
These are all the costs incurred in the distribution of
the product, information. Cost like data transmission
costs, postage, transportation of documents and information
will be included in this element.
Indirects, Administration and Distribution Expenses are
added together to form the Overhead Cost. Unlike the Prime
Cost the Overhead Cost within limits is fixed and will not
vary with the amount of work carried out. Although the
Overhead Cost itself is fixed the way in which it is appor-
tioned will vary with the amount of ~ork carried out by the
information production unit. The more information produced
the more the Overhead Cost can be spread. The Total Cost
is given by adding the Prime Cost to the Overhead Cost.
The relationship of total cost of information production
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facility against the quantity of information produced can
be shown diagramatically in figure thirty nine.
Overhead) ........-> ...."
Iost ,,........~----------------~----------------~---o
Figure Thirty
Total Cost
of Information
Production
Facility
1
.nine:Relationship of Total Cost of Information
Production Facility Against the Quantity of
Information Produced.
A B
Quantity of Information/Data.
Produced
A = Normal capacity of facility
B = Absolute limit of facility
If no information is produced the fixed portion of over-
head cost is still incurred the figure therefore starts at
this point. Prime costs and additional overheads are then
incurred as the quantity of information produced increases.
In the figure this has been smoothed out in a real graph
it would be a series of steps as more direct labour, etc.,
is incurred. These prime costs in the majority of cases
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are likely to rise consistently until the information
quantity for the normal capacity of the facility is
reached (Paint A). This is a level at which the facility
can operate over a long period. Moving past this point
starts to put stress on the facility and so the rate of
change of cost increases to the absolute limit of the
facility (Paint 8). Such an absolute limit is difficult
to determine in precise terms but can be estimated from
the rate of change of prime cost increases. When point A
has been passed then the stress put onto the facility
makes it difficult to sustain such a level of information
produced, and it becomes more difficult the closer one
gets to limit 8. When a facility is consistently being
asked to produce information beyond its normal capacity
then a change of facility should be considered. Figure
forty shows the total cost curves for various facilities
of differing capacities.
Due to the increase in capacity the Overhead Cost also
increases. The hatched line on the figure shows the optimum
facility for any given level of quantity of information
produced.
This form of costing applies to total facility costing for
such things as data processing departments, etc., facil-
ities whose main purpose is producing information. In
section 3.5.1. it was suggested that once a cost has been
charged it should not be charged again. This ~ll lead to
additional work carried out being charged at the incremental
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Figure Forty: Relationship of Total Costs of Information
Production Facilities Against the Quantity of
Information Produced.
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cost of completing it, i.e. Marginal Costing.
There will exist in organisations places which produce
information as a by product of their normal function. For
example this can occur with production control departments.
The function of such a department is to control and monitor
production. Such a department will produce information,
for example production schedules, as part of its function.
This information should be costed at full cost relating to
the resources used in the production of the information.
Some information produced by the production control depart-
ment will not be part of its prime function, for example
a one off production summary for a particular product. It
would be wrong to cost out such a piece of information at
full cost it should only be costed out at the incremental
charge of completing it i.e. the marginal cost.
The same problem will occur when managers produce inform-
ation. Part of the manager's function is to produce infor-
mation. (see section 2.1.4.2.). Information produced as
part of the manager's prime function should be costed at
full cost but information produced in addition to this prime
function should be marginally costed.
When costing resources some costs cannot be precisely
determined and will need to be estimated. Two techniques
could be used in this area to reduce the amount of
estimation required. The first of these is work measure-
ment. Work measurement is used a great deal, and with a
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high degree of success, when determining, for costing and
control purposes the time taken to complete production
jobs. Work measurement was also applied to office work
by O&~ practitioners particularly in America but with the
decline of this function and the increase of systems
analYSiS, which seems to totally disregard work measurement,
its use is on the deCline. Work measurement, if used
correctly, could provide for information management standard
times for carrying out various information processes. This
would be extremely useful in costing, planning and control
of information processing.
The second technique to help cut down the amount of
estimation is simulation. It is possible to simulate
events and make more informed predictions concerning costs.
It should be borne in mind that simulation will not produce
absolute accuracy the greater the accuracy required the
greater the cost.
2. Identification of alternative use of the resources
required and the value of such lost opportunities:-
This approach is to identify the alternative uses of the
resources required to produce a piece of information and
then to determine the value of the loss of such opportun-
ities. Consider the following example. Suppose a program-
mer finishes a particular job a week early. This extra
week has been casted out to the previous job therefore
some people would say that whatever the programmer does
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for this extra week it has cost nothing because that cost
has already been recovered. This is not true, there will
be cost attached to the weeks work this being the Oppor-
tunity Cost, Lipsey defines Opportunity Cost as:-
"The cost of using something in a particular venture
is the benefit foregone (or opportunity lost) by not
using it in its best alternative use." *1
To arrive at the opportunity cost of the programmer
consider all the alternative activities he could have
carried out in the week. The value of all the options
would then need to be determined and highest of these value
represent the programmer's opportunity cost. It must be
remembered that opportunity cost does not only apply when
there is spare time but whenever resources are being used.
There are a number of problems that might be encountered
when trying to arrive at opportunity costs. The first
problem will be encountered when trying to produce a list
of alternatives. Such a list is likely to be very large
even if limits are put onto it for example that all the
resources used must be within the organisation. The list
will become smaller with people or machines as they will
not be as versatile as money. As well as producing this
list each alternative on the list needs to be valued and
ordered to determine the best. Such a process is likely
to be time consuming and costly.
3. The third approach is a combination of both costing
*1 LIPSEY. (1966 Page 248)
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resources and valuation of alternatives foregone:-
The first part of this process is to list the resources
required to collect, process, etc., the information requ-
ired. These resources should then be casted either at full
cast or marginal cast depending on the case. It must be
remembered that the final cast can only be an estimate of
something to happen in the future so it can only be correct
within certain limits. This completes the first part of
the process. The second part is to look at opportunity
cost. It has already been said that to work out the true
opportunity cost will be very time consuming and costly but
it should be possible to obtain a reasonable estimate. If
the determination of management's information needs
(section 3.3.) and the valuation of management information
(section 3.4.) have been carried out there will be within
the organisation a list of managements information needs
with their values or estimates of their values. Such a
list would not include all alternative uses of the resources
but would be comprehensive as far as information uses
are concerned. The estimated value of the project could
be compared with the list to see if there is any other
piece of information with a greater value" still not being
provided. The difference between them being an opportunity
cost which then should be added to the previous cost. If
an opportunity cost is incurred on a piece of information
then there should be a good reason why that piece of infor-
mation is being considered instead of the one with the
higher value. Such a reason may be due to the nature of
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the resources available. Far example an analyst may be
free to take on a new project. Management may feel that he
would be better carrying out a project for which he is more
suited but which returns less than another potential
project. Management may feel that the lost opportunity is
worth matching the right analyst to the right project. The
analyst being capable to carry out a wide range of projects
but he will be more suited to some than others.
Any particular cost will include one or more of the
following components:
1. Money expenditure.
2. Other costs that can be quantified; labour etc.
3. Estimates of other non-quantifiable costs.
4. Opportunity costs.
3.5.3. OISCOUNTING ANO COSTS.
Time can become important to the calculation of cost.
Some of the costs of information system projects can be
quite a distance into the future so there is a case for
relating all costs at various points in time by discounting.
The technique of discounting has already been discussed in
previous sections and has been used to discount such things
as returns and value so it should also be used on costs.
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3.5.4. SUMMARY.
This section is not intended to be a full exposition of
cost theory. Such a summary is beyond the scope of this
thesis. This section aims to provide a reasonable method
of providing cost estimates of management information to
fit into the methodology far the economic appraisal of
management information. When talking in terms of costing
management information the first stage is to establish
consistent and correct definitions of the cost terms invo-
lved. The word cost is only a general term and can be
taken to mean different things to different people so more
precise terms should be used whenever possible.
The cost of information can be determined by the following
process.
1. List all the resources required to produce the
information.
2. Cost the resources using cost accountancy
principals using either full costs or marginal
costs depending upon the case. An estimate
should also be made of the non-quantifiable
factors.
3. Determine an opportunity cost if applicable.
This will be limited to other information
applications for the resources. The opportunity
cost will be determined from the lists of
information requirements and their values (see
section 3.3. and 3.4.).
4. To arrive at a Total Cost the cost calculated
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in two should be added to an opportunity cost if
there is one. If an opportunity cost is incurred
there should be good reason for this means there
is more valuable information still not being
collected.
5. If the Total Cost will be incurred over quite a
long time scale then the costs should be dis-
counted to bring them into line with returns and
values used elsewhere.
The above process will arrive at a reasonably true cost
estimate for management information. Before leaving the
area of costing information it is worth noting that with
the advent of technology change (the use of the silicon
chip) automated information processing costs are falling
and look set to continue falling. This fall is occuring
both in actual and real terms. Such a fall in cost will
affect the work of costing in that it will make opport-
unity costs more important. If more and more information
can be produced it becomes very important to ensure that
the information with the greatest value is collected,
produced and used first. Opportunity cost will show whether
this is being carried out.
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3.6. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION.
There are two terms used within this area than can lead to
confusion, these being cost benefit analysis and cost
effectiveness analysis. Cost benefit analysis is where
numerical values of cost are compared with numerical values
of benefit. Cost effectiveness analysis is where the
resources required are compared with the benefits accruing
and is used when it is difficult to arrive at precise
numeric values. Both cost benefit analysis and cost effec-
tiveness analysis are more associated with large scale
public utility projects especially the latter.
3.6.1. COST BENEfIT ANALYSIS.
To carry out a cost benefit analysis there are three stages:
1. Determine costs.
2. Determine benefits.
3. Selection of indicator.
1. Determine Costs:- Costing Management Information
has been considered in section 3.5. Here a proc-
edure was outlined to arrive at a cost of manage-
ment information. It would seem reasonable to
assume that a cost for information can be arrived
at without too many difficulties.
2. Determine Benefits:- The determination of a
numeric value for the benefits of the management
information will not be so straight forward as
that of cost. The numeric value for the benefits
will be the same as the value of information and
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has been discussed at length in section 3.4. In
this section it was found that for some pieces of
information reasonably precise estimates could be
produced but for other information the estimates
were inprecise and so could cause problems in cost
benefit analysis.
3. Selection of Indicator:- The indicator selecteq
will determine whether to carry out a particular
project. It will depend on factors such as inter-
est rates and will compare the cost against value
and see if the return is sufficiently high to
justify the project. When management information
is being considered it can be sufficient for the
benefits to equal the cost to justify the inform-
ation.
The greatest problem with cost benefit analysis is that it
can appear to take decisions automatically in some organ-
isations it can become institutionalised.
3.6.2. COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS.
Cost effectiveness analysis is similar to cost benefit
analysis and has the following three stages:
1. List resources required.
2. List benefits.
3. Compare resources and benefits.
1. List resources required:- This corresponds with
the first stage in cost benefit analysis. Cost
effectiveness analysis is sometimes used to compare
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B_ series of alternatives to achieve a given
benefit level. This can mean the production of
a series of costs for the different alternatives.
2. List benefits:- One method of the estimation of
a value of management information is to list the
benefits. This solves the problem for information
which is difficult to value. It is possible to
draw up a list of benefits generated by most items
of information.
3. Compare resources and benefits:- The last stage
is to compare the resources and benefits and to
decide if the information is worth producing, or
choose from a series of alternative methods of
producing the information.
The principal problem with cost effectiveness analysis
comes in the third stage. It is difficult to compare lists
of resources and benefits without using numeric values or
indicators.
3.6.3. SUMMARY.
By taking parts of two techniques a useful method of
comparing cost against value can be produced. This combined
technique can be called management information cost benefit
analysis. There will be three stages to such a technique:
1. Determine Cost.
2. Determine Value (if not possible list benefits).
3. Compare cost and value.
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1. Determine Cost:- The cost of producing the
management information will be determined by the
procedures given in section 3.5. Part of this
procedure will include listing the resources
required to produce the information. There will
be very few cases where it will not be possible
to estimate the cost within the field of manage-
ment information.
2. Determine Value:- The value of the information
will be determined by the procedures given in
section 3.4. With some information it will be
possible to arrive at a reasonable value for the
information. With other information the value
may be less precise and with some information
management may be reluctant to place a value on
it at all. In the case where information does
not have a very precise value or where management
are reluctant to set a value on it, a list of
benefits should be drawn up.
3. Compare Cost and Value:- The cost and value of
the information that have been determined will be
compared and provided the value is greater than
or equal to the cost the information will be
considered worth producing. In the cases of
information with an estimate of value which is
considered imprecise or where management are
reluctant to place a value on it, (i.e. the infor-
mation which at stage 2 had a list of benefits
produced for it), the list of benefits will be
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compared with the cost. Providing that management
considers that the benefits will exceed the cost
the information will be considered worth producing.
This will be better than simply comparing two
lists.as the cost will be a numeric value.
This procedure for applying cost benefit analysis to
management information will work for the majority of cases.
There will only be a few cases where it will not be possible
to determine a reasonably accurate numeric value for cost.
With these cases a list of resources required will have to
be compared against a list of benefits, even though this
is not a very satisfactory method. It must be remembered
that the procedure for management information cost benefit
analysis does not automatically take the decision as to
whether a piece of information should be produced. This
decision must rest with the manager or managers requiring
the information, therefore it must be possible to override
the procedure so that managers can take account of non-
quantifiable factors affecting the decision to produce the
information or not.
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3.7. MANAGEMENT INFORMATION CONSULTATION.
This section of the thesis deals with the role of the
information analyst as a consultant within his own organ-
isation. To consider all the behavioral implications of
such a role would probably take a volume as large as the
present thesis. Therefore in this section I shall confine
myself to a brief survey of the work of others that has
been of value to me in dealing with managers.
The information analyst must deal with managers when
producing the information needs of management. It is an
easy option when producing information needs to record the
information produced at present and then merely produce
similar information from a computer installation. An
approach such as this will not result in the determination
of management's information needs, it can only be consid-
ered a computerisation of existing informationo The sen-
sible approach to the production of management information
needs is for the manager to determine them. This can be
achieved by careful discussion and group discussions rel-
ating information needs to the manager's function. This
approach will require two extra skills on the part of the
information analyst/designer. First he needs a working
knowledge of the process of management and second he will
need behavioral skills in dealing with managers individ-
ually and in groups.
The process of management has been discussed at length
in section 2.1. These behavioral skills present a problem
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in that they are developed through experience but it is
useful to consider the experience of others when develop-
ing these skills. Schein has been involved in the field of
organisational development (the development of the structure
of the organisation) for a number of years and has produced
an excellent book called Process Consultation *1. This
book is a practical study of consultation with managers,
individuals and groups. The role of consultancy within
organisational developments transfers almost completely
to study the information needs with one exception. In the
study of information needs a more active role is required
by the information analyst than the passive role suggested
in Process Consultation. The book also contains a good set
of references to take the reader further. The work of
people such as Warr *2 and Cherns *3 in the field of Action
Research will also prove to be valuable to the information
analysts in the development of their behavioral skills.
Another important area where the information analyst will
find himself operating as a consultant will be that of
setting subjective estimates. This will involve face to
face contact with individual and groups of managers.
Subjective estimates may be required for probabilities
but are more likely to be encountered by the information
analyst in the subjective estimate of information value
and cost. The behavioral skills already discussed will be
of value in such work and in addition there are other
techniques that may be of use. The use of cumulative
density functions (CDF), Delphi techniques and weightings
*1 SCHEIN. (1969)
*2 WARR. (1977)
*3 CHERNS. (1976)
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are discussed in section 2.4.5. The Tydeman and ~itchell
*1 study, Subjective futures for Decision Making, provides
a good practical discription and case studies of the use
of the Delphi technique and other techniques such as cross
event analysis which are transferable to the use in the
subjective setting of information value and cost.
*1 TYDEMAN & MITCHELL. (1978)
296
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
Along with the work quoted as reference material the
following work may also be found to be valuable by the
information analyst when developing behavioral skills.
CLARK. A.W. (1976)
CLAR~. P.A. (1972)
DANIELS & YEATES. (1976)
EIN-OOR & SEGEW. (197B)
FOSTER. (1972)
FRENCH & BELL. (1973)
GELLERMAN. (1974)
MORRIS. (1977)
RAMSGEARO. (1977)
297
3.8. METHODOLOGY FOR THE ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION.
There are four main stages in the economic appraisal of
management information. These are:-
1. Determination of management's information needs.
2. Determination of management's information value.
3. Determination of management information cost.
4. Cost benefit analysis of management information.
It is possible with some management information that stage
three will be carried out before stage two.
STAGE 1. Determination of Management's Information Needs.
This stage will produce a list of management's information
needs which will include formal and informal information and
information about the internal and the external environ-
ments. The list will be produced at two levels at least,
management's present information needs and management's
potential information needs.
The information the manager is receiving at present can be
determined by using interviews, questionnaires, observation
and record inspection. These techniques will be reasonably
successful at determining the information managers receive
at present. The diary techniques and communication analysis
are especially useful to record the information managers
use when taking unprogrammed decisions. The information
the manager receives at present does not necessarily define
his present information needs. Some information the
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manager needs may not be included and some information may
be provided that the manager does not need. This list of
information provided must be modified to give the inform-
ation needs of management. This can be carried out only
in discussion with the managers. When the information
analyst opens discussion with managers questions like 'What
information do you need?' should be avoided because they
will usually bring unhelpful responses like 'I don't know',
'What I get now' or 'All the information you can give me'.
It would be wrong of the analyst to assume from these replies
that the manager does not know his information requirements,
the problem lies in the question. The approach to be taken
in the determination of managers' information needs is to
carry this out by examining the manager's job. It will be
helpful if the manager has a job specification if not one
needs to be drawn up. The analyst in conjunction with the
manager can then examine each part of the manager's job in
detail and determine the information required to carry it
out. When information needs are discussed in such detail
and directly related to the managers job then the manager
can successfully determine his information needs. The list
of information needs produced will include both formal and
informal information, also information about the internal
and external environments. The analyst should be concerned,
not only with the formal information about the internal and
external environments but should use his expertise to help
the manager develop his informal information system. It
would be wrong of the analyst to try to formalise the
manager's informal information. Such an approach will be
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doomed to failure because of the nature of the informal
system, but assistance to the manager to develop his own
information system would be of value.
If management functions are shared by a number of managers
then the analyst should first discuss the function with
each manager individually to examine his role in the
function and the information needs. This may vary from
manager to manager as each is likely to see his role and
the function differently. The group of managers should
then be brought together to decide the information needs
for the function from their individual lists. Care should
be taken by the analyst to ensure that managers are not
embarrassed by their previous individual discussions with
him. The group approach may also be of use even when
dealing with individual manager's information requirements
as they may introduce the manager to fresh ideas. Such
fresh ideas may also come from the analyst or specialists
in fields such as accounting, production control, etc.
In order to determine management's information needs the
analyst will require two extra skills in addition to his
information skills. First he will need a knowledge of the
processes involved in management, both at a management
system and a behavioral level. This will be essential if
he is to communicate effectively with managers and to
discuss with them in detail their jobs and the information
needed to perform them. The second additional skill will
be behavioral. The analyst will need to know how to act
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as a catalyst to get the best out of individual managers
or groups of managers in terms of the determination of
information needs.
The result of the analysis so far will be a list of
management's present information needs. If systems to
produce some of this information are to be designed they
should be flexible enough to allow for the development
of managers' information needs. To build in this flex-
ibility a list of managers' potential information needs
will be required. These potential information needs will
be more difficult to define than the present information
needs. The manager is unlikely to be aware of all his
potential information needs so the analyst will have to
include various specialists (accountants, management,
scientists, etc.) in the discussions to arrive at these
potential needs. It must be remembered that as these
potential needs are concerned with the future which is by
nature dynamic, they will be liable to errors.
The final result of stage one will be a list of management's
present information needs and an estimate of management's
potential information needs.
STAGE 2. Determination of Management Information Value.
Stage two takes the list of information needs and orders
them according to the importance to the manager, i.e. value
to the manager. Again this can only be carried out through
discussion with management. This ordered list will provide
301
a framework within which information can then be valued.
Before methods of valuation are discussed the timing of
valuation must be considered. There are three points at
which the information can be valued.
(i) Before the information or data has been collected
or extracted from a data base, i.e. before the
manager takes any decision or constructs any
plans.
(ii) After the manager has considered all the avail-
able information and decided what action is to
be taken.
(iii)When the actions of management have been carried
out the effects of such actions on the external
or internal environment or both can be studied.
The logical place to economically evaluate information will
be before it has been collected or extracted from a data
base for at this stage if it proves uneconomical it need
not be collected. If the information is valued at the other
two points then it is too late to decide it was uneconomic
for it will have already been collected and evaluated.
Valuation will involve two phases, these being the init-
iation of a valuation framework and then the continuing
valuation of information. To carry out the valuation of
management information three groups of valuation techniques
can be used, these being:
a) Decision theory approach,
b) Accounting method,
c) Estimation heuristics.
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a) Decision Theory Approach to the Valuation of
Management Information:
This approach uses either Classical Statistical
Decision Theory and/or Bayesian Statistics to
arrive at a value. This approach can be applied
at either the operational or strategic level
within the organisation. However, it is best
applied to the project type of decision which will
include a large proportion of non-programmed
decisions and some programmed decisions. It
would be difficult to apply this approach to the
type of information used for control, e.g. process
control, stock control, financial control. When
using Classical Statistical Decision Theory the
valuation is carried out after the information
has been gathered and the analysis produced.
Although the Bayesian approach values information
before it is collected the analysis involved in
this approach can involve a considerable amount
of work.
b) Accounting Method of Valuing Management Information:
There are two approaches within this method of
valuation. First, determine the cost of not
having the information end then equate the cost
to value. This approach works well for control
information at both the operational and strategic
level but due to the amount of estimation required
does not truly quantify the value of project
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information. The second approach works with some
project applications at both the operational and
strategic level and consists in valuing the
savings accrued due to using the information,
i.e. the savings from the project. 80th approaches
value the information after it has been gathered
and the analysis produced.
c) Estimation Heuristics Approach to the Valuation of
Management Information:
There are three heuristics that can be used in
the estimation of information value. First the
heuristic of anchoring and adjustment, which
involves starting from an initialisation value
and then adjusting until a satisfactory value is
found. Second the heuristic of representativeness,
which involves determining how representative a
piece of information is of a general class of
information and so determining its value. Third
is the heuristic of availability, in which the
information is valued by bringing to mind other
such similar occurrences. The best approach to
use is a combination of the three heuristics, to
use the cost of the information or its position
within the needs framework as the initialisation
value and then use representativeness and avail-
ability to adjust the value and set it into a
framework of past valuations (the valuations inc-
luding some carried out by one of the quantifi-
304
cation techniques above). At the same time as
valuation is carried out the framework can be
updated. For these heuristics to operate success-
fully the information value setter/s will require
two things. First a training in information
value setting, which could be best provided by
simulations, case studies, examples and training
packages. Second will be required frameworks of
information needs and information values. These
will provide consistency checks for the information
value setter as well as effective search sets for
carrying out the two heuristics of representative-
ness and availability. Such frameworks could also
provide an initialisation value to start the proc-
ess of estimation. The methods of estimation
heuristics will operate on strategic and operat-
ional information and can be carried out before
or after the information has been gathered and any
analysis produced.
The initiation of the process of valuation presents a few
problems. Stage one produced a list of management infor-
mation needs and the first part of this stage orders them
in importance to the manager (i.e. value). This ordered
list is the information needs framework. Although this
framework contains some form of valuation each piece of
information from it now needs to be valued individually.
The logical time to value such information is before it
has been collected or analysed so that if it proves not to
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be economic it need not be collected. The technique that
is most effective at valuing information before it has been
collected is the estimation heuristic approach, but unfor-
tunately this technique only really works well when a
valuing framework is already in existence. To initialise
the valuation framework, decision analysis and the account-
ing approach should be used on a number of representative
pieces of information from the information needs framework.
The problem with valuing information in this way is that
the information has to be collected before it can be valued
(with the exception of some Bayesian analysis) and this
stage is a little late to decide that the information is
not worth collecting. This problem is unfortunate but it
is the best way to initialise the valuation process. The
quantified values of the information will provide the
skeleton for the information value framework. This partial
framework along with some form of training provided by
simulations, case studies, examples and training packages
will enable the estimation heuristics to be carried out
successfully on the remaining information in the needs
framework. This will then complete the initialisation of
the information value framework, with a technique that
allows the information not to be collected if it proves
uneconomical. When the values are recorded it should be
shown which are quantified and which are estimated values.
The two frameworks, needs and values, should be checked
together to ensure consistency between the needs and
valuing processes. Any inconsistencies should be invest-
igated with the aim of removing them.
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Given the dynamic nature of business and the fact that
managers will develop with time, the information needs will
change. When new information needs a~e added to the list,
the first valuation will be made by using estimation
heuristics to decide if the information is economic. The
framework will also need to be updated. This may be a
total update for example to take account of inflation or
it may be an update on a particular piece of information
whose importance has changed. Consistency in estimation
can be maintained by carrying out the quantification
techniques on a sample of the information collected. The
lower the accuracy of estimates the greater the sample size
needs to be. Such a problem of inaccurate estimates may
be overcome by improved training for the information value
setter. The inaccurate estimates may of course be due to
high variability within the business concerned. The use of
groups may improve the estimates and the help of a group
may improve the estimation abilities of individuals. Also
to supplement the information value framework and to keep
it up to date it may be necessary to carry out attitude
surveys on existing ongoing information to ensure it is
maintaining the value associated with it. This total
process of valuation will work well for the majority of
management information. for some information managers will
not estimate a value or they may not feel confident of
estimates made. With this information a list of benefits
accruing from the information should be made in place of
the valuation.
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STAGE 3. Determination of Management Information Cost.
The next stage in the methodology is to determine the cost
of the management information. In some cases this stage
may be carried out before stage two, the valuation. This
will be when the cost is required at the initialisation
stage of the estimation heuristic. The cost of the infor-
mation can be determined in the following way.
a) List all the resources required to produce the
information.
b) Cost'the resources using cost accountancy prin-
ciples using either full costs or marginal costs
depending upon the case. Which of the two cost-
ing methods is used will depend on whether the
cost of any of the resources used has already
been set against some other information or function
of the organisation. Estimates may need to be
made at this point to take account of non-quant-
ifiable factors.
c) Determine an opportunity cost if applicable.
This will be limited to other information applic-
ations for the resources. The opportunity cost
will be determined from the lists of information
requirements and their values. This cost will be
a surplus in value of an alternative piece of
information not already produced that could be
produced with the resources being considered i.e.
the more attractive opportunity foregone.
d) To arrive at a Total Cost the cost calculated in
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b) should be added to an opportunity cost if
there is one. If an opportunity cost is incurred
then there should be a good reason, for this means
there is more valuable information still not being
collected.
e) If the Total Cost will be incurred over quite a
long time scale then the costs should be discounted
to bring them into line with returns and values
used elsewhere.
The cost of information can be used to produce a separate
list or better still the costs can be added to the inform-
ation value framework making it an information value and
cost framework. Before leaving cost of information it is
worth noting that because of technological change (espec-
ially the silicon chip) automated information processing
costs are falling and look set to continue falling. This
fall is occurring in both actual and real terms. Such a
fall in costs will affect the work of costing in that it
will make opportunity costs more important. If more and
more information becomes economic to be produced it becomes
very important to ensure that the information with the
greatest value is collected, produced and used first.
Opportunity cost will show whether this is being carried
out.
STAGE 4. Cost Benefit Analysis of Management Information.
There will be three parts to the cost benefit analysis of
management information although two of these parts will
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have been carried out within stages two and three. The
three parts are:
a) Determine the cost. The cost of the management
information will have already been determined
within stage three.
b) Determine the value. A numeric value for the
value of the majority of management information
will have been produced in stage two. In the
case where information does not have a very
precise value or where management are reluctant
to set a value on it, a list of benefits will
have been prqduced during stage two.
c) Compare cost and value. The previously determined
cost and value will be compared and provided the
value is greater than or equal to the cost then
information will be considered worth producing.
In the cases of information with an estimate of
value which is considered imprecise or where mana-
gement are reluctant to place a value on it, (i.e.
the information which at stage two had a list of
benefits produced for it), the list of benefits
will be considered in relation to the cost. Prov-
iding that management considers that the benefits
will exceed the cost the information will be con-
sidered worth producing.
It must be remembered that the procedure for management
information cost-benefit analysis does not automatically
take the decision as to whether a piece of information
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should be produced. This decision must rest with the
manager or managers requiring the information, and there-
fore it must be possible to override the procedure so that
managers can take account of non-quantifiable factors
affecting the decision to produce the information or not.
Whichever method of setting a value for information is used
one or more of the following six factors needs to be taken
into account.
1) Time:- the speed at which the information can be
obtained and is required.
2) Knowledge:- the knowledge level of the recipient/s
of the information.
3) Prior Information:- the amount and type of other
information that is available to assist with the
decision the piece of information is to be used
for.
4) Accuracy:- the accuracy of the information (this
may be subjective dependant on personality).
5) Quantity:- the size of the piece of information
or the amount of information available for a part-
icular decision.
6) Power:- information can be closely linked to
power and as a reulst this may enhance the value
of the information to the individual but not nec-
essarily to the organisation.
Along with these six factors the information analyst and
manager should be aware of the following pitfalls which
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should be avoided.
1. Information systems are not solely concerned with
computers.
2. There is a significant difference between data and
information.
3. More data in reports does not mean more information for
managers.
4. Where possible all information should be cost-justified
which requires a value and cost to be attributed to
it.
5. Any increase in the speed at which information is
provided needs to be justified.
6. Absolute accuracy is not essential in every case (it is
impossible when the base data itself is not accurate).
However, the degree of inaccuracy in any information
should be given along with that information.
7. More frequent reporting does mean more information.
Again any increase in the frequency of reporting must
be justified.
8. The total integration into one corporate data base
should not be the aim of system designers. Integration
and the formation of data bases should be used only
when they will be of advantage. This will usually
mean only partial integration, at varying levels within
the organisation and a series of data bases.
9. The information needs of managers are very difficult
to determine by interviewing due to the fact that the
majority of managers do not appear to know their
information requirements. It is really dangerous for
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systems designers to decide managers' information
needs themselves as few have experience of management.
However, with a combination of various techniques and
a reasonable approach a realistic estimate can be
made to determine the information needs of the manager.
10. The provision of 'correct' information is not necess-
arily going to produce good management. The manager's
managerial skills and abilties may need to be devel-
oped so he can take full advantage of the information
provided. It is however arguable that information
should not be provided until the manager has been
trained to use it.
11. The provision of communication mechanisms does not by
itself mean that communications within an organisation
will improve. The behavioral problems will also have
to be dealt with.
12. The managers who are receiving information from an
information system should have sufficient knowledge
of the system to be in control. The information system
should be run to serve the organisation and not vice-
versa. This statement assumes a high level of comp-
etance on the part of individual managers and in many
organisations considerable staff development would be
necessary to achieve this.
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL STUDIES.
This chapter is concerned with the empirical studies carried
out as part of the research project. The studies are of
three types. The first is a detailed look at the overall
management information system of one company. (4.1. A
Company Information Study). The second type of study was
carried out by observing the way in which management
students, all of whom were practising managers, solved
certain problems presented as tasks and case studies (4.2.
Personnel Information study, 4.3. Marketing Information
Study and 4.4. Small Business Information Study). The
third type of study isolates certain applications within
the area of management information in case study form. (4.5.
Concord Insulators Ltd. and 4.6. Robert Livesey and Sons
Ltd. The bulk of the detailed work of the studies has
been included in the six appendices.
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4.1. A COMPANY INFORMATION STUDY.
This piece of empirical work was carried out to examine the
information system of a particular company. The manner in
which the management of the company determined their infor-
mation needs and then set about producing systems for the
collection and analysis of such information was also
studied.
4.1.1. TYPE OF STUDY.
The company which prefer not to be named employs one
hundred and nineteen people with a turnover of £2·5 million
in 19S0/S1. The principal market of the company is the
provision of interconnection harnesses for the electronic
industry. The company was founded in 1969, has grown to
its present size rapidly in the last few years and is now
partly owned by a larger holding company.
The study involved the examination of the procedure manuals
and information flows existing in the company. Discussions
were undertaken with the management team of the company and
the monthly management meetings and other meetings were
attended to observe management in operation.
Extracts from the procedure manuals are given in Appendix
A. The first group of extracts are from the production
procedures manual. The index of the production procedure
manual is given to show the full range of the manual and a
sample of procedures in the index are given in full (these
being Production Control and Materials Control). Extracts
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from the sales procedure manual are also given. Again the
index is given to show the full range of the manual and a
sample of procedures are given (these being Processing of
Orders, Receiving and Accepting Orders, Generation Distri-
bution of Quotations, and Follow-up of Quotations). Also
given in the Appendix is the flow chart for a Management
Control System and examples of the forms used within this
system.
4.1.2. RESULTS FROM STUDY.
The results from the study will be given f~r each function
within the organisation. This does not mean that each
function operates independently, far from it with this
organisation, it is merely a convenient way of presenting
the information.
The first function to be considered will be production.
When the company first started, being small it did not
require many formal systems to control and manage the
production of goods. The majority of the information con-
cerning work in progress, stocks, etc., was informal either
being carried in someone's head or in someone's personal
information system. When the company started to grow the
systems remained mostly informal and consequently manage-
ment control of production started to decline. The lack of
control increased to the stage where jobs were completed as
and when parts became available. This meant that some jobs
were baing completed a long time before they were required
while other jobs were not being completed on time because
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they were awaiting parts. To further aggravate this situ-
ation there was no formal system to chase the missing parts
or when common parts arrived to ensure they first went to
the job that most urgently required them. The only parts
chasing that was undertaken took the form of a fire fight-
ing exercise when customers complained that their job had
not been delivered on time. As a consequence of this the
company acquired a very poor delivery reputation with
customers, they either delivered too late or too early,
rarely on time.
Some three years ago senior management in the company
recognised the problem and decided to do something about
it. The people then employed in production management had
been able to run the small business but were having diffi-
culty in running the larger enterprise so it was decided to
bring in somebody from outside. Senior management then set
about the task of finding a production manager, somebody
who would be able to introduce systems into the production
area to make the area controllable and manageable again.
The person appointed to the job of production manager had
a wide variety of production experience, his most recent
post being Works Manager with quite a large company. He
moved because he felt the new appointment would give him
greater freedom of operation.
The Index of the Production Procedure Manual (given on
pages A.1. and A.4.) shows the number of detailed proced-
ures introduced'by the Production Manager by the end of
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1980. There will be more new procedures to come and refine-
ments made to the existing procedures but the ones so far
introduced were considered by the Production Manager to
be the most important. This is an interesting point and
shows the value placed on the procedures by the Production
Manager, the order in the index giving the importance
placed on the introduction of each of the procedures. It
must be remembered though that this idea of value covers
much more than just the information coming out of the
procedures, it will also cover management aspects, etc.
A sample of the detailed procedures as written into the
Production Procedure Manual has been included in Appendix
A. The production control system has been included along
with the purchasing procedure, purchase requisition and
goods receiving procedure parts of the material control
system. If these procedures are examined the detail invol-
ved can be easily seen. This is especially shown in the
pu~chase requisition procedure 4.4.1. on page A.14 of
Appendix A. Here the exact detail of how to fill out a
Purchase Requisition is given and the discipline of carry-
ing out exactly what the procedure requires is reinforced.
The systems produced by the Production Manager are good,
providing much improved management control and managem~nt
information. On examining the procedures in operations it
is clear that a high level of systems discipline is operated
in the production area, the procedures operated in practice
being the same as those written in theory.
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The data bases which provide management with information
from the production area are contained on the shop loading
sheet (Page A.23), material shortage list (Page A.3D),
weekly production schedule (Page A.31), and the jobs kitted
list (Page A.32). Useful information can be provided by
the production Q.C. traveller (Page A.24), which moves
around the factory with the job. The material shortage list
has been steadily reducing in size as the other planning
systems have become more effective but when the production
manager took over he considered this to be the most import-
ant document in the production system. As the new systems
have brought the production area under control the prod-
uction manager considers this document as fallen in value
but still has its uses. From the other documents it is
possible for example to find the whereabouts of any job,
any free time on production facilities, to supply to the
sales office delivery dates. The new system enables accep-
table delivery dates to be quoted and achieved, however it
is taking time to live down the reputation built up in the
past for poor delivery dates. Problems were encountered
when the production control clerk was absent from work.
A temporary clerk had to be trained to carry out this func-
tion, consequently some operating problems developed.
Partly to try to avoid such problems and partly to extend
the analytical capacity and management information output
of the system it was decided to computerise the system. The
computer chosen was a microcomputer which was to operate in
the production office. The plan was to computerise the
system in the same format as existed before computerisation
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and major problems were not envisaged because the systems
discipline necessary to operate the system was already in
existance. The major change to the system was the extension
of the analysis and management information output from the
computer. This was previously carried out manually by
examining the relevant sheets. When the computerised system
was being tested major problems did develop in the file org-
anisation parts of the programs. The problem initially was
thought to lie in the software and considerable time was
spent trying to remove this problem. The problem was finally
found to be incorrect floppy discs (secondary storage devi-
ces) for the disc drives. The computer manufacturer had
supplied single density discs for a double density disc
drive unit. When this problem had been remedied it was
possible to get the programs operational although the access
times of the system proved to be excessive. The company
has now decided to purchase a larger minicomputer system to
deal with all the company's data processing requirements.
Initially the accounts system will be put onto this machine
but at some later date it is hoped to transfer the product-
ion control system onto this new machine and so improve
access times.
The production department also had problems with some of
the information sent from the sales department. To inform
production that an order had been given the sales depart-
ment would fill in a production instruction, this form
giving the go-ahead for production to proceed with the job.
For some jobs the product specification was not completed
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correctly on these forms and this lead to problems. Fort-
unately most of the errors were identified in production
before the jobs had been started.
Having considered the production area the sales area will
now be examined. Similar problems to the ones that had
occurred in the production area also occurred in the sales
area. As the company grew the person appointed to the
position of sales manager had grown to that position with
the company. He was a good product engineer and a competant
salesman, unfortunately he was not very successful as a
sales manager. The lack of sales was hidden to a degree
by the early inefficiencies in the production area (the
failure to meet delivery dates contributing to this lack
of sales). With the appointment of the new production
manager the production area became more efficient removing
the back-log of orders and so making the lack of sales more
apparent. Some two and a half to three years ago senior
management in the company decided to introduce monthly
management meetings to improve communications within the
company. The sales manager's performance in these meetings
was poor and he did not inspire any confidence in the other
managers, a feeling fairly widespread throughout the company.
To try and give the sales manager some support and to
assist in his development it was decided to employ a mark-
eting manager to operate in conjunction with the sales man-
ager. The marketing manager would have no direct line
responsibility over the salesmen but would provide sales
support and initiate an export effort. This plan of senior
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management was not a success, the new marketing manager
proving to be no more effective than the sales manager.
The marketing manager has now left the company.
About a year ago senior management decided that some more
pO$itive action was needed to improve sales. They decided
on a similar action to the one taken in the production area.
The sales manager was made the product manager of a new
product that was being launched and the managing director
took over the role of sales manager in the short term until
a suitable replacement could be found.
In the interim period the Managing Director tightened up the
existing systems in an attempt to eliminate some of the prob-
lems in the sales area. These actions included the intro-
duction of a sales inquiry system (see page A.51) to ensure
that full advantage would be taken of all enquiries and an
order checking procedure (see page A.54) which intended to
remove errors on instructions sent to the production area.
These innovations solved most of the problems associated
with the formal system and it is interesting to note that
there was an imporvement in the system discipline through-
out the sales area. Some of this improvement however may
have been due to the presence of the Managing Director in
the sales area.
To improve communications within the sales area (informal
information system) the Managing Director introduced
monthly sales meetings between the personnel involved in
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the sales area, ie. sales office supervisor, salesmen and
sales estimatorso These meetings did improve communications
within the sales area. Along with these monthly sales
meetings another series of sales meetings was organised.
This second set of sales meetings was part of the salesmen
development programme, the purpose of these being twofold.
First the development of the salesman's product knowledge
(especially with new products) and second so that the less
experienced salesmen could benefit from the experience of
the better salesmen within the company. This second set of
meetings were not held on a regular basis but arranged as
and when they were thought necessary. Initially there was
high frequency of these meetings their frequency then fall-
ing.
Prior to the time when the Managing Director took over
directly the sales area the approach to forecasting was
not very successful. The sales forecast produced for the
budgets proved to be very optimistic (thus causing problems
in profitability of the company). The short term fore-
casting was also poor, nobody knowing when orders would
arrive. In this company because of the nature of the prod-
uct quotes are given for all business. As it takes time for
quotes to mature into sales and the salesmen are involved
in this process it should be possible to arrive at a sys-
tem of short term forecasting (up to three months) that
should prove reasonably accurate. As a first step to impr-
ove the s~ort term forecasts the Managing Director intro-
duced a prosRects list. This list was of orders on quote
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and associated with these potential orders was the probab-
ility of the order maturing in the next month. 50 as not
to over complicate this initial system only the quartile
points were used i.e. 0, 0'25, 0'5, 0'75 and 1·0. This
system proved reasonably successful once the initial problems
of training the salesmen to operate the systems had been
overcome.
This interim period during which th, Managing Director
took direct control over the sales area lasted approximately
six months. During this period a suitable replacement for
the Sales Manager was found and recruited to the company.
Care was taken during the search for the replacement to
ensure that the successful applicant should be able to design
successful procedures as well 8S effectively control and
operate the sales area. Upo~ taking up the position of
Sales Manager the new applicant took some time to get to
grips with the company, the products, the personnel and the
systems in operation. His previous position had been Sales
Manager with a manufacturer of components for textile mach-
inery. When he had become familiar with the company he
decided initially not to radically change any of the systems
with the exception of forecasting. He quickly identified
the 20% of customers that accounted for 80% of the business,
these he called prime customers who were to have priority
and were to be visited regularly. He made some changes to
improve communications between the sales force and he insti-
tuted some additional checks to ensure the correct inform-
ation was appearing on quotes and being sent to production.
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The short tsrm forecastirlg system was changed to a three
month rolling forecast. This forecast will be updated each
month, the old month dropped off and a new month added on.
The forecast will contain all prospects of orders likely to
mature within the three month period. The order will be
placed by the salesmen in the month that it is most likely
to mature in. The salesman will also estimate the probab-
ility (now using all points of the scale) of the order
maturing in that month. The short term forecasts are then
obtained by multiplying probabilities by order value and
summing for the separate months and so obtaining an Expec-
ted Value for sales each month. Also by comparing succ-
essive forecasts it will be possible to trace the strength
of the prospect, it will be increasing if successive prob-
abilities increase decreasing if the reverse is true. Such
a system of short term forecasting should prove to be
accurate, the new sales managers estimat~± 5% once the
salesmen have gained experience and confidence in setting
the probabilities which he estimates will take approximately
a year from starting the system. Such a short term fore-
casting system with this level of accuracy will be of great
value to the production department for planning future
capacity etc. The new sales manager considers that in the
present economic climate forecasting over longer periods is
likely to be difficult but it must be carried out. The
past sales figures cannot be used to predict the future
for two major reasons; first the electronics industry is
in such a state of flux that any past sales figures are not
necessarily going to relate to what is going to happen in
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the future; secondly the sales figures of the company do
not represent the true potential of the company because of
the previous problems encountered in the sales and prod-
uction areas. The long term forecasts are going to be prod-
uced (that is until the above reasons are no longer signif-
icant) by sales staff and other personnel within the company
estimating the sales potential of the prime customers which
will involve the use of many informal information sources.
The new sales manager from his showing so far seems to be
a success and more than capable of solving the problems that
existed in the sales areas.
The last area to be considered is accounts. The accounts
area also suffered some personnel changes but for different
reasons than the other areas. The accountant who had been
with the company from early on felt for personal reasons
that he had to resign. This accountant had wide experience
of business and was capable of extending accounting into
management and fortunately he decided not to leave the
company completely but remained in a consultant capacity.
The accounts manager appointed in his place was young with
little experience but with high technical abilities in the
accounts field. He has no problem in ensuring what might
be termed the book keeping aspects of accounts (invoicing,
ledger keeping, etc.) are carried out correctly. He does
however still have more to learn about the management aspects
of accounts (the interpretations of the figures, designing
systems that can be used by managers etc). The accounts
department produces two levels of reports to managers within
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the company, these being monthly and quarterly. The
monthly reports contain profit and loss account gross nett
margins, materials costs, labour costs, overhead costs,
sales figures, outstanding orders, debtors and creditors
outstanding and labour establishment. The figures are
given for the current month and cumulative for the year.
The report tends to lose impact because it is circulated
two weeks after the monthly management meeting and by the
time of the next management meeting any points raised by
the reports tend to be superceeded by other events. It has
been planned that the accounts manager should discuss with
the managers any variances between actual overheads and
budgeted overheads. This has tended not to happen and before
it is likely to be successful the accounts manager will need
to develop his behavioral skills in dealing with the other
managers. The quarterly accounts report consists of a
summary balance sheet. This report would be improved with
the addition of some management accounting ratios to aid in
its interpretations.
Besides the reports sent to managers in the company the
accounts department sends a series of reports to the
holding company, these being a weekly, a monthly and quar-
terly report. The weekly report contains a return of sales
checked against budget and the cash flow. The monthly
report contains a copy of the company's monthly accounts
report, profit forecast and capital expenditure forecast
(the latter two being the month's figures and cumulative
for the year). This report also contains four graphs,
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these being: profit/sales ratio, profit per employee ratio,
sales per employee and the added value (the company oper-
ates an added value bonus scheme). The quarterly report
contains a copy of the company's quarterly accounts report
along with a graph of profit to capital employed. Although
much of the information sent to the holding company is
circulated to management the graphs are not. It is diff-
icult to see why these graphs are not circulated to the
whole management as they would be useful and the amount of
extra effort to circulate them would be minimal.
The new management control system has been included in the
accounts area because it was designed by the old company
accountant now acting as a consultant to the company. The
need for the system arose out of a problem that occurred
with quite a large order the company quoted and won. When
the order came into production some discrepancies were dis-
covered in the quote. It was found that it took twice as
long to make the order as had been allowed in the estimate
for the quote, but fortunately an error that almost can-
celled out this one was made in pricing the material. This
meant that the company did end by making a small profit on
this order but the consequences of making a loss on such a
large order prompted the investigation of the estimation
system. The problem was not only due to errors made by the
estimator but with some of the information given to him to
produce the quote. The investigation was then widened to
pr~du~e themanagsment control system shown in flowchart~. . . .. . -
form in Appendix A (Page A.50). This flowchart does not
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use standard flowcharting symbols but does illustrate the
system successfully. The system was designed very well and
with great care. The people in the company who were to be
affected by the system were consulted from an early stage
in the design process. When the system had been designed
it was verified to ensure that it was performing exactly
as the designer intended and it was validated by testing
the system in situ to ensure it could cope with the real
situation and that all people dealing with the system could
operate and understand all the outputs from the system.
The management control/system is an excellent system that
shows the way in which systems which are to operate in the
management area should be designed.
CONCLUSION FROM STUDY.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from the study is
that some of the managers employed by the company are
capable of designing, implementing and controlling excellent
formal systems and procedures, the outputs from such systems
procedures producing good management information. This
information may be for the manager's own use of for use by
other managers. It cannot be said that all managers within
the company are capable of designing systems in such detail
and quality as the ones discussed in this study. Clearly
this is not the case otherwise people from outside the
company would not have to be brought in (people were brought
in to solve management problems poor information being
incidental to poor~a~agement). _ The design. and implemen-
tation of the management control system showed that all the
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managers and personnel involved with the system could cope
with this development. They showed that even if they were
not able to carry out the work themselves they were able
to work with others to carry out the work of development
and design of efficient procedures.
The study also showed that small firms that grow may need
to take in new managers with wider experience to expand
the experience-base of the organisation. A lack of good
procedures in such an organisation can be a sign that some
managers are not coping with the growth of the organisation.
It must be remembered that some managers can grow with the
organisation and find the change from the less formal to
the more formal organisation possible. Because this study
is a sample of one it makes it dangerous to apply the con-
clusions to managers in general.
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4.2. PERSONNEL INFORMATION STUDY.
This piece of empirical work was carried out to examine
personnel management information needs and the way in
which personnel management determine such needs.
4.2.1. TYPE OF STUDY.
In the study, groups of people working in personnel manage-
ment considered the information needs of personnel manage-
ment. The people involved in the study were all students
from the Department of Management Studies of the North
Staffordshire Polytechnic. They were studying part-time
for professional examinations to gain membership of the
Institute of Personnel Managemento The entry requirements
for the course were that students must have a degree or
equivalent and be employed in personnel management. The
students jobs' ranged from junior personnel assistants
through to personnel managers.
The study was carried out on the course residential period
in March 1980 with one set of students and in March 1981
for another set of students. The students were split into
groups of approximately six, three groups each year and
were given approximately six hours to carry out the tasks
required. They were required to produce the information
needs of the typical personnel department. Also they were
asked to consider the value and cost of this information
but because the study was general in nature they were asked
to consider these as benefits and resources required. Part
of the function of the personnel department is the provision
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of information for other departments and t~erefore this will
show in the information needs.
The groups were given the problem with minimal input 50
as not to affect the way in which they would tackle the
problems. They were then split off into syndicate rooms
to determine the information needs and asked to produce a
written and verbal presentation at the end of the time
period. The writt~n presentations are given in full in
Appendix B.
4.2.2. METHODS EMPLOYED BY GROUPS.
In order to minimis~ the influence from external sources a
limited briefing was given. The 1980 students soon decided
that the only way to arrive at the information needs of
personnel management was to examine the function of person-
nel management. Group C of this set of students unfortun-
ately developed considerable internal group conflict. This
conflict led to considerable argument within the group
which eventually caused the fragmentation of this group,
into two. Conflict such as encountered within this group
would be unlikely to be found within an organisation. I
would not suggest ~at organisations are free from conflict,
far from it, but in organisations there will be a power
hierarchy. This will tend to ensure decisions and concl-
usions are reached by groups although some individual mem-
bers of the groups may be dissatisfied with the decision and
conclusions. On the whole the groups from the first set of
students were successful in the determination of inform-
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ation needs, the source of the information and the benefits.
Most of the groups though had difficulty attributing
numeric values to the information, but this was expected
due to the general nature of the study.
The 1981 students operated in much the same way as the
first set with the exception of group C. This group had
a great deal of difficulty in finding an appropriate method
to tackle the problem. When it became known that the
group was in difficulty it was suggested to the group that
an approach to the problem might be to first examine the
function of personnel management and then to arrive at the
information needed to carry out this function. The group
then tried to apply this approach but they still found
difficulty because of the generality of the problem. It
was then suggested to the group that they become more spec-
ific and fit the need around a particular company. The
group then invented a company employing 5,000 people, and
then had no difficulty in producing the personnel inform-
ation needs the sources and the benefits. Unfortunately
because of the time lost initially the final report
produced by this group was a little disjointed. This should
not be allowed to detract from the contents of this report
for despite the two false starts the group produced some
good results.
from the reports and observations of the groups of both
sets of students I considered that the methods employed by
the groups produced reasonable estimates of personnel
management information needs, sources and benefits.
4.2.3. SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM GROUPS.
The reports produced by each of the six groups are given
in full in Appendix B. The summary of results will be
given for each group in turn.
Group A. 1980.
If any of the reports can be singled out as being better
than the rest then this is the one. This may be due in
part to the fact that this group contained the most senior
personnel executive involved in the study. (Personnel
Director of local company), but is probably more due to
this individual's personality and ability. They divided
their report into four areas for which information would
be required.
1. Industrial Relations.
2. Education, Training and Development.
3. Working Conditions.
4. Manpower Planning.
Each part has been extended to form a list of information
required to carry out each function. Also given for the
information is its source. The cost of producing the
information is given but in general terms being in most
cases a list of resources required. The value of the infor-
mation has also been considered and has been given in
most cases as a list of benefits accruing from the inform-
ation. There is one value given that is of particular
interest being a numeric value. This value is given in
part II section C, Legislation (Page 8.4) and it concerns
the information giving legislation related to industrial
relations, the source of which has been given as Croner's
Law Reports costing £25 per annum. Also given under the
heading of cost is 'up to £16,000 for unfair dismissal
claim'. This is a cost of not having the information
therefore it can be included in the value of this inform-
ation.
Group 8 1980.
This group broke their information needs into seven cat-
egories although they reduced this number later in the
report.
1) Personnel.
2) Information in.
3) Information out.
4) Training.
5) Company information.
6) Informal information.
7) Safety.
The group produced a comprehensive list of management
information needs and uses that can be made of such infor-
mation. They did not add to this list the cost or the
resources needed to collect the information. They did
produce, however, an interesting pie chart. This pie chart
is shown on page 8.20. and gives the relative costs in
man hours per forty hour week of information requirements.
It is an interesting way to show how time is spent prod-
ucing and dealing with information. Such a chart can only
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be accurate for the people who produce it and will vary
considerably from organisation to organisation.
Group C. 1980.
This was the group in which considerable internal conflict
developed and the group eventually split into two after
sub-dividing the work, which resulted in a report that was
disjointed. The report was divided into five sections.
1) Management Planning.
2) Industrial Training.
3) Conditions of Employment.
4) Recruitment and Selection.
5) Unions.
The group produced a detailed list of information needs
and the uses and benefits of such information. They did not
take the analysis on to consider the cost and resources to
produce the information. This was due to the time lost
in the initial stages of the analysis because of the inter-
nal conflict within the group.
Group A 1981.
This group split the information needs into the following
categories.
1) Employment and Recruitments.
2) Training and Development.
3) Industrial Relations.
4) Salary Policy and Administration.
5) Employee Services - Welfare, etc.
6) Organisation and Manpower Planning.
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The group produced a list of information needs and consid-
ered the information uses to a degree but did not produce
any costs or resources required to produce the information.
Group 8 1981.
Group 8 split the information by considering the people
with whom the personnel department communicates and using
these as groups of people to give the broad information
categories. The four categories used were:-
a) The individual employee.
b) The Government/Legislators.
c) The Environment including competitors and the
'market'.
d) The individual operating units of the company.
This report although brief produces a reasonable list of
information needs including the cost and benefits. The
approach taken by this group is an interesting one in that
it is slightly different from the other group although
communications can be considered part of the function of
the personnel department.
Group C 1981.
This is the group that had difficulty finding an approach
to determine the information needs. It settled for an
approach relating information needs to the functions of
the personnel department of its own hypothetical firm. In
looking at the report from this group it is hard to see why
the group found it difficult to work in general terms and
required a specific firm. The report gives the information
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requirements in very general terms the only specific parts
being the staffing levels of the personnel department.
This group split the information requirements into the
following categories:-
a) Recruitment and Selection.
b) Training and Development.
c) Manpower Planning and Job Evaluation.
d) Absence Control and Welfare.
e) Industrial Relations.
f) Health and Safety.
g) Salaries, Wages, Pensions and Superannuation.
Despite the false starts this group produced an excellent
set of information needs with the sources and benefits of
the information. Cost or resources have not been included
in general terms but the staffing levels of personnel
department have been included. These cannot be considered
to be wholly the cost of information for the people employed
in these jobs will carry out the normal functions of the
personnel department as well as providing the information.
4.2.4. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STUDY.
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from
this study. The groups of students within the study appeared
to be able to produce their information needs with reas-
onable success. Most of them started by relating to the
function of personnel management and then determining the
information needed to carry them out. The group that did
not start with this approach found difficulty when trying
to relate information needs in abstractions but with a
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little guidance found the approach of first determining the
function of personnel management and then determining the
information needed to car~y this out to work reasonably
well. Most of the groups found it easy to produce benefits
and resources required to produce the information as these
came out from the approach used. Most groups found it
difficult to relate to the value of the information although
some of this difficulty was probably due to the general
way the problem was set.
Having seen the conclusions that can be drawn from the
group of students studied how can these conclusions be
related to personnel management in general? This will
depend on how representative the sample of students is of
the total population of personnel management. It cannot
be considered to be a completely representative sample in
that all the people in the sample had taken the decision to
extend their knowledge of personnel management and all the
people had the qualifications to enable them to register
on the course. But this may not be as unrepresentative as
it may seem at first sight. Although the entrance qualifi-
cations are high (degree or equivalent) this can now be
considered the normal qualification of most managers.
This is due to the increased number of graduates entering
management and the increase in the professionally based
courses. The Institute of Personnel Management for example
now operates a foundation course to give students without
the entrance qualifications a route onto the graduate
membership course. The bias due to the fact that all the
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members of the sample have taken a conscious decision to
extend their knowledge in personnel management is a
problem that would be difficult to avoid. It would be
difficult to persuade personnel managers to take part in
such a study unless it was part of a structured programme
from which they would be likely to benefit.
In spite of the biases in the sample it should nevertheless
be possible to reach some tentative conclusions which are
applicable to personnel managers in general. It can be
said that groups of personnel managers will require little
assistance in determining their information needs. The
only assistance required is that of ensuring that the most
effective method of determining information needs is used.
The information needs being produced will be the present
information needs. The group of personnel managers will
also not require much assistance when listing the benefits
from the information and resources required to produce it.
They are likely to have problems attributing numerical
values to benefits and costs. They will probably need to
be given training in information value setting and an
information value framework should be provided to assist
in this. Help with costing the resources could be provided
from the accounts department. The potential information
needs can then be determined by bringing in outside spec-
ialists or using specialists within the organisation. The
production of a standard list of information needs for
personnel management would not be a good step to take as
the personnel management information needs are likely to
3~
vary from organisation to organisation, the differences
being due to factors such as size, industry and managers'
knowledge levels.
The study was concerned with groups of personnel managers
and wherever possible groups should be formed to determine
information needs. It should be remembered that other
managers in the organisation will be involved with the
function of the pensonnel department and so should be
involved in the group. This will enable a group to be
constructed even when there is only one or a small number
of people in the personnel department.
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4.3. MARKETING INFORMATION STUDY.
This piece of empirical work was carried out to examine
how management tackle specific information-related problems.
The information-related problems were presented in the
form of a case study.
4.3.1. TYPE OF STUDY.
This study is based on a specially devised case study of
Plas-Tex Ltd. The case study is concerned with information-
related problems in the marketing area but the people
involved in the study were from all areas of management.
The people involved in the study were students on the
second year of the Diploma in Management Studies from the
Department of Management Studies, North Staffordshire
Polytechnic. The Diploma in Management Studies (D.M.S.)
is a national, post graduate, post experienced general
management course. Due to the general nature of the D.M.S.
the range of students taking part in the study varied from
junior to senior management with the majority being middle
management. The following are examples of the job functions
of the students taking part in the study: Managing Director,
Sales Manager, Production Unit Manager, Management Services
Manager. The case study was presented to the students as
part of the course residential study period and they were
given sixteen programmed hours over a two day period to
complete the tasks set in the case study. The students
were split into seven groups of approximately six members.
The students were given a minimal briefing and were pres-
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ented with a copy of the case study each. The case docu-
ment contained the background information to Plas-Tex ltd.
and the tasks involved in case study. The groups were
then sent to syndicate rooms to solve the problems and
tasks in the case study. From this point on the groups
were allowed to ask any question on the Plas-Tex situation
or to seek advice from members of departmental staff
present on the residential including marketing specialists.
A range of Plas-Tex type products were on display to help
the students to relate to the case study. The students
were asked to produce a twenty minute verbal presentation
and a written report containing the detail. The case
study documents and the seven written reports have been
produced in Appendix C.
4.3.2. THE CASE STUDY.
The case study is not based on one particular actual
company but all the problems built into the case have been
taken from a series of actual companies and built into the
fictional company Plas-Tex ltd.
Plas-Tex ltd. is a company in the plastic moulding industry
that specialises in the production of plastic yarn package
supports for the textile industry. The Marketing Department
of Plas-Tex ltd. was subject to mounting criticism from
other senior managers which eventually resulted in the
resignation of the Marketing Manager. It has been 'felt'
by other managers that the company had been missing sales
opportunities due to a poorly managed and co-ordinated
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sales force and a misdirected sales effort. The company
had also lost money and goodwill due to inaccuracies in
the completion of order forms.
The groups were asked to adopt the role of a newly appointed
marketing manager. They were asked to design a marketing
information system for Plas-Tex considering both formal and
informal information. It was suggested that to carry out
the following would need to be considered:
the information needs of the situation.
the costs of obtaining such information.
the benefits accruing from the information.
They were asked to produce detailed plans on how the
information should be collected, who should collect the
information, procedures required to collect and process the
information, reports that need to be produced, and the
timing and circulation of such reports, etc.
Within the case study the studentA were given background
information to the company and the company's products. The
formal information and documentation systems already exis-
ting in the company are given in detail in the case study.
Also given in the case are the details of the interface
between the marketing department and other departments
within Plas-Tex. The case study is given in full in
Appendix c.
4.3.3. METHODS EMPLOYED BY GROUPS.
All the groups appeared to work well and effectively
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together and no major confrontations appeared to take
place within the groups. All the groups started by discus-
sing, in general terms amongst the members of. the group,
the problems confronting the new marketing manager. They
soon realised that before information needs could be
produced the function of the marketing department had to be
defined and then the information needs to carry out this
function can be determined. After considering the problems
and tasks in general terms each group decided to sub-divide.
Each sub-group was responsible for a selection of tasks,
the final report being produced by the group as a whole.
All the groups in this study behaved in a more organised
way than the groups in the Personnel Information Study.
Whether this was due to the fact that this case gave
plenty of detail to work with or the fact that the students
in this study had greater and more varied management exper-
ience is hard to say, but both factors probably contributed.
4.3.4. SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM GROUPS.
The reports produced by each of the seven groups are
given in full in Appendix C. The summary of results will
be given for each group in turn.
GROUP A.
From the report this group appears to have got a good
grasp of the situation. They realised that the order
system works for the majority of orders so they decided that
the best approach would be to close the loopholes in the
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existing system rather than to change everything. They
stressed the importance of the informal system (especially
in a marketing situation) and that the dynamic nature of
business makes it essential for systems to be flexible.
The nature of the report shows that the approach adopted
by this group was first to examine the function of the
marketing department and then to determine the information
required to carry it out.
Group A also made some good detailed changes and intro-
ductions to the marketing information system. They intro-
duced a Customer Visit Report which become an important
link document within the new system. It would provide
good market intelligence and given the way the group have
designed the form it would provide validation checks on
other aspects of the system. The group provided a number
of cross checks and validation checks to ensure that the
other systems operate correctly. The Order/Advice Note on
page C.44. suggested by the group may create problems in
that the group has tried to get too much onto one form so
making it rather overcrowded. They have introduced a
product code system and designed an improved sales analysis
(the sales analysis in the present system at Plas-Tex being
very poor). The group considered the original system for
paying expenses to be lax and in consequence have suggested
a tightening up of the ~ystem and a redesigned form. They
made the suggestion that the new form could be used through-
out the company. but I do not think this to be the case. The
final part of the rep~rt deals briefly with the informal
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system of the marketing department, stressing the need to
train salesmen to obtain market intelligence and the need
for regular meetings of salesmen to ensure the information
gathered is passed on.
GROUP B.
Group B split the problem into four parts.
1) Redesigning the formal system to avoid errors.
2) Improvement of sales analysis.
3) Lack of Market Information.
4) Lack of co-ordination of supervision.
The group thought that it would be important to rationalise
the products. Superficially it appears there are three
0' 0'standard products (parallel tube, 4 20 cone, 9 15 cone)
but when one takes all the combinations of size, colour
and surface finish the number of standard products is
greatly increased. ,The group produced a very good technical
solution to this problem using an alternative colour
coding method (page C.70). This approach was to produce
uncoloured cones and then silk screen print the colour on
the top of the cone, the only part visible when the cone is
full of yarn. Such an approach will enable rationalisation
of production runs, stock holding, etc. This group design-
ed a questionnaire to be filled in by the salesmen when
visiting customers. The questionnaire is quite well desig-
ned and will provide marketing management with some impor-
tant information.
The group noticed the likelihood of declining markets in
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the traditional products and they proposed work to inves-
tigate the markets to either confirm or disprove this man-
agement feeling. If it did prove to be a declining market
they suggested the investigation of other markets in the
plastic injection moulding business. Although the group
realised the importance of the informal information syst-
em, there is little evidence in the report of how the
informal information is to be gathered. Even though this
information is informal there still needs to be planning on
how the information is to be gathered.
The group put forward some good ideas for the redesigning
of the formal system. They stressed the importance of
discussions with other departments and that the ideas
being put forward are only proposals. They also realised
that the bad name of the marketing department would make
such discussion difficult in the short term and they saw
their proposals as operating in the medium term when the
name of the department had been improved. They proposed
a good multipart form although it might prove to be a little
overcrowded and the system to operate the forms also seems
reasonable. The principal criticsm of the redesigning of
the formal system is the lack of effective short term plans
to stop the errors occurring in the existing system.
GROUP C.
Group C considered the following changes or additions to
the existing system which they split into formal and
informal. At the formal level they proposed the introduc-
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tion of a sales visit report and designed a form to be
completed at the end of each sales visit. This form was
quite a comprehensive and reasonable form. They proposed
to plan the sales areas, to give an area for each salesman
and to plan the salesmen's calls. They also decided to
tighten up the expense procedure and introduce additional
checks in this area. finally at the formal level they
considered the sales analysis and sales data base to be
inadequate therefore they proposed changes to both the
analysis and data base. At the informal level the follow-
ing would be considered, market surveys, technical journals,
etc., contact with customers both by marketing manager and
salesmen, trade associations and contact with managers in
other areas of the organisation.
The problem of the possibly declining market was considered
and the search for new products and their attendant infor-
mation needs examined. Page C.76 contains their plan for
market surveys which proposed splitting them into two parts.
Part 1 would look back through past records to produce a
useful sales analysis and part II would examine the market.
They produced good proposed improvements to the formal
system including a good set of multi-part forms. The
improved card index (C.84) and stock record card (C.85)
would provide good data bases to be used to produced a
useful sales analysis.
GROUP D.
This group produced the most disappointing of the reports.
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They identified the problem areas and produced some soluti-
ons to deal with these but they failed to extend these into
a coherent plan for the future. They identified five
problem areas.
1. Double Ordering:- to solve this problem they
would add orders onto the card index and this would
provide a check each time an order was placed
that it was not a duplicate order.
2. Errors in Transposition of Information:- to cut
down errors in this area they suggest that sales-
man quotes be verbal only and that the sales
clerk send an order acknowledgement as a cross
check.
3. Need to improve interdepartmental co-ordination:-
part of the solution to this problem will be to
hold interdepartmental management meetings.,
4. Misdirection of sales force:- to solve this prob-
lem there would be tighter control of the sales
force with a greater emphasis on market inform-
ation.
5. Absence of data base in marketing department:-
to solve this problem they decided to create
customer files, expand the card index, improve the
sales analysis system and develop departmental
trend analysis, etc.
This group had the ideas of what to do to solve the problems
but lacked a detailed plan of how to carry out the ideas in
practice. The group listed some sources of informal
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marketing information but again the detail tends to be
missing.
GROUP E.
Group E produced the most effectively written report cont-
aining both good ideas and the detail of how to put the
ideas into practice. The need for better market inform-
ation was identified. This information would be required
before decisions could be taken on reorganisation. The
report then outlines the proposed marketing strategy which
led to some of the marketing information requirements.
The benefits of the information and the expected costs
were also considered.
In order to solve the problems and to eliminate the errors
in the existing system they would need to redesign the
order flow system. The report contained detailed oper-
ations manuals dealing with the various parts of the new
system. The manuals and the systems contained in them are
well designed although some of the forms used might prove
to be a little overcrowded in use. The group produced a
good flowchart of the proposed system (C.10a) and though
this flow chart does not conform to normal flowchart practice
it still graphically illustrates the relationship between
the different parts of the new system.
The report also gives a series of external information
sources, the other major market information source being
the sales analysis. The sales analysis, which includes a
352
sales activity analysis to be completed by the salesman,
has been well thought out and should provide considerable
and varied information to marketing management. The report
also considers informal marketing information both in
broad terms and the details of collection.
The report ends by listing its aims which would be achieved
by improving both marketing management and the information
system and are as follows.
1) Clear corporate strategy.
2) Full sales analysis.
3) A better customer service.
4) Identification of future or potential markets.
5) Planned consistent production.
6) Fully involved workforce, fully conversant with
the aims of the company.
GROUP F.
Group F started their report by asking a series of questions
about the products and markets. They then went on to
examine the sources that were available to provide answers
to the questions along with the way in which the information
was collected.
This group considered the problem of reporting marketing
information to the rest of the management team. They
considered that there should be three types of report,
monthly, quarterly and annually. The monthly report would
be a comparison of orders received for each product line
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against forecast demand. This report would also include
any specific customer's comments regarding product quality,
special variants requested, etc, that have not already
been circulated. The quarterly report would contain an
updated forecast for the coming twelve months. This is an
interesting forecasting method and provided it is linked
with a reasonable forecasting model it should be a good
system. The annual report would give the market potential
for the coming five years and would include new product
possibilities as well as existing lines. Circulation of
the three reports would be to the whole management team of
Plas-Tex Ltd. Group F made it clear that even though these
reports would be in existance this would not prevent the
immediate communication of complaints, comments, opportun-
ities, etc. to other members of the management team as they
arise.
The report of this group then goes on to give detailed
procedure files for the formal system of quotations, order
form, despatch/advice note, invoice, product and rep.codes,
customer record files, accounts, monthly reports and
customer visit form. The two principal purposes of these
files are to tighten up the existing systems so as to remove
the possibility of errors and to extend them in order to
provide better information. There are some additional
procedures for example the Customer Visit Form, which is
well designed giving plenty of space for comments probably
the most important part of the form.
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GROUP G.
This was not a particularly good report and unfortunately
the few good ideas it contained were obscured by poor
organisation. Like all the other groups they redesigned
the existing formal systems to eliminate errors with a fair
degree of success. To get around the problem of initial
shortage of clear information this group decided to take
the last two years' sales invoices and to analyse these to
obtain such information as sales per product per month/year
and also to identify the larger customers. At the same
time as this analysis was carried out the new customer
card index which would be updated so that only live custom-
ers would be kept in the file. The remaining customers
from the card index would be visited by salesmen to see if
any could be revived.
The group decided to introduce a failed Quotation Report
(C.141) which would be filled in by a salesman if an order
did not follow a quote. If the salesman could be pursua-
ded to fill these forms correctly then it should be poss-
ible to gain some very useful information on pricing and
competitors. They decided to change the order form (C.142),
providing a form on which there would be a box for every
standard product. This is a good idea in prinoipal but
would fail in this example due to the variety of products
so making the boxes too small to be of use. The group
also produced an improved sales analysis procedure and
proposed the introduction of a production analysis. To
control the salesmen the group decided to introduce the
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Salesman's Weekly Report. This form would also give a
regular weekly communication between salesmen and the
marketing manager.
The group failed to grasp the importance of informal infor-
mation to the marketing department.
4.3.5~ CONCLUSION FROM THE STUDY.
In common with a lot of case studies Plas-Tex Ltd. does not
have one correct solution but in any solution of the case
some mention of the following would be expected.
The principal difficulty of the case is the lack of hard
information; there are plenty of feelings about the situ-
ation but this is all. Because of this the first function
of any information system should be the provision of some
market information as ,soon as possible to allow manage-
ment to form a marketing strategy. It should also be
taken into account that before any changes to the formal
systems are made they should be fully discussed with all
interested parties.
In any proposed solution to the Plas-Tex Ltd. case it
must be recognised that the formal systems for ordering,
quotation and invoicing adequately handles the majority
of transactions. It would be foolish of any new marketing
manager to try to change everything in the department, and
it would be better in the short term to plug the gaps in
the existing system. The errors in the existing system
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could be eliminated by ensuring a good degree of systems
discipline and the use of some verification checks. In
the medium term once the marketing manager has got the
department working well then these formal systems could be
revised and updated.
Part of the existing system that will need to be completely
revised is the sales analysis. This needs to be extended
to show the differences in sales between all the product
types and the quantity as well as value needs to be shown.
This type of analysis can be inputed into a forecasting
system for both the short and long run, the forecasting
being carried out in terms of the quantity sold and not
value. The way the analysis is reported to the rest of
management should also be considered probably monthly for
sales and quarterly for updated forecasts. To overcome the
problem of lack of marketing information and to give some
values to initialise the forecasting systems the invoices
for the past year or two could be analysed.
Some form of customer file also needs to be introduced.
This could be an extended card index or possibly due to
the lack of sp'ace on the cards it may need to be extended
into a lateral file or the problem may be,solved with a
computer system. Greater control over the sales force
will be required which could be provided by visits reports,
weekly or monthly meetings ,and an improved expense form.
Some type of follow-up of quotations that have not produced
orders could provide some very useful market information.
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Within the Plas-Tex Ltd. marketing information system there
appears to be a complete lack of informal information. It
is likely that the old marketing manager will have taken his
informal system with him when he left, however, all the
salesmen will have some form of informal information system
in operation. The informal information system for the
marketing manager should include contacts with salesmen,
customers and other managers. Also included in the formal
system will be journals, trade associations, etc.
We can now turn to see how the groups performed and the
conclusions that can be drawn from their work. Some of the
groups realised that there was little hard market information
and only feelings and so planned to obtain market information
before taking any decision. Some groups thought the feel-
ings a sufficient basis on which to start to take some of
the decisions concerning marketing strategy. When putting
forward changes to systems that would effect other depart-
ments some groups stated that discussions would be needed
before they would be implemented but some groups ommitted
to mention this.
All groups realised the changes that needed to be made and
the extra information that would be needed. All groups
with one exception produced good sets of detailed plans
for the obtaining of such information. The system manuals
produced are generally good and in some cases very good.
Most of the groups redesigned some of the forms but some
fell into the trap of trying to fit too much onto one form
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and sa having spaces too small for the figures. This is a
fault managers would soon learn to correct when the com-
plaints start to arrive from the people filling in the form.
Not surprisingly all the groups felt that sales analysis
to be inadequate and produced plans for a more detailed
analysis. Some of the groups linked the analysis to fore-
casting systems. They also -introduced various visit forms
to control the activities of the sales force and provided
a communication link between it and the marketing manager.
Most of the groups correctly considered that informal infor-
mation is very important in the marketing area and all
groups except one outlined the type of informal needs, most
including the detail of how to collect it. Some groups
listed the benefits that would be expected from the infor-
mation and the resources required to produce it but on the
whole this was poorly carried out.
The way in which these conclusions can be related to
management in general will now be considered. This will
depend partly on how representative the group of students
is of management in general. This sample suffers the same
shortcomings as the sample used in the personnel management
study, these being the facts that all the students had
taken a conscious decision to extend their knowledge of
management and that all the students had the necessary
qualifications to gain entrance to the D.M.S. The fact
that these entrance qualifications are becoming the norm
for management tends to reduce the bias from this source.
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It would be difficult to pursuade managers to take part in
such a study unless they would be able to extend their
knowledge as a result, and therefore it would be difficult
to remove this source of bias.
Some conclusions from the study can be extended to manage-
ment in general but the biases in the sample should be
remembered. Like the personnel management study this one
shows that managers are capable of determining their infor-
mation needs. The difference in this study is that the
managers were from all functions within the organisations
and yet they proved capable of determining information needs
for the marketing function. This shows how useful groups
of managers can be when determining information needs.
They do not all have to be from the same function in fact
it can be better if they are not. This study also shows
that managers are capable of designing the detail of systems
although they did have a few problems for example with
form designed. The problems with the detail would prob-
ably be removed if an information analyst joined the group.
The majority of managers realised the importance of dis-
cussions of all interested parties when changes are made
to existing systems or new systems designed. This is not
surprising as an important part of a manager's job is
discussion and dealing with other people inside or outside
the organisation. Like the personnel management study this
study showed that even with a detailed example managers
find it difficult without special training to determine in-
formation value and cost.
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4.4. SMALL BUSINESS INFORMATION STUDY.
This piece of empirical work was carried out to examine the
information needs at the initial stages of setting up a
small business and the way in which these needs are det-
ermined.
4.4.1. TYPE OF STUDY.
The study is based on an exercise set to students as part
of their residential period of study. The students were
taking the Diploma in Management Studies (D.M.S.) at the
Department of Management Studies, North Staffordshire Poly-
technic. The D.M.S. is a national, post graduate, post
experience general management course. Due to the general
nature of the D.M.S. the range of students taking part in
the study varied from junior to senior management with the
majority being middle management and from all parts of the
organisation. The following are examples of the job
functions of students taking part in the study: Managing
Director, Sales Manager, Production Unit Manager, Work
Study Manager. The exercise was set some two months before
the residential was due to take place, to give the students
time to gather background information. The students were
then given the majority of the residential week to organise
a written and verbal presentation, the written report to be
handed in by the Wednesday night, the presentation to be
given on the Friday morning. The following was given to
the students as part of the briefing for the project.
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GROUP PROJECT.
1. The project will occupy the first three days of
the residential period together with a plenary
session in the final morning.
2. For the purpose of the project the participants
will be arranged in groups of five or six. The
structure of the groups will be announced early in
the Spring Term.
3. Each group will be required to produce a written
report relating to the formation of a new enter-
prise. That report will be submitted no later
than the evening of the third day of the residen-
tial period and will contain all the data in
section 7 together with any supporting commentary.
4. The reports will be presented to a panel in the
plenary session on friday morning. The panel will
comprise members of staff.
5. The terms of reference, to the groups, require:-
5.1. The outline of a policy for the formulation
of a new business enterprise.
5.2. A precis of the planned development of the
enterprise for the first three years of
operation.
5.3. An outline of the policy for the expansion
and development of the enterprise beyond
the first three years of operation.
6. The choice of business is left to the discretion
of the groups.
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7. The report will, however, cover the following
points:-
7.1. Detailed description of the product(s) or
service(s).
7.2. The nature and size of market.
7.3. An outline of marketing policy.
7.4. A consideration of the sales organisation
relative to the market.
7.5. A consideration of the means of distribution
of the product to the market.
7.6. The location of the enterprise.
7.7. The type of premises required and the
availability of these in the area of location.
7.8. The requirements in terms of plant.
7.9. The layout of the plant and allied services,
within the premises.
7.10. The members and grades of personnel required.
7.11. The capital requirements for the enterprise
and the provision of these.
7.12. The cost structure of and the profitability
of the enterprise.
The above terms of reference were given to the students who
were split into four groups some two months before the
residential. The students were encouraged to seek any
advice they require from members of the management depart -
ment staff or from specialists outside. A wide range of
staff members were also available at the residential
centre along with representatives from the Small Firms
Service, West Midlands Region and one of the larger banks.
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4.4.2. METHODS EMPLOYED BY GROUPS.
All the members of each group worked well together and in
fact worked well past the time allotted and into free time
during the residential. They worked hard before the res-
idential, bringing a considerable amount of background
information for their project with them. ~ll the groups
chose their proposed business in an area with which at
least one member of the group was familiar. The information
needs were determined by the groups by first examining the
business and then determining the information required to
make out a case for the success of such a business. It is
interesting that one of the groups brought to the residen-
tial an Apple Micro-Computer with a financial planning pack-
age to carry out all the cash flow calculations.
4.4.3. SUMMARY OF RESULTS FROM GROUPS.
The reports produced by each of the four groups have been
given in Appendix D. The detailed cash flows, detailed
layout drawings, etc. produced by the groups have not been
included due to the amount of space that would have been
taken by them. The summary of results will be given for
each group in turn.
GROUP A. (COLUMN SERVICES LTD.)
This group reported details of the case for setting up a
company (Column Services Ltd.) to package and repackage
columns for use in high performance liquid chromatography
(H.P.L.C.). The principal information required concerned
the area of the available markets, the size of the total
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po~ential market for columns being determined from the
total number of sets of H.P.L.C. equipment sold and then
multiplying by the number of columns required per year to
operate the equipment. The sale of sets of equipment is
a high growth market so it is reasonable to assume that the
sale and repacking of columns will also be a high growth
market. The market for columns at present is being met by
the manufacturers of H.P.L.C. equipment and a series of
smaller service companies. The smaller service companies
are all experiencing considerable growth therefore this
group considered not unreasonably that there would be an
opening for the formation of another small service company
in this market. It is interesting to note that a consider-
able amount of the groups information came from informal
sources because of the close proximity of some of the mem-
bers of the group to the market. This case probably
had the best chance of success out of the four possible
businesses because of such factors as the nature of the
market concerned and the competitors in this market, the
relatively small amount of capital required to finance the
start of business (capital not provided by outside institu-
tions), and the close involvement of members of the group.
The chief problem which is likely to be encountered by this
group is the fact that the major suppliers of raw materials
are all outside the U.K. thus making the proposed business
vunerable to changes in exchange rates and fluctuations in
supply. The detailed financial calculations produced by
this group were sound but have not been included in Appendix
o due to space constraints.
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When the group had calculated their price for columns they
carried out a telephone survey of potential customers to try
and gauge whether the business could be successfully laun-
ched. This survey confirmed the high probability of a
successful launch of the business and in some cases the pot-
ential customers were willing to place firm orders for col-
umns there and then. It is likely that this small business
will be launched in the near future.
GROUP B. (Brew-Ware).
This group sets out the case for setting up a pottery
business in the Stoke-an-Trent area although since it
would employ 56 people it is debatable whether it can be
still classed as a small business. This group produced
very clear precise strategies for each of the areas of
operation. This is a very good indication as to the success
of the business as it shows clearly that the members of the
group know precisely where the business is going. The
biggest problem with this case for a proposed business is
the amount of capital required to set up a manufacturing
operation of this size.
The members of staff appraising the various projects con-
sidered that this group produced a very well researched
case for the establishment of Brew-Ware. The report con-
tains on page D.12. a list of information and its sources
used in preparing the case and is worth reproducing again
in this section.
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"PRODUCT INFORMATION.
a) Raw Materials and Kilns - local suppliers.
b) Buildings - Newspaper advertising.
c) Production costing - local company information.
d) Product Technical Specification - Company Infor-
mation.
e) Product rates - local company information.
MARKETING INFORMATION.
a) Previous market demand - confidential documents
from existing ceramic manufacturers.
b) Future market demand - confidential documents
from existing ceramic manufacturers.
c) Market outlets - own ~esearch and information from
existing manufacturers.
d) Product price - own research and confidential
information from existing manufacturers.
FINANCIAL INFORMATION.
a) Own research and information deduced from
manufacturing and marketing information." *1
The majority of this group were involved in the pottery
industry. It is interesting when looking at the inform-
ation used to prepare the case for the business and its
sources to note the amount of which comes from the individ-
uals' own experience and knowledge required to carry out
their normal job functions. The list of information
requirements produced by this group would provide a useful
*1 APPENDIX D. (Page 0.12).
check list of information requirements to anybody setting
up a small manufacturing business. The group produced a
detailed financial analysis which unfortunately contained
a few mistakes (none of which would seriously affect the
viability of the business) but due to space constraints this
has not been included in Appendix D. The group also prod-
uced a mathematical model to help with sales forecasting,
a detailed factory layout and job description for all its
proposed employees but again due to the space constraint
these have not been included.
GROUP C. (Newcastle Tyre and Exhaust).
This group set out the case for setting up a garage spec-
ialising in the replacement of tyres, exhausts systems and
batteries. This case is different from the ones so far
put forward in that none of the members of the group were
involved in the area of the business in their normal occu-
pations or interests. However, to get around this problem
of lack of direct market knowledge themselves they consulted
a friend involved in running a tyre and exhaust system out-
let. Such co-operation may not have been so freely given
had the prime object of the group been to set up such a
business and not just the completion of an academic project.
The members of staff assessing the viability of the project
considered the case put forward for this business to be well
structurered and researched. However, some members of staff
were a little dubious about some of the latter sales fore-
casts but even this reservation would not seriously affect
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the viability of the project. Like group 8 this group
produced clear objectives and strategies. It is interesting
that this group opted for a service business considering
that there was not sufficient monetary return to be made in
a manufacturing business at present. The group researched
the market well producing and obtaining considerable market
information. The profits produced from the project would
be quite considerable and even if the latter sales estimates
were considered to be optimistic and were revised the proj-
ect would still return a reasonable profit. Due to space
constraints the detailed financial calculations, cash flows,
etc, have not been included in Appendix D.
GROUP D. (LEISURE CENTRE LTD.)
This group presented the case for setting up a leisure
centre initially providing facilities for squash but later
expanding to provide other leisure activities. Although
none of group were employed in the leisure industry some of
the group members had experience and involvement with the
running of a similar enterprise as part of their leisure
activities. This group put in a considerable amount of
work collecting and analysing information to enable them to
determine potential markets. In this particular case the
search for premises is an important marketing consideration
for the actual position of the leisure centre determines the
potential market. During the discussion and the information
collection process the group discovered informally that two
other leisure organisations were looking in the same area
for premises. This increases the group's confidence that
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the area in which they had chosen to consider the setting
up of a leisure centre was a good one.
One drawback to the proposed business is that compared
with the other. projects it does not return very large
profits although the profits returned do make it a viable
proposition. The group produced a reasonably sound fina-
ncial analysis. One small mistake was discovered but this
did not seriously affect the viability of the project.
Due to the space constraint the detailed financial analysis,
cash flows, etc, have not been included in Appendix D.
Also due to space consideration the detailed plans of the
leisure centre and some impressive artists impressions of
how the proposed leisure centre will look have not been.
included in Appendix D.
4.4.4. CONCLUSIONS FROM STUDY.
The work produced by these groups shows how important it
is to have a good knowledge of the market when putting
forward a case to start a small business. This will include
information, publicity available although not necessarily
free, e.g. government statistical reports, reports from
market research organisation, own market research, etc, and
market information that is only available because of ones'
occupation which can come from the organisation's formal
system or the individual's informal system. The first two
groups show how important the latter type of information
can be. Both the cases produced by these groups rely for
a great part of their market information on information
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obtained by members of the group because of their direct
involvement in the market concerned due to the nature of
their employment. The other two groups did not have any
group members directly involved in the market because of
their occupation. Group C obtained a feel for the market
from a friend who was directly involved. This provided the
group with valuable information not directly available to
the general public. Group 0 did not have any members
involved in the market through their occupations but they
did have some members who had experience in running facil-
ities as part of their leisure activities.
How representative can the cases put forward be of the
normal small business enterprise? The projects put forward
by the groups may be considered by some just to be an aca-
demic exercise, but I do not believe this to be the case.
Several of the small businesses put forward in the past
have been started with a high degree of success, all of
which are still in operation. There is also a high prob-
ability that the first of the projects put forward here will
be started and should stand a very good chance of success.
It could be said that such detailed analysis as produced by
these groups would not be produced by the average small
business~ But if a small business required any external
finance then such an analysis would be required before any
finance would be granted. If the business was to be fin-
anced by the person/s starting the business I would again
.think it very foolish not to produce such a detailed analysis.
The large failure rate of small businessess may in part be
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due to the failure to produce such a detailed analysis
which if carried out would have shown them not to be a
viable proposition.
To consider how representative such cases are one must
examine the types of small businesses that are likely to
be started.
The following list which is not meant to be exhaustive
presents the most likely reasons for the setting up of
small businesses. In some cases more than one may apply.
1) A manager or group of managers seeing an oppor-
tunity arising in the market they are directly
concerned with or a closely associated market.
2) A person or group of people who have developed a
new product and wish to market it.
3) A person or persons wishing to sell a skill that
they possess.
4) A person or persons wishing to invest some money
in a small business.
The different reasons for starting a business are likely
to affect the probability of the business being a success.
Some of the variations of success are likely to be attrib-
uted to the information available on the likely market and
the detail of the analysis made as to the profitability,
cash flows, etc. The cases put forward in this study can
be considered to be representative of type one which
because of their nature are likely to have better market
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information than the others and be better able to produce
a financial analysis of the situation. The success rate of
the businesses started as a result of this exercise is
higher than would be expected which may in part be due to
the better market information and the better prepared case.
Any person considering the starting of a small business
would be advised to produce a report similar to the ones
produced by groups in this study. Such a report should
consider the likely markets open to the new business as
well as a detailed financial analysis. Such a report may
well eliminate a business before it starts due to lack of
markets, profitability, etc, but this is better than
starting the business and failing later. The production
of such a report will not guarantee success for a small
business but if such a report shows the business to be
viable then this is likely to be the case. The check-list
given to the students before the start of the study will
be of use to the small business man in the production of
such a report.
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4.5. CONCORD INSULATORS LTD.
Concord Insulators Ltd. is a case study constructed around
a decision analysis problem. It is based on a real situ-
ation concerning the hiring or buying of vehicles for a
transport fleet. In the case study this has been changed
to the hiring or buying of production machinery. The
full case study being given in Appendix E. There are
two main points that the case study has been produced to
illustrate.
First the case study shows a method of producing a value
of the piece of information itself. In valuing the infor-
mation it is best to consider the whole of the information
and knowledge that goes into the production of the best
decision. If there was no information or knowledge avail-
able then the only option open to management would be to
take random decisions at each decision point (each decision
path having an equal probability of being chosen). The
expected return from such random decision taking is
£33,895·75. The expected return from the best decision
using the tree is £38,656. The value of information is
therefore the difference between the two.
VALUE OF INFORMATION
(All information and
Knowledge)
= 38656 - 33895·75
= £4760·25
In addition the range of values can be determined. If
the best decision was chosen at random then the value of
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the information would be £0, the lower limit. The upper
value of the information is given by the difference of the
two extremes of returns i.e. £7,871.
VALUE OF INFORMATION = £4760·25
within the range £0 to £7871.
This value should be considered in the context of the
basic concepts in the economic appraisal of management
information (see section 3.2.). This is discussed at
length in the case study (pages [13 to (17).
The second point the case study has been produced to
illustrate is the size to which a decision analysis can
grow. The majority of examples used in texts and papers
on decision analysis are greatly oversimplified. This
produces trees that are small and so not realistic in
terms of practical examples. Concord Insulators is an
attempt to produce a decision problem of realistic size.
The size of the tree is shown in the appendix with a main
decision tree and two sub-trees. In order to obtain a
value of the information a random tree is also required
thus further increasing the amount of work involved.
Further information on the case study can be found in
Appendix E where the case is produced in full.
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4.6. ROBERT LIVESEY AND SONS lTD.
Robert Livesey and Sons Ltd., is a case study concerned
with the implementation of a cost control system. It is
based on a real situation and only the company name has been
changed. The manuals, memos, forms, etc., have been
reproduced from the originals. The full case study is
given in Appendix F.
This case study concerns the implementation of a cost
control system and is typical of the situation that can
arise when a specialist system (cost control, production
control, forecasting, etc.) is implemented. There are two
basic problems that cen occur either together or separ-
ately. These are the lack of understanding by managers of
the information produced and the lack of credibility of
the information to the managers that do understand. In the
case outlined in Robert Livesey and Sons Ltd., both
problems occurred. Such problems can be greatly reduced
and possibly eliminated by correct implementation and
ensuring the following two rules are followed.
1) The system should be verified and validated. The
first stage the verification checks the mechanics
of the system ensuring that it behaves in the
manner that the system designer requires. This
stage is usually carried out reasonably well but
the next stage is sometimes omitted. The second
stage, validation, checks how the system under
test relates to other systems and the environment.
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Data is put into the system and the resulting
information is checked for consistency. The
second stage can delay the time when managers
receive information for the first time but it
greatly increases the chance it will be correct
information. It is difficult and takes a long
time for a system to live down a reputation for
producing bad information.
2) Knowledge should be provided before information.
To provide information and then at a later stage
try to provide the knowledge to understand it
can create many problems and build barriers to
understanding. Worse still is the case where the
manager is given specialist information and expected
to understand it. It saves problems and signif-
icantly reduces the chance of mental barriers
being produced if the knowledge is provided before
the information. Care should be taken to avoid
specialist jargon and abbreviations as these are
not easily understood by the layman.
Further information on the case study can be found in
Appendix F where the case is produced in full.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS.
The aim of the study was to produce a methodology for an
economic appraisal of management information. It is not
claimed that the methodology will work for every piece of
information but it is considered it will work for the
greatest majority. The first part of the thesis, Chapter
3 covers the analytical background to the construction of
such a methodology.
The methodology can be divided into four main sections these
being:-
1) Determination of management's information ~eeds.
2) Determination of management information value.
3) Determination of management information cost.
4) Cost benefit analysis of management information.
It is possible that in some cases stage three will be
carried out before stage two.
STAGE 1. Determination of Management's Information Needs.
This first stage is to produce a list of management's infor-
mation needs. This list will be produced at two levels at
least, management's present information needs and manage-
ment's potential information needs, and will include both
formal and informal information.
The information the manager is receiving at present can be
determined by using interviews, questionnaires, observations
and record !~spe~~~~n. These techniques will be reasonably
successful in identifying the information managers receive
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at present. The diary technique and communication analysis
are expecially useful to record the information managers use
when taking unprogrammed decisions. It must be remembered
though that the information the manager receives at present
does not represent the manager's present information needs.
The manager may not 'need' (or be able to use) some of the
information he receives and may not be getting some infor-
mation he considers he may need. To extend this list into
management's present information needs discussions must be
undertaken with the manager or managers concerned. When
the information analyst opens discussion with managers
questions like 'what information do you need?' should be
avoided because they will usually bring unhelpful response
like 'I don't know', 'What I get now' or 'all the inform-
ation you can give me'. It would be wrong of the analyst
to assume from these replies that the manager does not know
his information requirements, the problem lies in the ques-
tion. The approach must be first to determine in detail the
managers job and then to examine the information needed to
carry out each part of the job. Such detail seems to help
the manager to successfully determine his information
requirements. The first four of the empirical studies
showed that managers were capable of producing reasonable
lists of present information needs. The lists will not be
the perfect information to carry out the job they will be
the information that the manager can understand and use at
present. It is interesting to note that the Marketing
Information Study (Section 4.3.) showed that managers were
capable of giving inputs to groups examining information
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needs outside their normal area of operations. If inform-
ation systems are to be designed that are flexible enough
to be capable of extensions as managers develop then the
manager's potential information needs require to be esti-
mated. It should be remembered that as this list of pot-
ential information needs is concerned with the future which
is uncertain, such information needs can only be estimated.
These needs can be estimated by specialists inside and/or
outside the organisation. The analyst should avoid the
temptation to produce systems that go directly to the pot-
ential information needs. This is what happened in the
case study Richard Livesey and Sons Ltd. (Section 4.6. and
Appendix F.). Here managers were presented with information
they were unable to either understand or use. It would be
better to present managers with simpler information and
gradually increase its complexity as the managers' under-
standing grows. Knowledge should be provided before infor-
mation. To provide information and then at a later stage
try to provide the knowledge to understand it can create
many problems and build barriers to understanding. Worse
still is the case where the manager is given ~pecialist
information and expected to understand it.
The Richard Livesey Case and part of the Company Information
Study (Section 4.1. and Appendix A) emphasise the need when
designing systems to verify and validate such a system.
The first stage the verification checks the mechanics of
the system ensuring that it behaves in the manner that the
system designer requires. This stage is usually carried out
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reasonably well but the next stage is sometimes omitted.
The second stage, validation, checks how the system under
test relates to other systems and the environment. Data
is put into the system and the resulting information is
checked for consistency and management understanding. The
second stage can delay the time when managers receive infor-
mation for the first time, but it greatly increases the
probability that it will be correct and usable information.
It is difficult and takes a long time for a system to live
down a reputation for producing bad information or inform-
ation that is difficult to understand.
The list of information needs produced at this stage will
include both formal and informal information, also inform-
ation about the internal and external environments. The
analyst should be concerned not only with the formal infor-
mation about the internal and external envirionments but
should use his expertise to help the manager develop his
informal information system. It would be wrong of the
analyst to try to formalise the manager's informal inform-
ation. Such an approach will be doomed to failure because
of the nature of the informal system, but assistance to the
manager to develop his own information system would be of
value.
If management functions are shared by a number of managers
then the information analyst will himself be dealing with
groups of managers to determine the information needs of
the shared function. The group approach may also be of use
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even when dealing with individual manager's information
requirements as they may introduce the manager to fresh
ideas. This point was amplified in the Marketing Inform-
ation Study where managers from various functions within
the organisation successfully identified marketing inform-
ation needs. Fresh ideas may also come from the analyst or
specialists in fields such as accou~ting, production control,
etc.
In order to determine management's information needs the
analyst will require two extra skills in addition to his
information skills. First he will need a knowledge of the
processes involved in management, both at a management sys-
tem and a behavioral level. This will be essential if he
is to communicate effectively with managers and to discuss
with them in detail their job and the information needed
to perform them. The second additional skill will be beha-
vioral. The analyst will need to know how to act as a
catalyst to get the best out of individual managers or
groups of managers in terms of the determination of inform-
ation neads.
The result of the analysis so far will be a list of mana-
gement's present information needs. If systems to produce
some of this information are to be designed they should be
flexible enough to allow for the development of managers'
information needs. To build in this flexibility a list of
managers' potential information needs will be required. It
must be remembered that as these potential needs are con-
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cerned with the future they will be subject to error.
STAGE 2. Determination of Management Information Value.
stage two of the methodology takes the information produced
in stage one and values it. The methods of valuation have
been dealt with in detail elsewhere in the thesis and so
only the general approach will be considered here. The
empirical studies carried out showed that on the whole
managers are not very successfull at valuing information.
They could order the information needs in valu~ terms but
had problems in setting numerical values to the information.
Stage one produced a list of management information needs
and the first part of this stage orders them in importance
to the manager (i.e. value), this ordered list being called
the information needs framework. Although this framework
contains some form of valuation each piece of information
from it now needs to be valued individually. The logical
time to value such information is before it has been coll-
ected or analysed so that if it proves not to be economic
it need not be collected. The technique that is most effec-
tive at valuing information before it has been collected is
the estimation heuristic approach, but unfortunately this
technique only really works well when a valuing framework
is already in existenceo To initialise the valuation
framework, decision analysis and the accounting approach
should be used on a number of representative pieces of
information from the information ~eeds framework. The
problem with valuing information in this way is that the
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information has to be collected before it can be valued
(with the exception of some Bayesian analysis) and this
stage is a little late to decide that the information is
not worth collecting. Nevertheless this method remains
the best way to initialise the valuation process. The
quantified values of the information will provide the
skeleton for the information value framework. This partial
framework along with some form of training provided by
simulations, case studies, examples and training packages
will enable the estimation heuristics to be carried out
successfully on the remaining information in the needs
framework. (The provision of training packages will be the
di~ection followed for the extension of this research, such
packages will probably be based on programmed learning and
using micro-computers as the teaching vehicle). This will
then complete the initialisation of the information value
framework, with a technique that allows the information not
to be collected if it proves uneconomical. When the values
are recorded it should be shown which are quantified and
which are estimated values. The two frameworks, needs and
values, should be checked together to ensure consistency
between the needs and valuing processes. Any inconsistencies
should be investigated with the aim of removing them.
Given the dynamic nature of business and the fact that
managers will develop with time, the information needs will
change. When new information needs are added to the list,
the first valuation will be made by using estimation heur-
istics to decide if the information is economic. The frame-
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work may also need to be updated. This may be a total
update for example to take account of inflation or it may
be an update on a particular piece of information whose
importance has changed. Consistency in estimation can be
maintained by carrying out the quantification techniques on
a sample of the information collected. The lower the
accuracy of estimates the greater the sample size needs to
be. Such a problem of inaccurate estimates may be overcome
by improved training for the information value setter. The
inaccurate estimates may of course be due to high varia-
bility within the business concerned.
The use of groups may improve the estimates and the help of
a group may improve the estimation abilities of individuals.
Also to supplement the information value framework and to
keep it up to date it may be necessary to carry out att-
itude surveys on existing ongoing information to ensure it
is maintaining the value associated with it. This total
process of valuation will work well for the majority of
management information.
For some information, managers will not estimate a value
or they may not feel confident of estimates made. In such
cases a list of benefits accruing from the information
should be made in place of the valuation.
STAGE 3. Determination of Management Infor~ation Cost.
The next stage in the methodology is to determine the cost
of the management information. In some cases this stage
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may be carried out before stage two, the valuation. This
will be when the cost is required at the initialisation
stage of the estimation heuristics. The detail of costing
management information has been dealt with elsewhere and so
only the general approach will be considered here. The cost
of the information can be determined in the following way.
a) List all the resources required to produce the
information.
b) Cost the resources using cost accountancy prin-
ciples using either full costs or marginal costs
depending on the case.
c) Determine 'an opportunity cost' if applicable.
This cost will be a surplus in value of an alter-
native piece of information not already produced
that could be produced with the resources being
considered i.e. that more attractive opportunity
foregone.
d) To arrive at a Total Cost the cost calculated in
b) should be added to an opportunity cost if there
is one.
e) If the Total Cost will be incurred over quite a
long time scale then the costs should be discounted
to bring them into line with returns and values
used elsewhere.
The cost of information can be used to produce a separate
list or better still the costs can be added to the infor-
mation value framework making it an information value and
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cost framework. Before leaving cost of information it is
worth noting that because of technological change (espec-
ially the silicon chip) automated information processing
costs are falling and look set to continue falling. This
fall is occuring in both actual and real terms. Such a
fall in costs will affect the work of costing in that it
will make opportunity costs more important. If more and
more information becomes economic to produce it becomes very
important to ensure that the information with the greatest
value is collected, produced and ~ first. Opportunity
cost will show whether this is being carried out.
STAGE 4. Cost Benefit Analysis of Management Information.
There will be three parts to the cost benefit analysis of
management information although two of these parts will
have been carried out within stages two and three. The
parts are:
a) Determine the cost. The cost of the management
information will have already been determined within
stage three.
b) Determine the valueo A numeric value for the
value of the majority of management information
will have been produced in stage two. In the case
where information does not have a very precise
value or where management are reluctant to set a
value on it, a list of benefits will have been
produced during stage two.
c) Compare cost and value. The previously determined
cost and value will be compared and provided the
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value is greater than or equal to the cost then
information will be considered worth producing.
In the cases of information with an estimate of
value which is considered imprecise or where man-
agement are reluctant to place a value on it, (i.e.
the information which at stage two had a list of
benefits produced for it) , the list of benefits
will be considered in relation to the cost. Pro-
vided that management considers the benefits will
exceed the cost the information will be considered
worth producing.
It must be remembered that the procedure for management
information cost-benefit analysis does not automatically
take the decision as to whether a piece of information
should be produced. This decision must rest with the man-
ager or managers requiring the information, and therefore
it must be possible to override the procedure so that man-
agers can take account of non-quantifiable factors affecting
the decision to produce the information or not.
Whichever method of setting a value for information is used
one or more of the following six factors needs to be taken
into account.
1) TIME:- the speed at which the information can be
obtained and is required.
2) KNOWLEDGE:- the knowledge level of the recipient/s
of the information.
3) PRIOR INfORMATION:- the amount and type of other
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information that is available to assist with the
decision the piece of information is to be used
for.
4) ACCURACY:- the accuracy of the information (this
may be subjective dependent on personality)o
5) QUANTITY:- the size of the piece of information
or the amount of information available for a
particular decision.
6) POWER:- information can be closely linked to
power and as a result this may enhance the value
of the information to the individual but not nec-
essarily to the organisation.
Along with these six factors the information analyst and
manager should be aware of the following pitfalls which
should be avoided. The empirical studies carried out
emphasise the need to avoid some of these pitfalls.
1. Information systems are not solely concerned with
computers.
2. There is a significant difference between data and
information.
3. More data in reports does not mean more information
for managers.
4. Where possible all information should be cost-
justified which requires a value and cost to be
attributed to it.
5. Any increase in the speed at which information is
provided needs to be justified.
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6. Absolute accuracy is not essential in every case
(it is impossible when the base data itself is not
accurat~. However, the degree of inaccuracy in
any information should be given along with that
information.
7. More frequent reporting does mean more information.
Again any increase in the frequency of reporting
must be justified.
8. The total integration into one corporate data base
should not be the aim of system designers. Integ-
ration and the formation of data bases should be
used only when they will be of advantage. This
will usually mean only partial integration, at
varying levels within the organisation and a series
of data bases.
9. The information needs of managers are very diffi-
cult to determine by interviewing due to the fact
that the majority of managers do not appear to know
their information requirements. It is really dan-
gerous for systems designers to decide managers'
information needs themselves as few have experience
of management. However, with a combination of
various techniques and a reasonable approach a
realistic estimate can be made to determine the
information needs of the manager.
10. The provision of 'correct' information is not
necessarily going to produce good management. The
manager's managerial skills and abilities may need
to be developed so he can take full advantage of
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the information provided. It is however arguable
that information should not-be provided until the
manager has been trained to use it.
11. The provision of communication mechanisms does not
by itself mean that communications within an org-
anisation will improve. The behavioral problems
will also have to be dealt with.
12. The managers who are receiving information from
an information system should have sufficient
knowledge of the system to be in control. The
information system should be run to serve the
organisation and not vice-versa. This statement
assumes a high level of competence on the part of
individual managers and in many organisations
considerable staff development would be necessary
to achieve this.
I would not presume to suggest that the methodology given
in this study will solve all the problems associated with
the economic appraisal of management information. However,
I do believe that most of the major problems in such an
appraisal have been considered and solutions put forward.
This work should be considered a beginning since there is
still work to be carried out in certain areas. for example
the author intends to extend the research into the area of
the production of training packages based on programmed
learning and taking advantage of micro-computer technology
to develop the skills of management in the estimation of
information value.
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